RIVAL AUTHORS

Hokitika Guardian, 31 January 1920, Page 4

RIVAL AUTHORS

When Julius Caesar returned from his conquest of Gaul he told the story of his campaigns in “De Bello Gallieo,” on which, for so many years neophytes in the study of Latin have cut their teeth and from which great commanders have drawn the immutable principles of strategy. When Xenophon and his Ten Thousand got home from their extraordinary adventure in Mesopotamia, ; he described the fortunes of the expedi- | tion in the “Katabasis” and the “Ana, basis.” But generally speaking until recent times great soldiers have left it to others to chronicle their exploits. Perhaps they considered literary composition to be beneath their martial dignity ; perhaps they felt that they could handle the pen less effectively than the sword; perhaps, like Wellington, they were so indifferent about what posterity would think of them that they scorned to plead their own cause or justify themselves in advance. Whatever be the reason of their silence, it is remarkable how few military men of the first rank i have themselves written of their camj paigns as actually conducted. Usually | they have been content to leave their despatches to tell their own tale or to provide the ldstorian with his material; at the most such campaigns form but an incident in memoirs published long after the event. This at least was the fashion of our forefathers but our generation, in its enlightenment, lias changed all that. The great commander of today has no hesitation whatever in'telling the world just what he did and why he did it. Since the armistice the literary activity of Field-Marshals, Admiralissimos, et hoc genus omne, ~as been prodigious; in Germany in particular their industry has been indefatigable, perhaps because they have nothing else to do. Like Othello their occupation is gone. A general without an army, an admiral without a fleet, a chancellor without a seal, has plenty of leisure for writing. But it need not be supposed that theirs is a labour of love; they kill two birds with one stone; they take the opportunity of saying nasty things about their colleagues, and they are very handsomely paid for doing it. A cable published lately, mentioned the extraordinary prices that German leaders are getting for their, books, prices which, even allowing for the depreciated value of the mark, sire enough to make the ordinary “best-seller” turn green with envy. Hindenburg is at the top of the list, although it was commonly supposed that he was merely the figurehead, and Ludendorff the brains of the German command. Milton sold “Paradise Lost” for five pounds; Hindenburg, for enlarging on a theme which has points of resemblance to that of the fall of Satan, gets a cool £200,000, taking the mark at its pre-war rate.,And this covers the American rights alone- Ludendorff receives £175,000 for his “War Memories,” von Tirpitz gets £45,000. The difference is no doubt explained by the fact that von Tirpitz was in office for only half the period of the war, and consequently has fewer “revelations” to make. But he is singularly lucky all the same; his book is interesting as showing the point of view of a naval junker, but its violent prejudices and frequent inaccuracies rob it of historical value. Bethmann-Holiweg and Helfferich, ex-Chancellors, have to be content with a mere pittance of £12,500 for their reminiscences. Thus the publishers are paying these five men almost half a million pounds as an inducement to tell how between them they managed to lose the war. How much would they have got if they had won! As it is, defeat is not without its consolations, and these are not the only German leaders who are unbosoming themselves to a surious audience. Von Falkenhayn’s memoirs are already appearing in the London press; von Lettow-Vorbeck and von Mackensen are preparing the story of their campaigns in German East Africa and the Eastern and Roumanian fronts. If an enterprising publisher could only prevail upon the ex-Emperqr to relieve the tedium of exile by giving his confidences to the world, the student of the war, as seen through German spectacles, would have material which would keep him busy for some time to come.

Among the Allies the literary output of the high cmmand has been less prolific. Of course, divisional generals and subordinate officers have described their experiences on various fronts, but with the exception of Lord French, Lord Jellieoe, Lord Fisher, and Sir John Monash, none of the “heads” has yet given an account of his work. The reason of their silence is no doubt that their reputations stand in no need of justification; they have won and they have nothing to explain away. A Ludendorff may be impelled to sit down and, in two' months, without the aid of notes, write two stout volumes, proving that the downfall of Germany was due not to the failure of his strategy, but the collapse of the home front. A von Tirpitz may hasten to protest that if Germany had only followed hiß advice she would have been victorious. Not only did they wish to vindicate their ideas in the eyes of the world, but there was the Committee of Inquiry in Berlin to be considered. A Foch, on the other hand, or a Haig, or a Beatty has no need to be in such a hurry; their fame is their prestige undimmed • they can afford to take their time. This, too, accounts for a feature which distinguishes such

English books as have appeared from the German. In the former the reader is struck by the absence of personal recrimination. Lord French, it is true, criticised certain actions of Lord Kitchener and General Smith-Dorrien, but lie was the exception, and even those who espoused his cause regretted the method of self-vindication which he had chosen. But in all the German memoirs which we have seen there is a disposition to put blame on someone else. Falkenhayn criticises Hindenburg’s over-ambitious Russian plans; LudendorfF insists that Falkenhayn persisted far too long in his attempt on Verdun, and bled Germany of man power which she could not spare. Von Tirpitz abuses all three, and von Moltke as well, for their lack of foresight, their preoccupation with the land, and their failure to recognise the possibilities of the sea. And, however much the soldiers and sailors may quarrel among themselves, they all agree in denouncing the politicians, especially the various Chancellors, whose manifold sins of omission and commission are said to have been responsible for Germany’s ruin. That all are so eager to wash their dirty linen in public may ho natural, but tho spec- 1 tacle is not edifying. j