Hokitika Guardian Evening Star MONDAY, NOVEMBER 24th., 1919

Hokitika Guardian, 24 November 1919, Page 2

Hokitika Guardian Evening Star MONDAY, NOVEMBER 24th., 1919

iA, THRICE TOLD TALE. | $0 explanation can be more dismal than that of tii/3 causes of failure. The Gal- : lipoli campaign provides for the Brit- ( ish people the most conspicuous case . in point drawn from the late way. The ] story of it, now growing old. and some- ,] what threadbare, is revived again by j the publication of a second report from ] the Dardanelles Commission. The { Otago Daily Times hopes that this is r the commission’s final report. We need ] not expect that at this date any fresh f l/ghfc of special s value will be thrown f upon the ill-starred enterprise. The s test and the worst, so far as the | essentials are concerned we knew long c ago. 'Dio main interest of the present s report of the commission consists in the c Pact that it links up the official views s respecting th e attack upon Gallipoli j From the naval bombardment down to 0 die evacuation. It is the opinion of s he commission that from the outset he risk of failure outweighed the hnnees of success. That it did is now, ndeed, very apparent. It was not so 0 tpparent at the time. The enterprise 1 vould probably have been quite a pronisincr on e if it lmd combined naval 7 nd military operations from the begin- w ing. The. mistake of the naval at- 0

sack without military support was' recognised , quickly enough once the exr ; * periment had been tried. The blun- ec ier it involved may have made all the difference between the success and the failure of the whole undertaking. It put the Turks upon the alert, and 111 showed them the quarter from which attack was to be expected. Its "effect could not have been otherwise than prejudicial to the success of the military operations which were commenc- ri ed only some months later. Military y< action was decided upon only after f; the most favourable opportunity for ir joint action had passed. Apparently b jMr Churchill told the War Council f( that if he had known three months be- ■ fore he did that an army would be avail- 1 able the attack by the nav y alone would y never have taken place. But in the be- ( ginning the War Office was clearly over- ~ sanguine a s to the ability of the guns r of the fleet to reduce the Turkish de- ( i fences. When the assumption that the c forts could be destroyed by naval fire j had been disproved, Mr Churchill “saw | clearly that a combined operation was essential* instead* of his original plan of operations without involving the ar- ( my.” Hie story : of the attempt to retrieve the initial mistake is rather * melancholy. The report of the commission reveals something of the difficulies with which the military authorities had to contend, but it also re- 1 veals sharp conflicts of opinion, unfortunate delays, and serious moments of indecision. “The problem was never I fully, investigated by competent experts,” declares the commission. This ; .would actually seem to be the explanation of much of the mismanage- , ment that was subsequently revealed. The commission expresses itself as satisfied \that no general plan was prepared. jEvep if the army of occupation had received adequate reinforcements, and been in all respects efficiently equipped, the result of the land operations must | have hung in the balance, so great was j the difficulty of the task ahead; but [ - jit was neither adequately reinforced I nor adequately equipped. The blunder 1 at Suvla Bay and the failure to press the attack after the lending at that ' ■ point were largely due, in the commis- 1 sion’s opinion, with which there will be general agreement, to the employrmnt of unseasoned troops under the 1 command of inexperienced officers, i. Moreover, there was a deficiency of - etssential supplies / which should have i been provided against. This episode was the climax qf a dogged effort in | the face of increasing odcjs. The net ; result of a succession of blunders was j that evacuation became inevitable, even |at the risk of the loss of prestige Y ‘ Jwhich was to be entailed by this ope- : ration. It was apparently outside the | province of the -commission to pronounce j as to the general effect of the Gallipoli J, expedition. But it would b© a grave i mistake to imagine that it was of no _ 1 military value. It undoubtedly held up ! a large number of the best Turkish troops who would otherwise have been ! employed against the Allies elsewhere. ‘ Moreover, the campaign had a not , unimportant political aspect. As the y commission has indicated, Russia sought .relief, from Turkish pressure in the Caucasus, while here was the hope that ; success at the Dardanelles would unite t . the Balkan States against the Central y Powers. When,all is said, however, it I is small wonder if in retrospect we are n ' fain to turn to the glorious side of the 'failure at Gallipoli. That, at least, 3_ cap not be taken from us.