Hokitika Guardian & Evening Star TUESDAY, MAY 18th. 1920. NAVAL STRATEGY IN THE WAR.

Hokitika Guardian, 18 May 1920, Page 2

Hokitika Guardian & Evening Star TUESDAY, MAY 18th. 1920. NAVAL STRATEGY IN THE WAR.

I Although much has been written about the British Navy in the war, it has for the most part been of a personal or episodic nature. Even where the ■writers have held official positions they have not attempted to cover more than hi limited field. Lord' Jellicoe, Lord Fisher, and-. Sir Percy Scott have described certain phases of thg war at sea, while experts such as Mr Archibald Hard and Mr A. B. Pollen have dealt with it as a whole ; but while the accounts given by the former are authoritative they are fragmentary ; and while those of the latter ,are more complete they are not authoritative. The official history of the war is mow being , produced under the direction, of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and the task of chronicling its naval side has been entrusted to Sir Julian S. Corbett, tho first volume of whose work . has now appeared. This, says a reviewer, carries the tale down to the battle of Fnlklnnds. The period under review was in .some ways the roost interesting in the war as far as naval operations were concerned. It was full of incident, and seldom liave the cardinal principles of naval strategy received better illustration .than in those first | four months' of hostilities. It was a time of “open warfare” •by sea.. Actions were* fought all over the world, sometimes between single ships, sometimes between squadrbinls. But with the destruction of Von Spec’s ships and the locking up of the German High Sea Fleet naval operations assumed a static character. They were the marine analogy of the trench warfare on the Western front. The sea affair became one of vigilant waiting, blockade and ceaseless patrois, the monotony of which was broken by occasional raids and brushes with outposts and infrequent engagements. ‘

Before Lord Jellicoq's book was published the complete preparedness of the navy in August, 1914, was an article of faith with most of us. He, however, pictured a very different state of affairs and suggested that if the Germans had come out they would have had an excellent chance of taking the Britisn at a disadvantage, and striking a blow which would have affected the whole course of the war to our detriment. Sir, Julian Corbett- reconciles the two opinions. It is true that the British navy was in the broader sense “un-

ready” for a war with Germany. There was no adequately protected base ui the East Coast; there was an insufficiency of certain types of ships required for .scouting and blockade; our material was defective in certain respects. But granted this theoretical unpreparalness. such naval resources as we did possess were all ready; the pressure of a single button released them against the enemy. The “War Book;” the result of years of organisation and forethought provided for the immediate mobilisation of various services by land and sea; from the nature of things the response of the navy with its superior mobility and its normal routine approximating to that of war would bo instantaneous. One word thrilling over the cables or vibrating through the air worked the magical transformation of an enchanter’s exorcism. iAll over the world in equatorial rivers, in arctic fiords, in remote islands, British and dominion warships cleared for action and silently proceeded to their appointed stations. It is generally thought that the speed of

the British concentration was due to a combination of luck and foresight—luck in that a test of mobilisation liad been held in July; foresight in that, on account of the critical international situation, the then First Lord of the Admiralty, had not allowed the ships to disperse. Sir Julian Corbett corrects this idea. The test mobilisation had not been prolonged; not only had it lapsed, hut manoeuvre leave had been given in the Second Fleet, and in part of the First. The actual mobilisation was an entirely independent movement,

and the swiftness with wliieh\it was accomplished speaks volumes for the efficiency of the organisation. Sir Julian Corbett .surveys the events of these four months in close detail; no naval, operation, however remote its scene, or however insignificant, escapes his notice. The, impression left on I the reader’s mind is that diiring this period British naval strategy was almost wholly dominated by the situation in the Pacific. The first and most ’’mpor-

tqut business was to confine the German High Sea Fleet to tho North Sea. - AVhen that was done von Spec’s squadron— wherever it might be—became the focal point. The naval history of those months, much of.which is now for the first time revealed by Sir Julian Corbett, furnishe's an instructive lesson in the principles of naval strategy. On land an arinv can immobilise an army of equivalent strength; on sea a “fleet in being,” even a weak one, exercises an influence far in excess of its own lighting value. It compels its opponents to concentrate forces sufficient to deal witli it at each one of its possible objectives. The mere existence of von .Spee’s squadron had repercussions all over the globe; its effects were military and no. less than naval. Von Spec, was a gallant and skilful sailor; oil his death, he had the .satisfaction of knowing that he had upset British arrangements. i In the first place he, delayed the sailing ‘of the Australian and New Zealand transports'. Their departure had been fixed for the end of September, but the uncertainty as to the whereabouts of the Germans and tile depredations of the Emden caused increasing anxiety among the public. The Admiralty was ready to guarantee the safety of the convoys, and this confidence was at first shared .by the two dominion Governments. “But in loyally deferring to the Admiraltyyview they had not reckoned with the public opinion,” to which these Governments “unversed in the inscrutable lore of the sen,” finally yielded. Sir Julian Corbett holds that this attitude (which, lie observes, was more marked in New Zealand than in Australia) was unwarranted though comprehensible. “It wa.s, of course, impossible for the people generally to understand the situation. Even less familiar than the public at home with real naval history, they had no basis of appreciation except a vague impression that the old naval wars were a series of rapid and brilliant victories which rendered a cowed and impotent enemy incapable of interfering with our control of the sea. The nntient and arduous preparation which made these victories possible and the no less toilsome work of reaping their fruits were almost a sealed book. It was not to be expected that

they could appreciate the prolonged and. methodical operations by which the Admiralty was making the Pacific untenable to the Germans and by which alone they could be made untenable. All they could see. were the failures—important cables cyt, raiders breaking through our lines and the main force of the enemy moving apparently at its pleasure.” To have delayed the departure of the Australasian convoy without firing a shot was no mean performance; after Coronal, von Spee’s influence on naval strategy was even greater. His victory located him off the coast of Chili. What would he do' next? Several courses were open to him. He might return to Australasian waters; lie might go north to Panania, and make bis way to the Atlantic. He might round the Horn and either cross to Africa or harry the River Plate, West Indies, or northern trade routes. Every one of

these contingencies had to be provided against; no report with regard to his movements could he neglected, however I unreliable its source or improbable, its I character. General Botha’s ■ expedition I to German South Africa had to be post- ’ pnned; the various squadrons in -the Atlantic had to be strengthened by concentrations made at the expense of the Grand' Fleet. Not only were the Inflexible and Invincible detached and sent south, but tho Princess Royal was sent to Halifax. What with the loss of tho Audacious and with his command indefinitely deprived of three of its most powerful, units, Lord Jellicoe’s statement that this was a. time of the most grave anxiety assumes fresh significance. The victory of the Falklands had a strategical importance far transcending the mere weight of German metal sunk. mcroiiiwnmmnr-TPm i