THE DAY THAT NEVER DAWNED.

Hokitika Guardian, 24 January 1920, Page 4

THE DAY THAT NEVER DAWNED.

VON TIRPITZ, MEMOIRS

An instructive comparison might be drawn between the memoirs of Lord Jellicoe and Lord Fisher and those of Grand. Admiral von Tirpitz, which have just been published." The Englishmen are faithful to the national tradition of sportsmanship and fair play. They do not seek to preserve their own reputation by blackening that of others. Lord Jellicoe, himself supremely indifferent

to criticism, criticised no one at all; Lord Fisher dealt trenchantly with a class whom he dscribes generically as “limpets,” but suffered them to remain anonymous. Where the enemy was concerned, both gave the devil his due, and spoke appreciatively of the courage and skill of the German sailor. But the “Memoirs” of von Tirpitz show neither dignity nor reticence; his temper has not been improved by adversity, and the dominant note of the book is one , of qfierulous complaint. He rails impartially at the English and at his fel-, low-countrymen. Quite a substantial. proportion of tjiese two volume.s is , taken up with bitter diatribes against Bethmann-Hollwegg, Von Muller, Hert-. ling and others whose policy failed to j

please him. His prejudices are ac-cen-tpated by the manner of his supersession ; he tells us that his resignatiin in 1917 was enforced, and he was not allowed to put forward the usual pretext of ill-health. His references to the British are in the most part singularly splenetic. “Hypocritical,” “bullying,” “treacherous,” are among the epithets he applies to them, and the reader looks in vain for any tribute of professional admiration for the British Navy such as the British sailors were always ready to bestow on their adversaries. He is continually proclaiming the superiority of the German fleet in personnel and material, but speaks rather cavalierly of British seamanship. The burden of his doleful apologia is that the war was won not by the British Navy but by the prestige of the British Navy. The first volume deals mainly wjth his work, in building up the German Navy. Von Tirpitz declares frankly that his object-was to make Germany so strong on the sea that allies would be attracted, and Britain faced with a combination of rivals too powerful for her. ,To satisfy public opinion it was thought well to secure Bismarcks approval of th§ scheme ,and is a glimpse of the veteran shortly before his death living in retirement and consuming heroic quantities of champagne and beer without turning a hair. Bismarck agreed in a general way that an increase in the navy was desirable, but he had little faith in big ships; he was all for what he called “hornets.” There is also an account of a royal banquet for the military and naval chiefs to which Bismarck was invited. He came only to be treated wftli the most studied discourtesy by William 11., who was devoid either of a sense of gratitude or of ordinary good manners. Von Tirpitz describes in some detail the meeting between Viscount Haldane, the Emperor and himself when the limitation of naval-building was discussed. In view of the author’s expressed intentions, it is not surprising that nothing came of the proposed naval holiday. Although, next to the Emperor, von Tirpitz was the head of the German Admiralty, lie docs not seem to have had very much voice in the conduct of affairs during the war. His perpetual grievance is that he was not sufficiently consulted, and tnat hjs Yeoommcndations were not followed. He tells us that he had never even seen the plan of operations di'awn up by the naval staff until after the' declaration of war. He advocated an attack on the Channel ports, but his advice was not taken. He firmly believed that if the High Sea fleet had promptly sought a decisive action with the British fleet it would have had excellent chances of success, and that a defeat could not have left Germany |n a worse position. He also conceived the amiable scheme of massing heavy batteries on Cape Grisnez and pounding London to ruins. “I have always opposed measures mat are of no military importance, including casual air raids on towns in the interior. On the other hand, a really effective concentrated bombardment of London by all available means from land and air would have been thoroughly justified.” He attributes the rejection of his ideas to the desire of Beth-mann-Hohveg’g, not to antagonise the British irrevocably, but to leave tho door open for an early peace. He regards the German plan of waging a naval war of attrition as a fatal mistake ; the proper course was to have come out and fought. Ho quite realises that the British navy was fulfilling its raison d’etre by lying in Scapa Flow, whereas by remaining at Kiel the German fleet was stultifying itself. During

the war the German Admiralty used often to boast that the navy had scoured the North Sea in a vain search for the British; Von Tirpitz’s disclosures dispose of that claim. The Imperial Chancellor repeatedly impressed on Von Pohl and himself “that it was absolutely necessary that the fleet should 1 be preserved intact until the conclusion of

peace. In my opinion, it was simply nonsense to pack the fleet in cotton wool. The ‘fleet in being’ had some meaning for England, for her fleet thus achieved its purpose of commanding tho seas. But the principle was meaningless for Germany, whose object must be to keep the seas free for herself.”'He finds support for his theory in the result of Jutland, which, we are told, proved tile complete superiority of tile German navy. It was, of eburso, a glorious victory for the Germans; night alone saved the British from annihiliation ; it was with heavy hearts that the German sailors scanned the sea the following morning, only to find that the

quarry had taken refuge in flight! Although von Tirpitz will probably go down to history as the originator of the submarine campaign, be was satisfied neither with the time nor the manner of its inception. Tin's was not from any scruples. He simply thought that the submarines then available would do better to concentrate on tho mouth of the Thames instead of scattering round the British Isles. They would do just as much damage there, and would not antagonise America. He lias no difficulty in justifying unrestricted submarine warfare. Even assuming that it is not strictly in accordance with international law, international law is out of date. Tho sinking of tho Lush I tania was legitimate, b'coausti she jvaa!. l

crammed with munitions, and in any case the submarine commander did not recognjse her! Von Tirpitz is very wroth with the German Government for paying any attention to President Wilson’s remonstrances; it should simply have told Wilson to mind his own business ; Germany’s attitude to his notes suggested an uneasy conscience. If von Tirpitz had liad his way the unrestricted submarine campaign would have be-

gun a year before it did. To his mind the only objection to it was tho possibility that it might have precipitated American intervention, but tho risk was worth taking. But the Chancellor, wjth his foolish solicitude for England, procrastinated, and in 1917 when the plan was at length adopted, it was already too late. The British had had time to evolve unsportsmanlike countermeasures which made the work of the gallant lads difficult and dangerous. Von Tirpitz thinks that it was an act of criminal folly to abandon the submarine campaign in October, 1918; by so doing Germany surrendered the only weapon which would have enabled” her to conclude an honourable peace. However, the sacrifice was not really so great, because, as lie tells us in another chapter, by that time Germany was losing submarines faster than she could build them.

Von Tirpitz cannot understand why the British sailors’ feelings towards the German sailor changed so profoundly between 1914 and 1918. He cannot understand why all this fuss is made about the submarine campaign, “which aimed at cargoes and cost the enemy very little human life—in all the years of war not so many lives as there fell Germans on a single day on the Western front.” He is thoroughly convinced that lie has been made a scapegoat to suffer for the misdeeds of others, chiefly Bethmann Hollweg. The German navy dared not seek a decisive action, because von Tirpitz had let it get into a bad state! The blockade did not succeed because von Tirpitz did not provide enough submarines. He repudiates both suggestions; the causes of Germany’s downfall muSt be sought elsewhere. He writes for Germany an epitaph that an Englishman might well have written. Germany' failed because “the German people did not understand the sea.”