NAVAL POLICY.

Hokitika Guardian, 23 August 1921, Page 4

NAVAL POLICY.

statement to commons. “temporarylnferiority reliance on personnel. LONDON, August 3. In th o House of Commons, speaking on the Navy Estimates, LieutenantColonel L. C. IM. S. Amery. Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, stated that the question of the desirability of building capital ships or concentrating on submarines and aeroplanes had been most anxiously and most searchingly investigated by the Admiralty and a sub-committee of the Imperial Defence Committee. Nothing had emerged from these deliberations to change the general and universally accepted conclusion that the capital ship was still the basis , of sea power. The. naval baitics of the ; war had indisputably proved the i.v>mence advantage of the larger and more powerful ships. | The submarine was very formidable, and had come to stay; but its powe*' i lay in its concealment, for which it nad i to sacrifice speed. Its offensive and defensive power and its power of con- ; cealment were very scroiusly impaired ! by the remarkable progress made in the ; closing months of the war in scientific measures against submarines, i ‘ - The aeroplane lias become an indU i pensable factor in naval warfare, i>D i Amery proceeded, ‘‘but it was not yet : capable of carrying or discharging aci ciirately at moving objects projectiles j more formidable than those against | which the modern capital sluo was already protected. Its range was very limited, and, except for inshore warfare, it depended upon an aeroplane carried. All new elements in naval war had acquired an increased relative importance. The fighting fleet of the fu tore could no longer ho regarded simply in terms of ships of the line. naval strength of other powers. The Imperial Defence Committee had approved of the policy of laying down four capital ships, which solely was a policy of replacing scrapped ships. It ! was the relentless pressure of the Grand j Fleet which finally brought down the ! Central Empires, but that fleet now wn« i largely obsolete. Tim few hours’ fighti ing at Jutland had revolutionised ideas I of armament and battleship design. Hie j lessons of that fighting had been open | to the whole world, and others Powers i had not been slow to use them. They • were constructing at present whole battle fleets incomparably more powerful than anything afloat at Jutland. Japan was constructing eight battleships. One was already completed, and the others would he completed by 19” She had voted money for eight mor to be completed by 1028. The United States was not. counting ion four battleships of 32,000 tons, | equipped with Ifiin. guns which wore tar more powerful than our latest types . There would ho completed for the I 'nited States by the end of 102-1 no fewer than 12 supreme engines of war, each of 43,000 tons. Therefore, as regarded Japan and the United States. I Britain was dealing with ships actually ; being constructed. Yet the British Navy : had only one post-Jutland ship, namely, the Hood, building, and equipped . merely with loin guns. Therefore the j programme for replacing four obsolete | ships to be completed by 1925 did not foiitaiu ally element of challenge oi provocation. On the contrary, the Government was allowing the Navy temporarily to ho inferior to other navies, which risk was justified only by the international and financial situation, arid the desirahifity 'of avoiding any step inviting fresh competition upon the o\ c of tlm Washington Conference, which would meet with a view to ascertaining who ther 1> V broad agreements the policy in future of ever-increasing competition could he prevented. But it was unlikely that other Powers at the conference would oiler to scrap the ships building. Therefore the proposed British construction could not alfeet the problem before the conference. Britain’s policy was one of gradual replacement within the narrowest limits, and postponed to the latest date which the safety of the Empire, permitted. FOUR NEW CAPITAL SHIPS. Colonel Amery emphasised that risks could only be taken because, owing to unique war experience, in personnel Britain would be well ahead of other Powers for the next few years. The very existence of the Empire was completely staked upon the high morale and professional efficiency of the Navy, which could not be sustained indefinitely on obsolete ships. It was proposed to build four battleships of the Hood type, with improvements ia protection and armaments embodying the experience of the war. The new ships of Japan and Hie United States were being armed with Ifiin, guns. Britain’s new ships would be similarly armed, but the dimensions of the ships would not necessitate larger docks. The idea luvd been merely to furnish modern ships, in which tin personnel of the Navy and the Empire, whose existence might depend thereon, had every right to feel confidence. Mr Winston Churchill, Secretary for the Colonies, concluded tile debate, after which the vote was agreed to. lie urged eloquently that Britain should maintain herself as a first-class sea power and asked: “What would the Dominions say if we were to say, ‘We cannot guard you—we cannot any longer extend the protection which it hitherto has always been our proud boast to supply?’ ” Britain has never Mr Winston Churchill declared, said that yet, and lie trusted that she never should he reduced to such a position. ONE-POWER FORTH! I,A CRITICISED. The “Times” in a leading article, attributes the nebulous atmosphere of the discussions by the Dominion representatives on a common naval policy, for the British States to the impossibility for firm discussions wnon disarmament is in the distance. “In these circumstances,” says the “Times,” “it is most essential that the Admiralty should disclose the basis of its naval policy, and it is hoped that tin's will be based on the one condition of the security of the British people. “The one-Power standard is an obsolete and provocative shibboleth, suggestive of renewed competition in armaments which will not be tolerated by

the Dominions, and the • Admiralty i would he well advised to repudiate it. j In Britain and the Dominions public i opinion is impatient of the control of, naval policy by pre-war ideas and is unwilling to acquiesce in the assumption that security depends >n at least equality with any other Power. “The Admiralty must judge what is necessary for security. We do not question in this respect its decision to build four new battleships in England, but the time is approaching when the question will arise of what shall constitute the test of security. The prewar formula that strength lkc in battleships has been shaken, but not superseded. The Admiralty still has faith in such ships, but doubts of the justification of such a faith persists, and sooner or later the Admiralty will have ■eriously to consider them.”