THE U-BOAT WAR

Hokitika Guardian, 22 May 1920, Page 4

THE U-BOAT WAR

FAIL URE ADMITTED,

NEW FACTS AND FIGURES.

Unrestricted U-boat warfare was instituted on February 1, 1917, on the strength of a German Admiralty “pledge” that England would thereby be brought to her knees within six months. The causes and effects of tbe failure of thiß policy were recently examined by a Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry sitting in Berlin, and the official reports of the evidence before the Cofninittee shed new light upon this phase of the Great War. Admiral von Capelle, who was Secretary for tbe Navy from March, 1910, until September, 1918, stated in evidence that in the autumn of 1917, as soon as it became apparent that England could not be brought low within tbe specified period, lie established the U-boat Office as a separate section of the Navy Department. Vice-Admiral Ritter von Mann.was placed at the head of tile Submarine Office. Thence forward the requirements of tbe new office were treated as paramount. “Everyelse went to tbe wall.”

Admiral Capelle informed the Committee that, fijoni first to last (including all orders both before and during the war), the AdmiraltyJind placed contracts for 810 U-boats. Of this total Admiral von Tirpitz had ordered 45 before the. war and 186-during -no war, while Capelle himself had ordered 579. The actual distribution of U-boat orders during his term of office was:—9o during the lastnine months of 1916, 269 during 1917, and 220 during the first nine months of 1918. The U-boat tonnage on order averaged, according to another expert, about 4000 tons a month under Admiral Tiipitz and about 14,000 under Admiral Capelle.

The Committee was anxious to ascertain why there had been no speeding up of LT-bont construction during tbe nine or ten months immediately preceding the proclamation of unrestricted submarine warfare in February, 1917. Admiral Capelle pleaded, in the first place, that the policy of the Imperial Government during 1916 was essentially -one of marking time; seebnd, that the urgent task of repairing the damage suffered by the German Fleet in tbe Jutland battle imposed a Heavy additional strain upon the dockyards ; and, third, that tbe extensive mine-laying operations undertaken by the British in the North Sen during 1916 rendered imperative tbe construction of large numbers of mine-sweepers.

Evidence was also given by Admiral Koch, formerly Deputy-Chief of Staff under the late Admiral von Holtzendorff, the author of the “six months” pledge. According to Admiral Koch, all that the German Naval Staff really hoped to do was to bring England to a frame of mind in which she would be ready to make peace. He admitted, however, that not even this more modest expectation had been fulfilled. The Üboats, in his opinion, had not been atfault. They had done all that had been asked of them. He suggested' that the error in the calculations of the German naval authorities might be attributed to an imperfect estimate of British endurance on the part of the German economic experts who had been called in' by tho Navy. Tenacity was notoriously characteristic of the British “sporting spirit.” , In the further course of his evidence Admiral Koch put in the following official return for the first nine months of the unrestricted submarine campaign

As the Admiralty Staff has been dissolved, Admiral Koch experienced some difficulty in producing even this brief summary. But he did not make it clear why his information stopped short at the mouth of October. It may have been that he was not over-anxious to exhibit the irresistible increase of Üboat losses in excess of Admiralty expectations that resulted from British coun-ter-measures.

Admiral Capelle was. reminded by the committee that on January 1, 1917, he himself had confidentially informed the Reichstag that the German naval authorities were prepared to make allowance for more intensive British counteraction to the extent of estimating Üboat losses for the future at an average of two or three per month instead of, as hitherto, at about IV per month. Nevertheless, already in the following May, seven U-boats were returned as lost. Admiral Capelle was hound to admit that, in the event, British countermeasures caused heavier losses than had originally been contemplated, and that tho German Naval authorities had been disappointed in their expectation that it would be possible to maintain the rate of loss, as in 1916, at one-quarter of tho monthly average of new construction.

Admiral Koch was further invited to explain how it came about that, if the U-boats had not in themselves been a failure, only a single transport conveying American troops to Franco Imd been sunk by submarine agency. What, he was asked, were the specific British devices for combating the U-boats? Admiral Koch declined to commit himself beyond expressing the opinion that tup success of British counter-measures was due chiefly to new technical inventions, such as listening ships, and to tho fast surface craft that compelled the [I-boats to remain almost continuously submerged. Tho convoy system and tho continual alteration of routes for shipping had likewise played an important part. Notwithstanding correspondingly heavier losses, the U-boats never relaxed their efforts.

Ou the vexed question of U-boat “effectives,” Admiral Capelle stated that from February to June, 1917, tho following were respectively the lowest and highest numbers of U-boats at sea during each month: —

One of Admiral Capelle’s submarine experts, Captain Bartenbach, added the j information that for the whole nineteen \

months of the unrestricted campaign the average of actice U-boats was 127 per month,'and. the number of U-boats actually at sea averaged 47 per month.

It was pointed out by various members of the committee that on the fateful first of February, 1917, the Admiralty had at its disposal only some 20 U-boats ready to take the sea. Deubts were expressed as to whether it was timely to declare unrestricted U-boat warfare on so harrow a margin. Admiral Oapelle replied that Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, in a masterly treatise written bofore the war, the chances of a submarine campaignagainst England with only eight boats. The former Secretary for the Navy recalled his own first speech before tiie Budget Committee of the Reichstag on March 28, 1916, when he explained that the decisive U-l>oat theatres were the northern and southern entrances to the Irish Sea. and the western entrance to the Channel. These, he repeated, were the highways of the world’s traffic. The initial Admiralty plan had been to divide these waters into three patrol areas, and to station. one. U-boat mancntly in each area. Experience had shown that (reckoning the duration of each expedition at one month) about one-third of the time on the station, and one-third again on the voyage home. A continuous cycle o,f three boats for each station had therefore to bo maintained. With an average additional allowance for each station of two boats in dock, five boats in all had to bo assigned to each station. A total number of 15 boats was therefore required for the three decisive stations. He. accordingly considered that the German naval authorities were amply warranted in embarking on the unrestricted campaign with 20 boats.

1917. Active Tonnage U-boat U-boats sunk, losses February •••■ 103 781,500 2 March 121 885,000 6 April 124 1,091,000 2 May' 128 809,000 i Juno :-... 131 1,016,000 3 July 130 811,000 7 August 123. 808,000 4 September ... 131 872,000 9 October 134 874,000 9

1917 Minimum. Maximum. February ... 25 44 March 32 57 Aril 39 58 j May 36 58 June 49 66