THE NAVY IN THE GREAT WAR.

Hokitika Guardian, 12 March 1921, Page 4

THE NAVY IN THE GREAT WAR.

•Sir Henry Newbolt Has exceptional c qualifications for the task of writing 1 “A Naval History of the War.” No one f among contemporary authors is a more ) faithful interpreter of Britain’s national ] sentiment for the sea, and no one .has . celebrated with greater eloquence the , exploits of British sailors living or dead. |.„ a preface Sir Henry Newbolt pays a tribute to Sir Julian Corbett’s official history of naval operations, but suggests that simply because the latter is official there is room for one which can present the unofficial point of view. An official historian is to some extent trammelled; “an official account, even though it be an excellent scientific study, cannot be in the fullest sense a personal expression,” and m this book, especially when dealing with the broader aspects of the war, -ii Henry Newbolt strikes a strongly individual note. The earlier part is u voted to a consideration of the imponderabilia. lie envisages the war as a tremendous and mortal conflict 1h tween two ideas of life. “After seeing I the two conceptions illustrated upon a gigantic scale, the judgment of mankind appears to .have reaffirmed the old code of humanity and chivalry, and condemned the new philosophy of Might and the new method of Fright fulness. ’ He holds that temperament was a decisive factor in the victory, and analyses the essential differences between the British and the German temperament, showing how the latter was not equal to the cumulative strain of those searching years. .Sir Henry Newbolt also discusses British and Gorman naval policy prior to the war, and, here again, notes a profound contrast, the results ot which became manifest during the war. British policy was, so to speak, negative; it was general and defensive ! 'l s !, im was not to attack a particular enemy, but to repel an aggressor, whoever he might be. and whenever he might arise. Hence it was more elastic, better able to cope with unforeseen developments. Of course, this argument' must not he pushed too far. Britain's naval construction ami dispositions have been governed by the construction and ilis- , positions of this or the other foreign j Power, which seemed likely to threaten j her safety, while flexible and far- j sighted as her policy has been, il has i not always made adequate piovision tor the event. British naval experts, lor j instance, did not anticipate that the submarine would be so cfleetivo a weapon; neither, for.the matter ol that, did the German experts, and their failure to do so proved singularly lor- j lunate for Britain. But Fir llcmy Xewliolt’s contention is that British naval policy before the war was not offensive, and that being defensive, it was mine readily adaptable to circumstance.',. German policy on the other hand was "narrowed to t’: • achievement ol a particular and transitory object, it was aggressive, lawless, and ; predatory.” In August, It 11, a- the stage was not set according to Gelninny’s pnconceived notions, it broke, down altogether. "Germany began the i war without a naval policy, and carried it on, under the ordeis ol the army j command, by a scries ol nesperato ex-j peiiments. which wore tiioiii-sehes the -subject of continual ami chaotic diiler- , cnees of opinion between admirals, generals, and politii inns, embarrassed j bs 1 the histrionic activities ol the Kaiser. Bv one ilieuiy a policy of raids would weai away the supci unity ol the ! Grand Fleet ; but the superiority incieased out ol all proportion. Another hope lay in the depredations of last ; cruisers on tlie British commerce that covered the seven seas; but in lour mouths the last of those cruisers had been sunk. The submarine attack on warships began with one or two successes, but immediately lapsed into complete impotence. The F boats were then turned against mu merchant service, lint this use oi the submarine bad not been foreseen; tlu* 2i boats with which Germany begun the war proved utterly insufficient. The high Sen Meet then attempted an attack upon our light forces. It met the Grand Fleet and resolved never to meet il again. Alter this an unrestricted U-boat campaign against all the world, combatant and non-combatant, was resolved upon ; it failed to blockade England, but drew America into the war. And this, as the politicians, though not the militarists, could see, was indeed •Finis Germaniae.’ ” ; Tin* scheme of the book is a description of tlie various phases ol the operations as mentioned in the last paragraph. Sir Henry Newbolt supplements bis record of fact with general observations and expressions of opinion. Thus in bis review of tin* battle oil Coronel, he defends Admiral Cradock against criticisms which have from time to time been directed agaiast his action in engaging a force so much superior to ms own. It has been suggested that this battle was an imprudence on Outlook’s part, an error of judgment, even all act i of disobedience to orders. But alter a close examination of all the circumstances Sir Henry Newbolt is convinced that Cradock was completely justified in the course lie took, disastrous though it proved. The only alternative was to run away, and what would have been (lie moral effect of flight upon neutral South American States at this stage ol the war!-' No one lightly throws away liis life and the lives of so many ol his fellows. -Cradock was laced with a grave responsibility; lie thought that he had a lighting chance, and his decision was consistent with the finest traditions of the British Navy. In dealing with the battle ol .Jutland, Sir Henry Newbolt deovtes some space to a criticism of von Sclieer’s account. He convicts the German admiral of inaccuracy as regards facts, and of unwarrantable inferences. Von Sclieer exaggerates both the number of British units engaged in the battle and the losses sustained by the British ; further, he minimises the injuries suffered by the German ships. Several of the latter reached port only to remain in the dockyards for six months. During that period, for all the use they were as component parts of Germany’s naval strength, they might as well have been at the bottom of the sea. Von Scheer’s version, indeed, is not i history, but propaganda, “written i avowedly with an eye to the tut lire to create a legend.” Sir Henry Newbolt i also reviews the old controversy as to < whether Lord Jellicoe was right in f avoiding a night action with his capital c

ships. The author doubts very much whether the annihilation of the German fleet, even if it had been accomplished, would have appreciably hastened the end of the war. On the other question, , he recapitulates the various arguments for anil against, but docs not- commit himself to any very definite judgment, j He thinks that naval opinion will never , agree* on the subject; it is all a matter ; oF temperament. He quotes from the recently published account of the battle by Captain von Hose, commander of the Derfflinger. Von Hase claims that Jutland was a ‘'partial victory” for Germany, but admits that it profited her little, as it left the naval position absolutely unchanged. Moreover, he declares that Jellicoe’s strategy was correct in the circumstances. If he had continued to fight in the darkness he would inevitably have suffered further losses, far from his own base, and. no great distance from Hie guns of Heligoland. As it was, he was able to continue to maintain the strangle-hold on Germany without striking another blow. Germany was welcome to a ‘ victory,” which left every German sailor with the conviction that this must "lie the last appearance of the High Sea Fleet on open water.