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Hokitika Guardian, 29 July 1921, Page 2

Mu Bywatkh proceeds to examine the naval armaments of the two nations. America has an ambitious programme of 'construction, but it cannot mature for some years Meanwhile she is woe-

fully deficient in battle cruisers and modern light eruisdrs —two indispensable types of craft. Battle cruisers are building, they are of a, new design and their value is somewhat problematical. American docks ore neither large enough nor numerous enough. The s'mrlage of pel sound is very serious; at the beginning of this year, despite payment oi bonuses tu imbue men to stay in or enlist in the navy, it was 30.000 below the authorised total. The Pacific Fleet is inferior to the Japanese Fleet, and though the Panama Canal would enable if to be joined in a few weeks b.v the Atlantic Fleet, experience has shown that no force can attain a liioh degree of efficiency unless it has had a long course of training and manoeuvring under a single command. Japan, oil the other hand, sutlers fiom no lack of personnel; the entire navy could be mobilised without seriously ib ’ pie ting the first class of reservists, gho is well equipped in battle cruisers, amf indeed in every type of ciatt. She has adequate bases. I|> to this 1 point Mr By water’s reasoning would suggest that war lxl-wecn America and Japan is inevitable, Japan has various

powerful incentives to challenge America within the next few years; her

existing superiority in the Pacific would seem to promise her success before America could gather her strength.

But now we are shown the other side

of the picture—a aide. which places Japan’s prospects in a less favourable

light. Suppose that Japan threw down the gauntlet. She could strike silently and swiftly and would undoubtedly

gain some initial advantages. Both Guam and the Phillipplnes would fail an easy prey. Phis would be a grave 4 view to America, anil there are Japanese who think that at this stage Am-

erica would despair of retrieving tin

.situation, and would negotiate for peace. Mr Bywater, however, believes that it is inconceivable that America would own

defeat at the very outset of the war. and there would ensue a long and hit-

ter struggle over the vast sea spaces,

which would tax each country grievously and might end in a stalemate. But if Guam were fortified, it could he

made impregnable quickly and at a

comparatively small cost- the story would be very different. Japan’s defeat. would be assured from the begin-

ning Japan cannot feed herself nowa-

days. and with the concentration of tin* American Fleet in Asiatic waters

a blockade would gradually starve her into a- submission which would he accompanied lily revolution. *Mr Bvwater will not admit that war is inevitable. America is not likely to precipitate it, while “Japan has cverythng to lose and nothing to gain bv a policy of aggressiveness.” Japan’s development can best be assured by peace. She has on the mainland certain legitimate special interests which no one challenges; and it is there, if anywhere, that she can fulfil her true destinv “There is plenty of room in China for all legitimate interests,” and if Japan would adopt a policy of conciliation and genuine friendship with the Chinese peoples “she would eventually acquire

in that quarter a predominance which • could never be seriously contested. It remains to be seen whether her rulers and statesmen have sufficient acumen to seize the unique opportunity thus presented to them instead of hazarding the fortunes of Dai Nippon in a military gamble more reckless even than that which caused the ruin of the German Empire.” I