NAVAL "HUSH-HUSH."

Hokitika Guardian, 18 December 1920, Page 4

NAVAL "HUSH-HUSH."

I (By If. W. Wilson), j It is a great misfortune that the pre- , sent Admiralty is maintaining the “hush-hush” policy as to what happened in. tile battle of Jutland instead of promptly publishing all the available evidence and documents in the shape of logs and signals. The public is not concerned in the personal dispute between Earl Beatty and Lord Jellicoe, but in a vital issue of naval defence. For .if the tactics employed by Lord Jellicoe were sound, and if the escape of the German fleet. whic.li was their consequence, was inevitable, then it is difficult to see why ivo should maiiftain squadrons of battleships and battle-cruisers. In that battle the British advantage in gun power was greater than any adpiiral had previously possessed in any serious naval engagement. If it produced little or no result, then either it \vas not satisfactorily employed or else it is useless. The great problem before British admirals in the days of sail was to attack promptly and decisively with a large fleet. Nelson’s famous Trafalgar order opens with the words, “Thinking it almost impossible to bring a fleet of 40 sail of flic line into line of battle in variable winds, thick weather; and other circumstances which must occur, \vithout such a loss of time that the opportunity would probably lie lost of bringing the enemy to battle in such a manner as -to make the business de-

cisive,”'and goes, on to outline the plan lie adopted. It will be obserced that he condemns the line of battle because in thick weather (low visibility) the enemy would get away while it was being formed. Lord Jellicoc, however, decided to form his fleet into one great line, which would be about 11,000 yards long. To f9rln.it he had to turn his battleships

in one. of two directions—either to--wards the enemy or away from the

miemy. In tlie first case he would get his ships quickly into battle and use to the utmost the surprise which, the arrival of his great force had sprung oil the Germans. He would run some risk, but to protect him against that risk Lord Beatty, by a manoeuvre which the Cjerman commander von Hasc hits described as superb, had drawn well in front of the leading German ships, and if Lord Jellicoe’s battleships fell into line behind Lord Beatty’s battle-crui-sers the Germans, in von Hasp's words, would have been “completely enveloped.” At thu same time Sir It. Arbutlipot had moved out in such a manner -that he could crush any German torpedo attack, and though his ship was destroyed her movements covered the battle-fleet. The battle-fleet, however, deployed = not towards hut away from the German main force. The result of that was to leave Lord Beatty ill-supported, to lose tfie effect of surprise, and to delay the decision pf the battle, though every fnotnent yqs o.f importance as the hour was then 6.15, p.m.

Even then it was possible to deal a decisive blpyv. The British Fleet was nfuc|t fastpr than, the German. It could steam certainly 20 knots, and perhaps f2l knots as a whole. By maintaining tlie highest speed it could work round the Germans and either get across their head or compel them to keep oil turning in a circle till they were destroyed. Evidently expecting such a manoeuvre, Lord Beatty ncreased the speed of his battle-cruisers to 22 knots. But the battle-fleet followed at only 17 knots, which lyas exactly the. speed of the German fleet. A gap opened between the British battle-cruisers and the British battleships—accentuated by a second turn-away from the enemy on the part of the battle-fleet —and Lord Beatty was Compelled to reduce speed or take the chance of being isolated and cut off. It was as the gap was opening that he called—-in vain—oil the nearest battleships; to follow him 1 and annihilate.the enemy. It is on all these points that light is | needed beforp the final verdict on tlie j battle and the leadership employed | there can be pronounced. There may have been unsuspected reasons for movements which seem inexplicable, but, if so, the country ought tp know what they were. .