THE STRONG HAND IN GOVERNMENT.

Hokitika Guardian, 27 November 1920, Page 4

THE STRONG HAND IN GOVERNMENT.

(Hie Letters of an Englishman)

Of late years there lias been manifest all over Europe a bitter dislike of authority, if government be a painf.u| necessity, we have been told, let us spread the responsibility of government as wide and as thin as possible, so that the very first niiLn in the State should not arrogate to himself a dangerous pre-eminence. Nothing could be worse for the happiness of the world than this dislike of authority. From it have sprung all the disasters that have overtaken the world. And the worst of it is, as we have seen in Russia, that the abolition of legitimate authority means a settled policy of hardship, tyranny, and starvation for all.

But the nearer we approach to dissolution the more closely we cling to the traditions of the past, and the wise resolve of M. Millerand to he President in truth as well as in name, is of good augury for the future. M. Millerand, backed by the strongest Chamber that ever France has known, has been able always to support the dignity and honour of his country. And had M. Deschanel not been compelled to resign, lie would have continued to fight loyally and energetically the battle of France. But he cannot accept at the Elysee the situation of greater ease and less responsibility which has contented not a few Presidents of the French Republic. It is not for him to be a do-nothing monarch. He has watched (as who has not?) the determined efforts of Parliaments, wherever they be found, to encroach upon tile territory, clearly marked out, of the Executive. He knows, being a reasonable man and a statesman, that upon a strong Executive depend the happiness and prosperity of every country.

‘ Parliaments have their uses; they may advise and control; they may discuss and''sometimes—the more rarely the better—pass laws for the amelioration of human life. But in the end it is to a strong and wise Executive that .we must look for effective government, and M. Millerand, by insisting upon the ancient rights of a President, has shown us all the way back to better things. It is no revolution that he is attempting. He does not aspire to be. (he maker of a coup d’etat. His only is to lead his country back into the paths of peace, to restore to the Presi-' dent the rights and the duties which once were incontestably bis. He hopes to get rid of “tlie political and parliamentary blackmail of the Government,’

which for many years has corrupted the Chamber and destroyed the authority of tli'e JSlysec.' After ah, the President of the Republic is not, and never should be, the puppet of Parliament. He is, in his own proper person, the Representative of France, upon whom the responsibility of executive action should lie. He has the right to frame Ministries, to appoint those whom he believes best fitted to perform civil and military duties, and to sign all treaties made with foreign Powers.

But in this dull age, which is afraid of government, which cherishes without ’ knowing it the red ideals of anarchy, the exercise of power seems a patent 1 disgrace. We do our utmost to hide from ourselves the fact that it is some- , times necessary for a single man to • make up his mind upon this question ot upon that, and to translate a fixed opinion into action. The people has encroached upon Parliament, Parliament has usurped the functions of the Executive Chief, until in England, as in France, we pretend that nobody ever does anything, and that the whole object of government is to pretend that the Common Will, whatever that superstition may be, makes war and concludes peace, and by itself controls and directs the life o'f each one of us. But M. Millerand does not wish to accept the prevailing superstition. He is determined to make of the Presidency what the Presidency at the outset was

designed to be. He, who has governed the Chambers, is not ready io' submit, as a servant, to“the orders of a casual Minister. ‘ And’thus he may restore to Franco that sense of authority, that gesture of real governance, which she has lost. ’■ T|ie importance of his mission as lie sees it, cannot lie overrated. If he can check' (lie‘despotic power of the Parliamentarians he will restore to France the prosperity, varied and characteristic, which once was her pride and her joy. ." ! ’ n ' ' j It is a commonplace of modern his- j tory that the government of France is rigidly centralise! in’ Pairs. Nothing ' may be done in, i|ie provinces that does not emanate froip the capital. It was the whim of Napoleon to concentrate all the power in his own Jiands, to allow no project to be set on foot in Bordeaux, let us say, or jjfarseijles which Paris had not framed and approved. To do the bidding of the centra] Government, prefets are despatched through the breadth and length of |franee, prefets who are seldom sensitive to the needs of the provinces and whose education on the boulevards has not fitted them to deal with people' qiffering from themselves in habit arid training. ■-

The injury that is done to France by this system, invented by a man of genius who left behind him nobody capable of carrying it on, cannot easily be understood by us. We have been accustomed from the beginning to the rough-and-ready kind of local government which has made our vast provincial towns prosperous and independent as we see them to-day. The administration of Manchester and Liverpool, of , Bristol and Bradford, is independent of’ London. They manage their own affairs as they think just and right, and they are all the better arid Toyaller members of the kingdom because they enjoy a reasonable and necessary independence. From our own practice we may divine the proper course which France should follow. Her future prosperity, indeed, depends 'upon the policy of decentralisation which the politicians call “regionalism.” The term is less euphonious than the purpose is happy. But its meaning is clearly apprehended in the prance of to-day.

Think what good fortune would attend our neighbour if the ancient indpeendence of the provinces were once more restored to them! They Would work anil strive without a thought of the squabbles and disputes which embroil the politicians of Paris. They would dispense, to their great advantage, with the services of unsympathetic officials, whose career, begun in Paris, must needs be furthered in the country. And the best chance for France to enhance the busy vitality of her provinces is to set a President at her head who is not afraid to execute such measures as he believes right, who does not shrink from the heavy burden of responsibility that is laid upon him. After all, the business of a Government is to govern—an obvious truth wdiich has long been forgotten—and to govern without fuss and without injustice. That country, after all, is happiest which is least conscious of its Government. “Rule a great country,” said the Chinese philosopher, “as you would cook a little fish; don’t overdo it.” And you have the best chance of not overdoing it if you respect authority; if, having accepted your governor with loyalty, you refrain from interfering with his discharge of a delicate duty.

This is what M. Millerand demands: the power winch ought to belong to a strong Executive. And the conduct of his high office will lie watched with interest by all those who hope for the peace and happiness of Europe.