JUTLAND BATTLE

Hokitika Guardian, 20 December 1920, Page 1

JUTLAND BATTLE

PUBLICATION Ojf DESPATCHES

ausniAhiAN A n.z. cable association;

LONDON, Dec 17

Jutland official despatches with appendices, were issued to-day consisting of a volume of six hundred pages, with numerous maps ,charts, and diagrams. The reports ore most numerous, comprising one from every ship engaged. Lord Jellieoe, in a covering letter, dated Iron Duke, June Bth, 1916, directs attention to the number of lessons to be drawn from tho battle. He says when the Admiralty ordered tho Grand Fleet at Seapa to proceed to sea on May 30th, he ordered Admiral Beatty, whose ships were at Rosytli, to he at a certain spot in the North Sea at tyo in the afternoon of the 31st giving also his own probable position at that hour. If Admiral Beatty had no news at two o’clock, lie was to stand towards Jelli coc. Jellicoo says he had no anxiety about Beatty’s advanced position, owing to tin* gun power and speed of Beatty’s ships, but the German third squadron displayed unexpected speed. Though nomfhnily the British battle cruisers could do twenty-five knots and the Germans only 20. V, the former were unable to increase tlm distance from the Germans. This comes to us an unpleasant surprise and will considerably affect future operations. It is quite

evident that the German ships were much faster than their nominal speed. Beatty adopted the correct and only possible course in keeping between the enemy and his base, and by keeping in touch with the enemy lie bad a great superiority. LONDON, December 17. The letter proceeds: — l The loss of the Queen Mary and the Indefatigable was duo partly to tho indifferent armour of the British battle-cruisers and to a disadvantage as regards light, but the German gunnery was of - a very high standard. It falls off when they are hit, but even then it is very accurate. The German organisation at night time is very good, and their' recognition of

tlieir signals excellent, whereas ours is practically nil. We have a good deni to learn from them. The German tactics were, as anticipated. The enemy’s turning away movement, under cover of destroyers attacks, is difficult to counter. It has been closely studied, but there is no real counter, except ample time and superior speed. Thus a fight to a finish is almost impossible, unless |it begins early in the day. It would I he rendered even more difficult by mine j fields and submarines. A feature of the j action was the number of torpedoes which crossed the Britisli line. Only one ship was hit. It is supremely important not to let the enemy know that his torpedoes tracks are visible, because it would not bo beyond German ingenuity to prevent a by-track being left. Certain lessons were learnt as the result of dispositions and tactics. Interesting actions are devoted to many thousands of messages and signals between the ships before and after the battle. This shows the Admiralty received news on May 13th. indicating that there would be early activity on the part of the German fleet, and instructing Lords Jellieoe and Beatty to concentrate eastward of the long forties I ready for eventualities.

A 111 on n the signals stated is one which was much discussed, and which was sent from Beatty to Jeilieoe at seven' fortyseven on the evening of the 31st., and received seven minutes later: “Urgent —Submit van of battleships and follow battle-cruisers and we can then cut olf whole enemy’s battle fleet.” Jeilieoe at 8.14 ordered Jerrarn, commanding the second battle squadron to follow Beatty, but .Terrain at 8.45 reported the battle cruisers were not in sight. Another signal from the Flotilla Leader Faulkner, at 1.52 on the morning of June Ist. announced Jhat lie had sighted the enemy battle ships, giving their position, but the Iron. Duke (Jellicoe’s flagship) did not receive the message, which was probably jammed by the Germans. This is viewed by some almost as a tragedy, as Jellicoe’s battleships were then speeding southward to cut off Von Schecr and Faulkner’s message if received, might have prevented the enemy reaching home. It would have showed Jeilieoe that Von Schecr at about that time was crossing his track.

The critics arc busily reconstructing the events in the light of the signals There are two schools, still sharply divided. Some declare c.the signals uphold the previous contention that Jellicoe in turning away, lost the chance of a decisive victory. Others say that .Jeilieoe took a less spectacular, but a logical course, in avoiding torpedoes and they direct attention to the fact that Beatty did not signal before Jellicoe manoeuvred away, but half an hour later, and Jeilieoe completed the manoeuvre at 7.35.

A GERMAN CRITIC. LONDON, Dec. 19

Captain Von Hase, the Derflinger’s chief gunnery officer at the battle of Jutland in bis hook “Kiel and Jutland” which is shortly being published by Skeffington, admits that Jellicoe’s strategy was unimpeachable, and that the battle though indecisive, in no way impaired Britain's mastery of the seas.

COMMENT ON REPORT. (Deceived this day at 8 a.m.) LONDON, Dec. 19.

Lord Sydenham in interviews with Lloyd’s “Sunday News,-” suggests wo allowed tire Germans to deceive us over the battle cruisers speed just as earlier, they did over their census. The German fleet had one definite purpose, to light us in the North Sea. The Kaiser could, therefore, build ships cut into sections for better protection on the watertight system, creating such diihculties relating to restricted crew space, internal communication and dts-

cipiiue, that, oceaii going battleships like ours were unable to follow their model. The Germans had certain advantages in speed, fire, direction, night communication and other technical devices. Then why should they go home. They went because tlieir seamen were not as good as the ships they sailed. This one hammering knocked the fighting spirit out of them, Von Selieer could not subsequently trust tjie moral of. his own sailors. Ip their position British Tars would have hung on like grim depth- So the Jutland sacrifice wps well worth while. The lessons of the battle show the gun is still supreme. The torpedo wps as disappointing in a fleet action as it proved in tjio RussoJapanese war. Thirdly, tho officers must give more careful study to strategy and tactics, fourthly, not all the technical science in the worjd can supply the place of the born seaman. The future will see the battle cruiser disappear, and the battleship and destroyer will fight big actions. Cruisers will scout and sweep t)ie seas, but men will count for everything, everytime. PRESS VIEW. (Received This Day at 8.40 a.m.) LONDON, Dec. 18. The “Times” in a leader, declares the Jutland report will not help in dissipating the impression that it was a British reverse. The report is too vol-' uminous and too mechanical to command public understanding. The only result .may bo to add fresh fuel to fan the flames of those interested in the controversy.