Russian Communism.

Hokitika Guardian, 16 July 1921, Page 4

Russian Communism.

ANARCHY, OR ANOTHER AVAR ? j

(By Tom Skeyhill). If the Communist Government in Moscow suddenly collapses Russia will fall to pieces as completely as a, barrel with the hoops knocked off. Then what will happen? Either she will Balkanise into a lor of little principalities and go up in the consuming.flames of anarchy, with every man’s hand raised against his neighbour’s, with Gentiles pogroming Jews, with Cone munists massacring capitalists, with the mines filling with water, the fields wasting in fallow, and the railroads crumbling in rust —until in an incredibly short time she will have receded into the darkness of the Middle Ages, and so receding render inaccessible to starving Europe all her rich sources of cheap raw materials—or she will be a vacuum into which Europe will he sucked. Poland will annex the Ukraine, Japan will claim Eastern Siberia, Turkey will seize Turkestan, the Baltic republics will plunder the north-east corner, and Germany and France will indubitably stick their fingers in the pie. They will all quarrel over the spoils; and then there will be another wa r.

J say this in all seriousness, after j having spent several months in and j around Soviet Russia. Tn those several months 1 not only met and conversed with intelligent members of the different social stratns in Soviet Russia, but r also had the privilege of long audiences with the Prime Ministers of Latvia and Estihonia, with a high official of the Polish general staff, and with numerous other European statesmen who arc extraordinarily familiar with every thread in the tangled skein of present European politics. This lias given me a unique opportunity of soaking myself on the evolving life of Russia, and in that of those other European nations whose destinies are inseparably dovetailed into that of the once great Slav Empire.

This first-hand knowledge, tins intimacy with the complex problem, has changed, aye almost inverted, my early views. Before 1 went out to Central Europe I believed, a s so many millions til other people believed, that the C ommunists were the scum of the earth, and ought to be wiped out at any cost. How this was to be accomplished 1 was not quite clear, although I had ratliei hazy ideas of military intervention on llie'part of the Allies, of economic poneiration, of the assassination of Lenin, or of an internal counter-revolution. Had 1 not gone out to Russia. I would in all probability still lie thinking along these lines; but now that I have been out 1 think diiferently. I think differently because I believe that hot one of these four weapons—military intervention. economic penetration, the assassination of Lenin, or counter-revolution could be successfully employed against Communism; mure than that, I Jiniily believe that they would help rather than hurt the cause of the Reds.

.Military intervention would have been .■!!(•( c-ssful three years ago. but not Inlay. for Kolchak’s, AYrangel’s. and Reiiikon’s attempts to restore the monarchy, and Georgia’s, Poland’s, and the Puttie Republic's efforts to break Russia up piecemeal, have aroused the indignation of the Russians to such a uiicli that they have Hocked to the banner ul Trotsky, and have hacked him with such a moral and physical force dial lie has experienced but little ditlicnlty iii routing the enemy un all fronts. To-day there are 7.000,0(10 Russians other in tho field or in reserve; they are not Reds -they are simply patriotic Russians who object to the dismemberment of their country, and to the ellorts of adventurers to resurrect the rotten old system of the past. True, a certain percentage are conscripts: they light hard, nevertheless —they have to, for their parents and friends are held as hostages for the conduct undei fiio. Europe lias no army with which she rould successfully attack this force. Even if, for argument’s sake, we say that one "White is as good us two Reds., that still leaves an army of three and a half million men to he raised ; where are they to come from? America will not contribute a single unit; Ivrivisit labour will not allow John Bui 1 to send one soldier; and Germany is too afraid of France’s predatory spirit to he of any material assistance. This leaves France, Italy, and the minor Powers. Between them they could not possibly raise an adequate army ; and so, no matter which way wo look at it. military intervention is unthinkable. Nor has “economic penetration am greater chance of success ; Lenin is not fool enough to throw Russia wide open at present to tiif agents ol the ( ounierrevolutionaries or to the envoys of Western thought. All trading uit : Russia for the next few years will he done either collectively through the Communist party or by means o[ isolated and far removed mining, oil. limber, and fishing concessions. Counterrevolutions from within may succeed, but 1 am very, very doubtiul; for bread . is the sceptre in Russia to-day, and Lenin has the bread ; and the moment a revolt starts, all fie lias to do is to surround the revolting centre, isolate it, and then starve the rebels into submis-

The assassination of Lenin would ho a colossal tragedy, for it would make a martyr of him, and even il Communism collapsed with his death, it would soon appear again, and again. Discontented working men the world over would periodically resurrect him from the grave and start again where he was forced to leave ofT. To martyr a cause, or the hauler of a cause, is to perpetuate it. And so the finest way to establish Leninism would he t° assassinate Lenin or to overthrow him by force. Eliminating these lour weapons as impracticable, we approach the three remaining solutions, or possible solutions, of the problem—-either the Communists will succeed, or fail, or luodily their method and ideas ol government. The first of these solutions—that they wifi succeed —wo may at once dismiss as absurd. Three years of experimenting have proven conclusively that Communism, although ideal in theory, is impossible in practice. While man is man some men will have more of this world’s goods than others-; and who is to sav that this should not he, for

surely if a man works more- and saves more than his neighbour, then he is rightly entitled to more wealth than

• that neighbour. The toiler should be * more rielilv rewarded than the idler,

and the saver than the squanderer. Deny this and you take away the incentive to produce and save. Russia’s deplorable condition to-day is a living monument to the truth of these assertions. The peasants will not produce above what they receive for their own consumption; for they know that i: they do, the surplus will he taken away from them. At the same time, the labourer reasons if all men, slackers ami workers alike, are to be equally rewarded, why, then, should he wear himself out, why should he not take things easy and have a good time? And so the peasant does now sow, the worker lies down on his job, and the result is starvation and death for the masses. Thus, if the Communists stick to their impossible theories, it. is not a question ol “will they collapse.” but ot “how much longer will it be before they collapse.'” Now, provided thi' collapse is not brought about by to reft, and also provided it does not occur too suddenly, it •would be an acceptable solution of the impossible and altogether deploraole situation ; for if the Communist party, after three and a half years in office, collapses through the impracticability of Communism, then surely Communism will die for ever, lint, as I have previously pointed out, there is the danger of this collapse occurring too suddenly and before we have another 5 form of central authority to take its I oinoe; and so, tempting as it is to 1 leave the Communists tn stew in their j own juice, it is nevertheless inadvisable i for it is risking anarchy or another ! world war.

This brings us to die final, and in my opinion to the very best solution of Communism in Russia, and tor that matter in the world. There must he a modification by Lenin of bis whole idea of government. Lenin started this experiment, and Lenin must finish it. It lit' fails to do so, then it will finish |.liii. He has no third cause ; either he stubbornly, blindly sticks to Communism, and sticking to it hurls himself, and Russia, and maybe Europe back into barbarism, or else lie repudiates his former doctrines and moves to the Right until he succeeds in steering the ramshackle Russian ship ol State into J:c placid waters of decency and democracy, outside of which there is no port unless it is that of darkness. 1 believe that lie realises this at last, and that even now lie is ready to reform,and by reform I mean he is prepared to abandon his ideas of world revolution and overthrow ot capital, and is even icady to recognise Russia’s original gold debt, to indemnify the foreign investors lie robbed, and purify the Soviet system of government. I hast' this belief of italic, tb.it lie will move to the Right, on the tone of hi" recent speeches, and ■ n (lie conciliatory attitude lie has adopted in his trade negotiations with England. They all show a maiked leaning toward conservatism. Rot Lenin alone • -;i 11 not scrap Communism. He can repudiate it, is true.

but he cannot abandon it until he "ins

over ;i majority of bis followers : and tliai is going to lie no easy matter. He Ims loaded Trotsky, Bukharin, Zinovied’, and some of the other extremists, •■chock-full” of his early ideas of “overthrow of capital,” “world revolution,” “dictatorship of the proletariat, etc., and now lie is going to have a “deal o’ a time” unloading them. This is where the responsible government* of the world can take up the game. If 1 1 jo s' let Lenin know that they will recognise Ids government do facto, and later do jure, provided lie abandons Communism, and makes the necessary reforms, then he can go to his colleagues,- and win them over to the Right witli this fascinating bait of world recognition.- -Sydney Paper.