A WARSTORY.

Hokitika Guardian, 16 January 1920, Page 4

A WARSTORY.

THE PERSIAN EXPEDITION

One of the most jealously guarded secrets of the wai; was that of the “Hush, Hush Expedition,” under General Dunsterville, which operated in the neighbourhood of the Caspian in .1918. Since the armistice the veil has been partially withdrawn, but the first complete and authoritative account of the doings of the “Dunster force,”, as it was called, is contained in “With the Persian Expedition,” by Major Martin H. Donohoe, the well-known correspondent, who accompanied it as a combatant officer. The collapse of Russia had by the early part of 1918 produced a critical situation in the Middle East. It had relieved the pressure on Turkey, left the right flank of the British army in Mesopotamia in the air, and, above all, had opened the road to Afghanistan and India through Persia, which from the beginning of the war had been honey-combed with German agents, and had fallen an easy victim to the solicitations of German propaganda. Already the Bolsheviks, with their German masters and paymasters, had occupied Baku; once in control of the Caspian littoral, and of the Russian gunboats which patrolled its waters, they would be free to use the Transcaspian railway for a thrust at India. Already a force' known as. “the volunteers of Islam” had been destroyed by the British near Kermanseh, but the relief thus gained was only temporary. Bad as the position was, there were nevertheless elements of promise. South-west of the Caspian were various “nationless” peoples, Armenians, Georgians, and Tartars, who hated Turks, Germans, Bolsheviks, and each other with equal vigour and impartiality. There were also Russians who repudiated Bolshevism and would be glad to strike a blow against its disciples. If these could be organised into an effective fighting force the road to the east would be barred. The attempt would involve the theoretical violation of Persian neutrality, but Persian neutrality had long before ceased to exist. ‘We entered Persia to defend Persian rights as much as to defend our own cause and the cause of our Allies. The territory of the Shah had been devastated by contending armies of Turks and Russians.” As Persia’s frontiers were coterminous with those of Russia and Turkey, she was a convenient battlefield for the pair. She had become the cockpit of the Middle East. “The weak emasculated Government of the Shah, a mere set of marionettes, hopped about on the political stage of a corrupt capital. It had no will of its own, and even if it, had the constitutional adviser of tile ‘King of Kings’ had no means of enforcing it.” The attempt was entrusted to General Dunsterville, whose mission was at first political and diplomatic, as much as military. It required tact and bluff, in neither of which qualities was the original of Rudyard Kipling’s Stalky deficient. Setting out from Bagdad in February with a handful of officers and non-coms., he made a wonderful journey of seven hundred miles through the almost roadless mountains of Persia, and nearly reached his goal—the Caspians. The Bolsheviks and their Persian auxiliaries were overawed at first by his sudden appearance, and were for temporising. They even invited General Dunsterville to a conference to discuss a basis for an understanding. He attended, a Daniel in the lion’s den, but his bluff failed. The Bolshevik spies reported that no reinforcements were coining to swell the ranks of his tiny command, the enemy recovered confidence, and Dunsterville had to retire to Hamadan, where he maintained himself with some difficulty in the midst of a hostile population. So ended the first act of the Dunsterville drama. Is the subsequent proceedisgs Major Donohoe played an active part. A force consisting of 70 officers and 140 N.O.Us. had been hurriedly got together in England. All were picked men, who had fought in every theatre of war, and every single one of them had been decorated for personal bravery. A number of Australians, Canadians, and South Africans were with this force, which was to be the nucleus of as army consisting mainly of local levies, as at that time Britain could not spare a man from the Western front. In due course it reached the scene of operations ,and set about raising the army. It was an uphill task. The most promising material was contained in the two forces commanded by two Russian-generals, free lances who had gathered around them the odds and ends of stray Russian regiments, bands of irregulars from Transcaucasia, and Cossacks from the Don—stout fighting men whoso trade was war and whose only asset was their sword. “They were willing to make war on our side as subsidised'auxiliaries. In short, these heterogeneous cohorts were for salo; they possessed a certain military value, and the British taxpayer bought them at an inflated price, and also their right, title, and interest in the abandoned motor lorries, machine guns, and military stores which littered the track of the retreating disorganised Russian army.”

The Persians were of little use. By feeding the whole country side, the British prevailed on a number of them to enlist, their warmest admirer was only able to say of them that they, wero “courageous to a certain extent and honest according to their lights;” as fighters they wero ineffectual. Tlio other auxiliaries from whom so much was hoped also proved broken reeds; centuries of oppression bad robbed tlio Georgians, Armenians and the rest of them of the qualities conducive to military virtue. “Would that all

these nationless peoples of the Caucasus,” says Major Donohue, “who with so much vehemence are always pleading their inalienable right to self-determin-ation, possessed military gifts commensurate with their brilliant perfervid never-failing oratory. If they could fight only half as well as they can talk, what unrivalled soldiers they would be.” In the see-saw fighting at Baku the British learned that it was hopeless to rely on these auxiliaries; the brunt of the work fell on the British troops, some 2000 in number, composed of detachments from the North Staffords and Hants, armoured car sections, and so forth. These had to lead the advance and bring up the retreat. “Rarely could more than 5000 of our more than doubtful allies be rouided up to assist in holding the far flung line of Baku. It was found impossible to infuse any real enthusiasm into the Baku army. It had its own ethics of fighting and stuck to them. Russians and Armenians would leave a ‘back to-morrow message,’ and casually stroll out of the front line trenches whenever they felt in the mood to attend some political meeting at Baku, or such refreshment at the local cafes.”

Baku had to be evacuated, but it was the enemy’s “last kick.” After the capture of the oil fields, the Turks were incapable of further effort, and the fol--1 caving month the armistice with Turkey dispelled all danger from that quarter. But, although the Dunster force was unable to hold Baku, the expedition must not be set down as a failure. It was like the Murmansk Expedition, a preventative measure; it must be judged by the negative test of what the enemy would have done if it had not been despatched. Its justification is that it parried a blow which threatened India, and in Major Donohoe it has found an excellent chronicler of its adventures.