HOW THE ARMISIIGE GAME

Hokitika Guardian, 11 November 1920, Page 4

HOW THE ARMISIIGE GAME

GENERAL HINDENBURG’-S- REVIEW. (From his war-book, ‘‘Out of My Life”) In the evening of that day (October 2’5) I left the capital (Berlin) whither 1 had gone with my First Quarter-master-General to confer with our All Highest War Lord, and .returned to Headquarters. 1 was alone. His Ma-. jesty had granted General Ludendorff’s request to be allowed to resign and refused my own. Next clay 1 entered what bad been our cAinmon office. I l’elt as if I had returned to my desolate quarters from the graveside of a particularly dear friend. Up to the present moment—l am writing this in September, 1919—1 have never again seen my Idyal helper and adviser during these four years. In thought I have visited him a thousand times and alway found him present in my grateful heart. Oct. ‘2oth to Nov. 9th, 1918. At iny request my All-Highest War Lord appointed GemjVal Groiier as my First Quartermaster-General. The* General had become well known to me through holding previous posts during the war. I knew that lie possessed a wonderful organising talent and a thorough knowledge of the domestic situation at home. The times we were now to spend together brought me ample proofs that I was not mistaken in my new colleague. % The problems which faced the General were as difficult as thankless. They demanded ruthless energy, utter ' selfdenial, and renunciation of all glories but that of duty faithfully done, and the gratitude of none but this colleague for the time being. We all know how great and critical was the work which awaited him. Affairs-began to go from worse to worse. I will attempt to describe them in outline only. In the East the last attempts at resistance of the Ottoman Empire were collapsing; Mosul and Aleppo fell, practically undefended, into the hands of the enemy. The Mesopotamian and Syrian armies had ceased to exist'. Wo had to evacuate Georgia, not under military pressure, but because our economic plans there could not be realised, oi at any rate made* profitable. The troops which wo had sent to help with the defence of Constantinople were withdrawn. The Entente did not - attack it from Hi race. Stnmboul was not destined to fall by some mighty deed of ltcioism or impressive manifestation of military power. I do not know the reason. It may lie in certain military ’ considerations which were concealed from our understanding at the time. It is possible, too, that political motives played the dominant role in the decisions of tho Entente. All our other German reinforcements which were in Turkey were drawn in the direction of Constantinople. They left the land we had defended side by side, enjoying the respect of the chivalrous Turk with whom we had fought , shoulder to shoulder in 7iis life and death struggle. The outburst against us which now took place came from those circles which now saw their plans materialising and hoped by their manifestations of hatred of us to have a first claim on the good feeling of the newcomers. The true Ottoman knew that we stood ready to help not only in the present conflict but also with the subsequent reorganisation of his country. Enver and Talaat Pasha left the scene of their labours, insulted by their opponents hut otherwise without a stain on their character.

Our last troops were withdrawn from Bulgaria also. They were followed by the gratitude and honourable recognition of many feelings which found their most vivid expression in a letter which title former Commander-in-Chief of the Bulgarian Army wrote to me about this tifiie. I could not resist the expression that the lines expressed something which I had thought I detected so often in the words of this honourable officer: “Had I been politically free, my military actions would have been different.” The revelation had come too late in his erse, as in many others. The political structure of AustriaHungary went to pieces at the same time as her military organisation. She not. only abandoned her own frontiers, hut deserted ours as well. In Hungary rose the spectre of Revolution, inspired by hatred of the Germans. Can this be considered Was not this hatred an ingredient of Magyar pride? During the war the Hungarian had certainly had other sentiments when t'ne Russian was knocking at his frontier. Mighty knocks and many of them! With wliat joy were the Germans troops greeted; with what devotion were they looked after, nay pampered, when it was a question of helping to overthrow Serbia! What an enthusiastic reception we met with when we appeared on the scene to reconquer Transylvania! Gratitude is a rare blossom in human life, even rarer in political. ,

In the other hand in Rumania we often met with open expressions of gratitude. The Rumanian appreciated that without the destruction of Russia the free developnient of his country could never have been realised. If certain circles in Germany now bring up the hatred of our former Allies as a reproach against us and a proof of our mistaken political and military principles, they forget that outbursts of hatred against an ally could also he heard, in the enemy camp. Had not French soldiers insulted and shaken their fists at their English brothers in anils under our very eyes? Pad not Frenchmen shouted to us: “Against you with England to-day; with you against England to-morrow!” In March, 1918, had not an angry French private, pointing to the ruins of the Cathedral of St Quentin, cried out to an English soldier who had been taken prisoner at the same time: “You did that?”

I can only hope that the expressions of hatred between ourselves and our former Allies will gradually die away when the ’dark clouds lift which now veil the truth, and our former brothers j in arms can once more gaze steadfastly ar the' scenes of glory wc shared together, scenes in which German blood was poured out for the realisation of their plans and dreams. By the end of October the collapse was complete at all points. It was only oil the Western Front' that we still I

thought we could avert it. The enemy pressure there was weaker, hut weaker was our resistance also. Even smaller became the number of German troops, ever greater the gaps in our lines of defence. We had only a few fresh German divisions, but great deeds could still have been done. Empty wishes, vain hopes. We were sinking-, ,for the homeland was sinking. Jt could breathe no new life into us for its strength was exhausted.. On November Ist General Ginner went to the front. Our immediate concern was the withdrawal of our line of defence to the Antwerp-. I *!ease position. It was easy to decide but difficult to carry out the decision. Precious material was within reach of the enemy i-. this lino, but it was less important Lo save it than to get awny/tlie 80,000 wounded who were in our advance or field hospitals. Thus the execution of our decision was delayed by.the feelings o 1 gratitude which wo owed to our bleeding comrades. It tins plain that this situation could not last. Our armies were took weak and too . tired. Moreover, the pressure which the fresh American masses were putting upon our most sensitive point in the region of ' the Meuse, was too strong. Yet the experiences of those masses "ill have taught the United States for the future that the business of war cannot lie learnt in a few months, and that a crisis lack of this experience costs streams of blood. The German battle line was then still connected with the’ lines of communication, the life-nerve which kept it in ,touch with the homeland. Gloomy pictures were certainly revealed here and there, but generally speaking the situation was still stable. Yet this canid not last for long. The strain had become almost intolerable. Convulsions anywhere, whether at homo or in the Army, would make collapse inevitable. Such were my impressions in the first uavs of November.

Our fears of such convulsions began to be realised*' There was a mighty upheaval in the homeland. The Kevoluiion was beginning. As early as No, vember sth General Groner hastened to the capital, foreseeing wlmt must bappen if a bait were not called, even at (lie deventTf hour. He made his way to hi '. Emperor’s presence and described tin- consequences if the Army were deprived of its head. In'vain ! The Revolution was now in full career, and it was purely by chance that the general escaped the clutches of the revolutionaries on his way back to Headquarters. This was on the evening of November 6th. ' •'

The whole national organism now began to shake with fever. Calm consideration was a thing of the past. No one thought any longer ablaut the consequences to the whole body politic, but only of the satisfaction of his own passions. These passions in turn began to foster the craziest plans. For could there be anything more crazy than the idea, of making life impossible for the Army? Has a greater crime ever had its origin in, human thought and human, hatred? The body was now powerless: it could still deal a few blows, blit it was dying. Was it surprising that the enemy could do what he liked with such an organism, or that he made his conditions even harder than those he iiad published? Nothing more was heard of all the promises which the enemy propaganda had announced. The vision of revenge appeared in all its nakedness. “Woe to the vanquished!” A phrase which springs from t'cawas well as hatred.

Such was the situation on November 9th. The drama did not conclude on this day, but took cn new colours. The Revolution was winning. Let us not waste time on discussing the reasons. It first destroyed the very hack-bone of the Army, the German officer. As a foreigner has said, it tore the hardearned laurels from his brow and pressed the thorny crown of martyrdom to his bleeding head. The comparison is moving in its truth. May it speak straight to the heart of every German. The visible sign of Hie victory of the new powers was of the Throne. The German Imperial House also fell.

The abdication of the Emperor and King was announced even before he had made his decision. In these days and hours much was done in the dark which will not always'-evade the fierce light of

history. Tiie suggestion was made that we should use the troops from the front to restore order at home. Yet many of our officers and men, worthy of the highest confidence and capable of long views, declared that our men would unhesitatingly hold tiie front against the ynem.y, but would never take the field against the nation. . I was at the side of my All Highest War Lord during these fateful hours. He entrusted me with the task of bringing the Army hack home. When I left my Emperor in the afternoon of November 9th, I was never to see him a'gain. He went, to spare his Fatherland further sacrifices and enable it to secure more favorable terms of peace.

In the midst of this mighty military and political upheaval, the German Army lost its internal cohesion. To hundreds and thousands of loyal officers and men.it meant that the very foundations of their thoughts and . feelings were tottering. They were facedf'with the hardest of all inward struggles. I thought that I could help many of the best of them to come to the right decision in that conflict by continuing in the path to which the wish of my Emperor, my love for my Fatherland) and Army, and my sense of duty pointed me. I remained at my post.