THE MAKING OF A SOLDIER.

Hokitika Guardian, 20 May 1921, Page 3

THE MAKING OF A SOLDIER.

INTERESTING REMARKS BY GENERAL RUSSELL.

WELLINGTON, May 17

A very interesting' lecture, not all of which it is permissable to report, was delivered by Major-General Sir Andrew Russell to service officers here last night. Sir Andrew lias an interesting and an original, way of putting things, and what lie says on military subjects, and indeed on many other matters, is always well worth listening to. Quite original, for instance, was his comments upon “fear,” and one might infer from them that there were one or two rare instances in which even certain of the New Zealanders had “got the wind up.” “Fear,” he said, “is in its initial stage an excitement; in the second silage it is depressing; in the third stage it becomes panic, under which men act stupidly. You all know of cases of birds being paralysed with fear, and have heard of people being so. In the second and third stages it becomes very much more difficult for the will-power to assert itself. No troops were ever free from the risk of panic, and they were more liable to it stationary than when moving. It was curious the fueling that came over one when there was a sudden rush of men without any apparent reason. I remember one such occasion in France. One good remedy I found was to take three deep breaths and toll yourself not to be a fool. When-you have done that you will probably find that your feeling of panic is over, that there is nothing in the incident, and that you have correctly diagnosed the whole thing.” The title of the General’s chat was “The Making of a Soldier.” and dis % coursing on the question of training, lie said one of its important objects was the development of certain instincts of reflex actions, so that even under stress of emotion men would do the right thing. It was incorrect to sav that military training made an automaton of a man. The training taught a man to do certain necessary things instinctively, and thus kept his mind free to receive the impressions and the* orders of the moment. It failed il it did not teach men to think for themselves. The General proceeded to point out that fatigue was a potent cause of inefficiency. Correct training reduced fatigue, since it was a fact that the will tended to tire more quickly than the muscles. A company or a regiment might be regarded as a reservoir containing'a certain quantity of torcc. The commanding officer had that quan-

tity of force to draw upon and no more. Ho must not spare-his men in the field when the moment came for decisive action, Imt, until that moment arrived, lie should grudge every drop of sweat, because it, meant that the reservoir was being diminished. Unnecessary exertion in the field was often the result of neglect or inexperience. Troops would accept necessary exertion, Imt they found it harder to accept unnecessary exertion, and that meant loss of confidence in their unit and themselves. Fatigue, said General Russell, was a complex study which had to receive the attention of the commandin,, officer in war. The muscles, the assimilative organs, the will, and tin brain had their own types of fatigue. The question of how much could l>u taken out of the men without unduly lowering their recuperative capacity was often very difficult to answer. Here mem Ire red that, on the Somme, in 1916, the New Zealand 'troops were in the line for twenty-three days, and during that time had a fair amount of fighting. He had argued at the time that it'"was better for the men to have a. loiiu rest than to have merely a few flays in the line, a short rest, and then another spell of fighting. The conditions of the Somme made getting iu and out of the line a wearing and dangerous business and he bad felt that struggling backwards and forwards t<x>k as much out of the men as staying m the line. But this problem of fatigue al-. wavs required careful consideration. If a commander took too much out of his troops, and allowed them to fall below a certain point, they would take a long time to recuperate. He would not hasten his journey’s end by making the , puce too severe. If » commander wanted n I,if, result lie must not allow supreme fatigue to intervene. When troops had reached the stage of exhaustion, physical rest was not enough ; tlu\\ required mental and moral rest as well. The commanding officer had to remember in this connexion that waifare meant a conflict, not merely of material forces, but of moral and will

power. There was a hint in one part ot the (Jenernl’s lecture about the moral effect of tanks. We all know how the British tanks destroyed the moral ot some of the German regiments. The German tanks were not so effective noi nearly so numerous as the British tanks, but the New Zealanders had one experience of them late in th e war. Referring to tliis, General Russell said lie had been very glad 'that the German tanks were not more numerous on the day tho New Zealanders first met them. The troops met them and got the best of them, hut he personally had been pleased that there were no more. bo misled by those people who think that initiative can take the place of discipline,” said the General. “Don’t imagine that, becaus 0 you make a man a good soldier, that you have destroyed his power of initiative. You 1mv 0 been a very had instructor if you have done that.” He added that the intelligence of the New Zealand soldiers meant a special demand for efficiency oil tho part of officers. The New Zealand officer must have some other claim than the insignia of rank on the obedience of his men. fie must be a good man to follow, and a good man to lead.