WELLINGTON TOPICS.

Hokitika Guardian, 18 August 1920, Page 4

WELLINGTON TOPICS.

THE ELECTIVE EXECUTIVE,

REFORMING THE CONSTITUTION

(Our Special Correspondent)

WELLINGTON, Aug. 10.

Wlion ;i Bill is read a first tiino in Parliament it has not necessarily been even drafted. The “reading” is one oi the convenient fictions which have fastened themselevs on to legislative procedure to the comfort and advantage of all concerned. This was the case with Mr SLatham’s Elective Executive Bill which was read a first time in the 1 House on Friday. The measure has not yet been printed, nor its details, it would seem, very closely considered; hut it will have to make its appearance in the House in due form on September 1, which is the day selected for its second reading. The Prime Minister having argued when the member for Dunedin Central brought down his proposal as an amendment to the Address-in-lteply that it should be embodied in a private member’s Bill, he had no alternative to promising “a fair run” to the acceptance of his suggestion and this no doubt it will receive. WHAT IT MEANS.

It is understood that Mr Statham an l the members who are collaborating with him in this matter will frame their proposals on tlie lines of the Bills introduced by the late Sir William Steward some years ago. These provided for the election of the members of the Ministry by a ballot of the,, House and the allotment of the various portfolios between themselves. Mr Massey himself was at one time an ardent supporter of this sohenie, holding that it was the only means of restraining the undue dominance of the Prime Minister, but after the death of Mr Seddon be renounced his former profession of faith and gave his vote and influence to the maintenance of the existing system. Sir Joseph Ward also supported Sir William Steward’s Bills, but in late years lias not urged their principle on his own behalf. FORMER OBJECTIONS.

An obvious objection to Sir William Steward’s proposals was that they inevitably would lead to the election of the members of the Ministry by the dominant party in the House and not by the House as a whole. The leader of the dominant party in the House, who would have established himself in his position at the preceding election, would nominate Iris Ministers to the caucus and the caucus would confirm their appointment under the provisions of the Elective Executive legislation. It is conceivable, of course, that the dominant party might contain a sufficient number of members of ‘‘independent” tendencies to upset the choice of their leader by coalescing with the Opposition, but in this case it would be open to the leader to resign and to throw upon the malcontents the responsibility of disorganising and possibly defeating the party they had been returned to sup]>ort.

ITS ADVANTAGES. On the other hand, it was argued by Sir William Steward and his friends that the election of the Executive of the House would lead to the selection of the best men available, would g) check the arrogance of a self-willed leader, would make each Minister responsible for the administration of his own Departments and would enable the House to get rid of an unsatisfactory member of the Cabinet without dismissing the whole of his colleagues. All these advantages, however, would depend upon the Prime Minister being prepared to abrogate the privileges and authority he enjoys under the present Constitution and to settle down as a member of a team in whioh tie would have no more effective voice than the least of his colleagues. It would be an act of self-abnegation that would not come easy to the average party leader.