America and Disarmament

Hokitika Guardian, 22 June 1921, Page 2

America and Disarmament

AUSTRALIAN AND N.Z. CABLE ASSOCIATION. LONDON, June 20. The London Times states that the New York Times Washington correspondent deals fully with the broader aspects of the attitude of tlie Harding administration towards the limitation of armaments. He says; “Firstly, it is not believed that the present moment is a propitious„one for a Conference of all the Powers to discuss disarmament, because such a Conference could not b e completely representative. This is owing also to the political indecision existing now in many countries, especially those of Europe. Secondly, the British Empire, America and Japan have a virtual monopoly of naval power, thus making an arrangement between them theoretically possible, and also desirable in the interests of world peare. Thirdly, tlie Harding Administration favours an- agreement on naval limitations by these three Powers. Fourthly, any formal ‘ Conference should not be called until an agreement is assured previously by informal conversations aiming at the discovery of an acceptable formula. A fifth aspect may be added, namely, that the U.S. Administration hopes the British Imperial Conference will help to create a situation in which informal conversations may proceed with a fair hope of success. President Harding and his advisers, are convinced a disarmament conference would certainly reach a deadlock unless every conceivable difficulty were smothered over in advance. Each country would find it practically impossible to recede from a position once taken up ,without tlie risk of causing a domestic outcry. If a general conference of the world Powers failed, it would only cause disappointment, whereas if the British Empire America and Japan covertly tried to find a common basis, and failed, it would carry certain implications of policy and national intentions which would strain re’ations dangerously, and do indefinite harm: While America accepts a conference restricted to certain Powers, we may be sure a basis of agreement has already been found. Hence the importance of applying a financial formula'to naval strength. But in the highest quarters intimate with the U.S. Administration’s feelers this has produced little apparent result. Britain’s readiness to confer, eve<i informally, was not expected until the Imperial Conference had an opportunity to discuss the broad lines of the Empire’s naval policy.