Forbiden Book

Hokitika Guardian, 30 March 1921, Page 1

Forbiden Book

BISMARCK’S MEMOIRS

EX-KAISER AND THE MILITARISTS.

LONDON, March 2G

The forbidden third volume of Bismarck’s Memoirs, which is on the eve of publication, discloses ample reasons for the ex-Kaiser’s anxiety that it should not see the light of day. Tin* volume vividly demonstrates the ex-Kaiser’s leanings towards war, both before and immediately after he attained the throne. Bismarck realised, even when the elder Wilhelm was still alive, the ill-effects that the military society of Potsdam wer 0 exercising on the young man’s character, hut the stinginess of the Imperial Household defeated his efforts to transfer the I’rinee to Berlin.

When he was twenty-seven the Prince

applied for, and was granted access to the Foreign Office documents, despite his father’s strong disapproval. Frederick wrote: “Considering, tho unripeness and inexperience of my son, with his vanity, presumption, and overweening self-estimation, it is dangerous as yet, to bring him into touch with foreign affairs.” Notwithstanding the extension of this privilege. Bismarck was chagrined to find Wilhelm ascend the throne without any impressions of the internal lif,> of Germany other than those afforded by regimental life. Whilte his grandfather and father were both alive, the Prince drew up a brief proclamation “to my future col-1 leagues .the princes of the German Empire,” embodying bis views on their mutual relations, which he conceitedly affirmed were very different from I 1: father's. Wilhelm requested that sealed copies of this document he deposited in the legations of the various German courts, but Bismarck, struck by the folly and indecency of the proceedings advised him to burn them without delay. Wilhelm, nevertheless, contrived to convey the impression to the minor court's that his father’s views were strep than his own,

Wilhelm'? first hint of his “mailed fist” predilections was given a month or two before reaching the throne. He wrote a letter which showed how fully the Prussian militarists of 1888 anticipated the views and plans of their successors in 1914. and how thoroughly they permeated th,, man launching the world war. The miltnrists considered tin' moment favourable for attacking Russia, and. writes Bismarck, “claiming for the General Staff a more powerful influence over Imperial politics, Wilhelm considered that the German and Austrian military authorities snould have been called to attention in autumn Inst year, when a favourable military opportunity for warlike procedure tlien offered itself to both countries.” The opportunity did not come till twenty five years later.

Another remarkable pronounc.emeitt made at th 0 same time by the future Emperor lias a benrinag on Russia’s position to-day. He foresaw that Russia, after a unsuccessful war, could fall as the result of critical internal trouble into quite a. different state of impotence than it was likely would happen in the ease of any other European State.