KAISER’S LETTERS

Hokitika Guardian, 12 January 1920, Page 3

KAISER’S LETTERS

INTERESTING GOSSIP

(By Electric Telegraph— Copyright)

- LONDON, Jan. 9. A further series of Kaiser letters is being published in the Morning Post. Admiral Togo attacked the Russian Fleet on February 8, '1904, and the Kaiser three days' later wrote to the Czar sympathising with him over the naval defeat sustained by the Russians but him on having a good ,• which “permits men to <*»""mareh to the fray Without a knapsack or impedimenta.” The Kaiser adds “It is quite evidnt, as serious events show, that the warning I sent you is absolutely correct, and the Japanese were in bitter earnest when they decided to have war.” The Kaiser informed the Czar that it was his wish to send a prince of his House with the Russian troops, as a spectator, to learn the art of war. He . suggested that his brother-in-law, Prince Frederick Leopold, should go, but subsequent letters show that the Czar was not specially anxious to have this emissary.

The Kaiser sent the Czar a copy of a contract signed-in the previous October, for the supply of arms to China by a Japanese firm. He significantly adds: “Raw material for this contract is beiiig produced at Ivroeusoto works in France, your ally.” The Kaiser, in March, 1904, was anxious to secure the benefits from the war (which, the paper says, he did mucli to engineer). He regales the Czar with a flamboyant description of his cruise in the Mediterranean. He found Gibraltar overwhelming. “It is the grandest thihg I have ever seen in nature, and

by its military power.” In the midst of his chatter about bewitching Naples, he remarks: —“I sec by the papers that our treaty of commerce is deadlocked. Negotiations are evidently slumbering. What a lark if you thump your imperial fist on the table and give the lazy ones a jump.” He continues: —“After all, one cannot wait for ever, considering the months we have already waited. A nice picnic to Siberia would do wonders Pcrfiaps affairs might be quickened if you sent a person of importance to Berlin, straight to Bulow, to finish the game off.’’ In June, the Kaiser wrote : —“Your about Kuropatkin was a perfect revelation. I am astonished at his short-sightedness in not implicitly obeying your commands. You have been to Japan, and are therefore much more competent to judge the Japs than him. I hope to goodness that General will not jeopardise his final success by rashly exposing his forces to check before his reserves join him. I still hold that Napoleon’s proverb is good: “Victory with large battalions.” One can never be

. too strong for battle, especially respecting artillery. I had. an interesting conversation with a French military attache, who, on my remarking that it was most astonishing that France, as your ally, did not send a fleet to keep Port Arthur open till your Baltic Fleet arrived. He answered: “We had to reckon with other Powers!” The Kaiser continues: “I found out, •what I always feared, that the Anglo - French agreement had the main effect in stopping the French from helping you. It goes without saying that if France had been under an obligation to help you with her Fleet or Army I would not have budged a finger to her harm, for that would have been illogical on the part of the author of the picture “ The Yellow Peril.” I am sure that England will renew her efforts to propose mediation to you. It is a fact, and I know that is Lord Hardinge’s special mission though you strongly repudiate it,, and which is presuming in the extreme on her part, seeing that the war has only begun. She is afraid for her money, and wants to get Tibet pheaply. I will certainly try to dissuade uncle Bertie as soon as I meet him, from harrassing you with any more proposals. Should mediation in the cgurse of events prove seen desirable it is clear that the first wish vnpst come from you, and you may be sure Jam always at your disposal. I talked over the matter about the commercial treaty with the Chancellor. You suggest sending Count Witte. We would welcome him. The sooner you invest him, with powers to negotiate, the better for our two countries. I wonder what I am going to hear from Uncle Berties at Kiel.”

MQRE INFORMATION. (Received this flay at ip.ls s.m.) LONDON, Jan. 9. The Kaiser's correspondence with the Czar throws fresh light over the famous Secret Treaty signed by the two Emperors at Bjoerkoe in the Gulf of Finland on July 24th, 1905. The Kaiser declares the object was ( to break up the Franco-Russian Al- , liance, and confront Great Britain with , „a new group, comprising Russia, France "and Germany. A considerable amount. of secret information is already published, notably a series of telegrams between the Kaiser and the Czar, published in September, 1917. The attempt to isolate Great Britain is mW° apparent in the drafts than in the final form, which was modified at the Kaiser’s wish, in order not to reveal too clearly his intention. The Treaty was really incompatible with the F.ranco- . Russian Alliance, hence the Kaiser’s eagerness to conclude it before reyeal- ' ing the contents to France. Count de Witte claimed pie Treaty was annulled at his instigation, as no responsible Russian spiteswn eignpd it, 'ted even responsible German officials recognised tliat the Emperor obtained much more that the Czar could possibly carry out. The Kaiser, writing in August,, 1904, traversed the progress of the war, and worked out calculations of the forces employed-, showing the disparity between the Russians and the Japanese, making the Russian task a heavy one. He suggests: “Should your battleship In’ the last dash from Port Arthur fall to reach Vladivostock on account of injuries received in the fight, their best chance is to try for Tsingtau where thev would lie well, looked after till the end of the war, instead of being blown up and sunk.” The Kaiser expressed the belief--11 You must win in the long run, bul ;t will cost money and men, as tin enemy are well led and can only be bea pn by overwhelming numbers. Th. operations of your army will be easier

and give better results, when the Baltic} fleet arrives and forces Japan’s fleet into ports, thus restoring your command of the sea, now lost by the inefficiency of the admirals in command at Port Arthur. The command of the sea is an absolute necessity, equivalent to the final success of the land campaign, by deprivating the enemy of the ability to injure your reserves, munitions and stores.” The Kaiser continues. —“Mjhen the war broke out I worked out a plan of mobilisation on my own account, founded upon the number of Japanese divisions of the first line, which would he sufficient to win with. I did not venture to write you my idea, as it is not my business to meddle with vour affairs and I was afraid of your telling me to mind my own business, as you know better wliat Russia requires, but as the first stage of the campaign is practically over, I thought, in sending it now it might interest you.”

Shebeko brought messages from the Osar upon which the Kaiser says: “She beko informed me of your intentions to send out the Black Sea fleet in conjunction with the 'Baltic. He asked my opinion of the plan. J confess that I long expected this plan to be executed. It is a sound military idea and will ensure victory. The best plan would be to silently and quietly prepare, with out a word to anyone and then, at the right moment, steam through the Dardanelles. The Sultan will not offer a shadow of resistance and once you are out we shall -he faced with an an fait accompli, which we shall quietly accept. I have no doubt England will accept too, though her press may fume and rage and squadrons steam about a little as they often do in the Mediterranean, but they won’t stir in earnest when they see other Powers remaining quiet. The main point is for it just to happen suddenly and take the world by surprise.”

In a letter dated 30th October 1904, the Kaiser states lie and the Chancellor had secretly drawn up the' articles of treaty you wished. (Be it as you say. Let us stand together. Of course the alliance will be purely defensive, and exclusively against European aggressors. It is very essential that America should not feel threatened by the agreement. Rooseveldt, as I know, owing to his innate American dislike for coloured races, lias no special partiality for Japan ,although England does her utmost to work upon American feeling in favour of Japanese. -Besides the Americans have a clear perception of the indisputable fact that a powerful Japanese Empire is a. lasting danger to Phillippiues. As for France, we both know the Radicals and anti-Christian parties incline towards England, hut are opposed to war, which means certain destruction to this Republic of miserable civilians. The National or Clerical party dislikes England, and has sympathy for Russia, but does not dream o,f throwing in their lot with Russia in this war. Between these two parties the Government can do nothing and England counts-upon this neutrality and consequent isolation of Russia. I positively know Rouvier declared that France wjill not join ini the Russo-Japam ese war ev'en if Englapd sided with Japan. To make these Republicans doubly sure, England handed Morocco to France. The absolute certainty that Prance will remain neutral is the motive which gives the English policy its presont unwonted brutal assurance. This unheard of state of things will change for the better. The Kaiser, in enclosing the dratt ot the Treaty says “Nobody, not even my foreign office, knows anything about it. The work was done by Count BueloP and mo personally. When we had finished, Buelow said “May God’s blessing rest on the purchase of two high rulers May a mighty triple group, Russia, Germany and France help to mamtain peace for ever.” It is clear that the Dgoger Bank incident decided the Czar to conclude the Treaty with Germany.