Hokitika Guardian & Evening Star THURSDAY, MAY 20, 1920. THE DEFENCE OF KUT.

Hokitika Guardian, 20 May 1920, Page 2

Hokitika Guardian & Evening Star THURSDAY, MAY 20, 1920. THE DEFENCE OF KUT.

Although the garrison of Xut was ultimately compelled to surrender, the defence must rank among the finest exploits of the war. The siege was the longest in British military history since the days of Marlborough. It began in circumstances singularly unfavourable to Gcnerifl Townsend’s command. His men were exhausted by their efforts at Ctesiphon and the subsequent retreat. There had been very heavy casualties among the British officers in Indian regiments, and this was to have an unfortunate effect on the latter’s moral. The force was quite unequipped ' to stand a siege, while Kut itself had no natural defences, save the river; every-

thing had to be improvised. Moreover the native population added to the difficulties of plie garrison; these “useless mouths” ]m.d to be fed a.p the exppnse of

the fighters, Genera] Toiynshend at first proposed to make the inhabitants leave the town, but it was urged that they would die in the desert or he killed by the Arabs, and somewhat against bis better judgment, he Jet them stay. In spite of these many handicaps, Kut held the Turks at bay for five months; at last the time came when further resistance was hopeless. Men were dying at the rate of twenty a day from starvation ; the survivors had .hardly the strength to .lift Aheir rifles, there was

literally no food left in the place, and in obedience to orders from the corn-

mander in chipf, General Tpwnshend re. gretfiilly hauled dowp hjs flag. In “My Campgjgn in Mesopotamia-” lie tolls? the story of the .siegp, the operations which preceded it, and his experiences as a prisoner of war in Turkey. This hook, unlike many vdiieh have boon written by celebrities, since tho war, is in no way an apologia. General Tpwnshend lias no need to justify himsplf, His .reputation' is secure. Whatever, the bjiipdefs fhat fed to the fal) of Kill, he was guilty pf "none. The Royal Commission on flip Mesopotamian campaign has placed it on record that lie did all that man could do, and that lie was in no way responsible for the unfortunate strategy which resulted in this blow to British prestige in the Cast. Kitchener-, never lavish with [praise, delivered a glowing eulogy of : General Townshend in his last public utterance before his death. The only criticism that has even been offered against his conduct of the defence—and this was less a criticism than an inquiry—was whether ljc could not have cut 'his way out; when it became clear that there was no prospect of relief. General Towns'll end’s own position is per fectly simple. He embarked upon the adventure against his better judgment; he made representations to which authority refused to listen. As a soldier he had to obey orders, and he set forth on the advance on Baghdad, hoping against hope, that his forebodings of disaster would not he realised. Before leaving Tndia ho had told Sir Beauchamp Duff that to take Baghdad from ( 30,000 to 40.000 men would he needed. Sir Beauchamp Duff agreed with him, , and said that he was not to go an inch beyond Kut until the required number < was available. After his victory in the ,

first battle of Kut, General Townshend reaffirmed his conviction that to make the attempt on Baglitlnd with less than two army corps would be a highly dangerous proceeding. But Sir John Nixon insisted that he should advance without reinforcements; that is to say, one division, now reduced to 18,030 men, was set the tajisk for. which General Maudo was later given 120,009. At the hard-fought battle of Ctesiphon General Townshend lost a third of Ids force in casualties. That battle might lave been a decisive victory but for roe sudden arrival of a Turkish Army corps from tlie Caucasus. This left the British* no alternative hut to retire. (Jenoral Townshend determined to stand at Kilt in order to save the Britim “fro.a being simply kicked out of Mes.pftamia. All Mesopotamia wou'J have risen behind us had I continued my retreat past tms point.” When the British wore beleigucred in Kut three courses were open to then 'I lie.v might “stick it out” to the bitter end; ' they might extricate themselves by a sortie, destroying their guns, and leaving their wounded behind; they might negotiate with the Turks for the surrender of the town conditionally on themselves being allowed to depart with their arms. General Townshend considered all three courses. Clearly, it either of the latter two were to be followed) the sooner the better. If the garrison had no food, f negotiations would be useless. If' a sortie was to succeed it should he undertaken before the troops were suffering from the effects of privation. General Townshend declares that while in theory a sortio wns the best policy, local conditions rendered it impossible. “If he still commands; a disciplined body of men who are in good heart,” he says, “a general may perhaps hope to cut his way out. In doing so ,if he can carry off twothirds of the garrison that remain to him the operation is well worth trying. But the difference between theory and practice in this case is that we have an impassable river on three sides of us and on the land side the terrain is flooded. ..;If I could get out with three hundred men only it would be great luck.” . The instructions life received seemed to he somewhat contradictory. Now, he was invited to break out and now hidden to stay where he was, waiting for relief wjiich never came. i