NAVAL DEFENCE.

Hokitika Guardian, 6 March 1920, Page 4

NAVAL DEFENCE.

SUBMARINES AND SEA POWER

In 1911 Admiral Mahan expressed the opinion that the greater range of tlie submarine and the torpedo must affect naval strategy, though in exactly what manner and to what extent was impossible to determine until the practical value of these weapons had been tested by actual fighting. That has since happened, and now everyte offensive and defensive capabilities of the submarine in the light of war experience. The latest contribution to the debate is “Submarines and Sea I Power,” a book by Mr Charles Dom- ; ville-Fife, an authority on all questions relating to submarines, who took an active part in the campaign against the U boats. The subject is one of particular interest to Australians in view of the enormous coast line we have to guard and the scanty population with which ive have to guard it. Clearly the carrying out of the programme suggested by Lord Jellicoo would impose a tremendous financial burden on us'; if, as has been urged, submarines and aircraft “provide a cheaper and more effective defence than surface ships, we would welcome the alternative. The “submarine v battleship” controversy dates back to 1912, when Sir Percy Scott exploded Ins bombshell by declaring that the day of the latter had gone for ever. But his was a voice crying in the wilderness. Generally speaking, sailors derided his views. Practically the only support he re-, ceived for his theory was from civilians who had little influence. Times have changed, and the name of those who now agree with him is legion. In his recently published memoirs, Lord Fisher uttered a most solemn warning of the risk we run in “putting too many eggs in one basket.” But even no.w naval opinion is by no means unanimous on the subject. No one nowadays disputes the value of submarines, but many experts maintain that the battlesliip has not been made obsolete by them, and that no nation with a sea frontier can afford to dispense with the protection of a surface fleet. Lord Jellicoe is a representative of this school. He holds that a battleship can be made almost invulnerable as far as attack from the air or from beneath the sea is concerned. Her speed enables her to escape from the submarine; her “skin” and paravanes protect her against torpedoes and mines, and specially armoured decks against bombs from aircraft. The only way to sink her is by dealing repeated blows with heavy metal from a ship of the same type as herself. Mr Dom-ville-Fife’s views are a compromise between these two opinions. The submarine has revolutionised naval strategy. It has curtailed the usefulness of surface ships, but the latter have still important functions to perform, and it is improbable that these will ever wholly disappear. From a close analysis of the German submarine campaign he draws certain conclusions. The ' campaign against merchantmen did not succeed in its object; it failed to starve Britain, and so to defeat her by tl/e economic weapon. But /though not a success in fact, the German blockade was “a success in theory.” Mr Domville-Fife e-s timates that, although for the time spent in going to and from the trade routes, in refitting and repairs, never more than thirty submarines were operating simultaneously. What, then, would have been accomplished by five hundred of them, “larger, faster, more heavily armed, and capable of keeping the sea in all weathers for periods of three months? . . . Even if the loss of submarines be reckoned an 50 per cent per annum, when opposed by the world’s greatest navy' supplemented by many hundreds of armed auxiliaries, it does not in any way lessen the value of underwater craft, hut cidy increases the number required for active operations and to be held in reserve.” If Germany had devoted the money spent on Dreadnoughts in the five years preceding the war to the construction of submarines the result must have been disaster for England. The only reason that she did not do so was that she herself had failed to gauge the possibilities of this weapon, and as it is the submarines have impressed on the world the necessity of self-dependence. “Our experience,” said Lord Selborne, “must be the motive for the reform of the whole agricultural and economic policy of the food production in Britain.”

u Mr Domville-Fife holds that the war L - has established the axiom that “the o superiority of a surface fleet or the t command of the sea cannot prevent g hostile submarine activities, and one a under-water fleet is almost useless as a a protection against another.” But r it has also shown that submarines - have limitations. In their operations against combatant craft they were not > conspicuously successful. In the earlier ; months of the war they sank a number i of cruisers, but this was before tho r British had grasped the fact that in ; speed and an escort of destroyers r safety lies. When this lesson was , learned the submarine seldom scored, , and it will not be forgotten. Even at Jutland, when the presence of submarines was noted, the capital ships j did not run away but simply manoeu- : vred. In his “Memoirs” von Tirpitz regretfully records the comparative . failure of the U boats against battle- ; ships and battle cruisers. Moreover, submarines have, besides their slow- , ness, a further handicap which will for long prevent them from superseding surface ships. Their range is limited. If they wish to .go far from their base they must be accompanied by supply ships; and tho maintenance and protection of these can “only he 1 successfully accomplished by a navy superior to the enemy in surface c ships.” Tho genius of engineers and C naval architects may in time evolve s immense submersibles with a speed, range, and gun power equal to those v of a modern battle cruiser, but until that happens surface ships will not g find their occupation gone. And this ti consideration leads Mr Domville-Fifo V to his final conclusion:—“lt seems ridiculous to say that the object of tho ft

submarine is the destruction of surface ships, and that without the latter the former would be a useless expense ; but underlying this seemingly absurd statement is the fact that sea power includes not only warships but merchantmen, and not only merchantmen but naval bases, shipyards, and commercial harbours, without all four of which the sea power of a nation cannot last.” (Bell and Sons). “Submarine Warfare of To-day” is a popular exposition of the subject by the same author. In the other volume ihe is concerned rather with general principles ; in this one lie diseusses technique. He gives a very interesting and detailed description of the anti-submarine measures adopted (by the Allies, and illustrates them with diagrams and photographs. Although the censorship has long been in abeyance, many of these are now fully explained for the first time. Yet, ingenious as these devices are, it appears that tile most effective were the two simplest, the old-fashioned convoy and the mine barrage.