A “DUG-OUT.”

Hokitika Guardian, 3 February 1921, Page 4

A “DUG-OUT.”

ON THE DARDANELLES

LONDON, Dec. 16*

In view of the strong lino taken by Sir Thomas -Mackenzie at the Dardanelles Inquiry, the following from Major-General Sir C. E. Callwell’s “Experiences of a Dug-out” is of interest. After explaining how, partly from paucity of secret service funds and partly because of difficulty in that district of obtaining military information in peace time, little information was available, he says:—

"It was made plain to me when giving evidence before the Commission that the Right Hon A. Fisher and Sir T. Mackenzie, its members representing the Antipodes, considered that there had been great neglect on the part of the War Office in obtaining information with regard to the environs of the Dardanelles in advance. But, quite apart from the peculiar situation created by the decision of the Committee of Imperial Defence, there must have been serious difficulties in obtaining such informaton about the Gallipoli Peninsula —only those who have had experience in such matters know how great the difficulties are. Intelligence service in peace time is a subject of which the average civilian does not understand the meaning nor realise tho dangers. The Commission, which included experts in such matters in the shape of Admiral Sir W. May and Lord Nicholson, made no comment on this point in its final report, evidently taking the broad view that the lack of information was, under all the»circumstances of the ease, excusable. In his special report, Sir T. Mackenzie, on the other hand, blames the Imperial General Staff for being ‘unprepared for operations against the Dardanelles and Bosphorus,’ obviously having the question of information in bis mind, as be must be perfectly well aware (Hat the planning of actual operations was just as much a matter for the Admiralty as for the General Staff, the whole problem being manifestly an amphibious one.

“As a matter of fact, considering the kind of place that the Gallipoli Peninsula was, and taking into consideration tho extreme jealousy with-which the Turks, quite properly from their point of view, had always regarded the appearance of strangers in that wellwatched region, the information contained in the secret official publications which the .Mediterranean Expeditionary Force took out with it was by no means to he despised. All but one of the landing places actually utilised on the famous 25th of April were, I think, designated in these booklets, and that one was unsuitable for landing anything but infantry. A great deal ot the information proved to he |>qrteotly correct, and it good deal more of if might have proved to he correct had the Expeditionary Force ever penetrated far enough into the interior of the Reninsuln to test it.”

Another subject which General Callwell discusses ill 1 1 is very interesting hook incidentally points out how very much on the spot the Japanese always are. He is discussing matters on the Eastern Frontier and he says:—-“There was much talk in the Press about the ‘steam-roller’ which was going to flatten the Central Powers out. We at the War Office had received warnings from our very well-informed Military Attache, it is true, but those warnings did not convey to us the full gravity of the position, a gravity which was probably not recognised even in high j daces in Russia for some time. Moreover, as far as we could judge, Paris had no idea that anything was seriously amiss beyond the \ istula, in spite of the Franco-Russiau alliance having been in force for some years.

“The first really alarming tidings on this subject that we received came to hand, oddly enough, from Japan ; and it bears testimony to the efficiency of our Far Eastern Ally’s intelligence service that the Island Empire should have been so intimately acquainted with the military conditions in a State with which it had been at war only a very few years before. This information reached us, I think, in October, 1914. But as far as T recollect that warning, inexorable as it was, only touched the question of ammunition. We were told plainly that the Russians were likely to run out of this indispensable at an early date; but the message did not mention rifles, although those already began to run short within eight months of the commencement of the struggle. How it came about that there should have been so deplorable a breakdown in respect to war material can only bo a matter of conjecture; but we may hazard a pretty shrewd guess that the collapse which was to lead to such deplorable results in the early summer of 1915 was attributable to graft on a Homeric scale. For the Russian army budgets had for several years before the war been framed on lavish lines; that for 1914, for instance, mounted up to 725,000,000 roubles, which represented a higher figure than the corresponding budgets in either Germany or France. General Sukhomlin off, the War Minister on the Neva from 1910 to 1915, was, as is well known, disgraced in the latter year, and he was tried for his life after the-Revolution.”