GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

Hokitika Guardian, 22 November 1919, Page 3

GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

EVACUATION OPPOSED. (By Electric Telegraph—Copyright.) I LONDON, Nov. 20. The report continued : t General Birdwood agreed with- Gen eral Monro regarding the difficulties o making progress, but opposed th< evacuation, considering that the Turk: , would view it as a complete victory while it would exert a bad effect on the Mohammedans in Egypt, India, anc Persia. Further, the lateness of the season and the probability of bad weather made a withdrawal dangerous. Generals Byng and Davies agreed with General Monro with regard to the evacuation. Lord Kitchener on Nov. 3rd, wired to General Birdwood: “I am coming to see you. I believe the Admiralty will agree to force the Straits. We must do i what we can to assist them. Examine the best landings at the head of the Gulf of Saros. . We may perhaps have to evacuate Suvla of all the best fight- ' ing men that can be spared, including your Anzac boys and every one I can ; sweep up in Egypt, might be concentrated at Mudros ready for this enterprise. You will have command of the whole force. General Monro will go' to Salonika. Please work out the plans. We muist do it right this time.. I ab- ! solutely refuse to sign the order for the evacuation, which will be the gravest disaster, and condemn a large percentage of men to death or imprisonment. It appears that Admirals Robeck, Wemyss and Keyes held strongly that the 'fleet should attempt the Strait in order to relieve the Army, but between November 3rd and 4th Lord Kitchener’s proposal ‘to seize Bulair Isthmus was adversely criticised by the Admiralty and General Birdwood. Therefore Lord Kitchener on 4th November telegraphed to General Birdwood that the naval operations might not be renewed. The more I look at the problem the less I see the way through. So you had better quietly and secretly work out any scheme to remove the troops. POSITION UNTENABLE. On the 22nd Lord Kitchener telegraphed the Prime MinisterAs the Germans’ assistance to the Turks is now practically available our position is untenable, and evacuation seems inevitable. . Lord Kitchener on the 15th had reported to the Prime Minister the resul of his personal inspection. He said: The country is more difficult than I imagined. To gain what we hold has been a most remarkable feat of arms. Everyone has done wonders, both on sea and land. The fact that the base at Mudros is too detached from the field force and the impossibility of proper lines of communication was the main difficulty to a successful operation. SCHEME REJECTED. Telegrams which passed between the Prime Minister and Lord Kitchener show that the latter was greatly concerned as to defending Egypt in the event of evacuation. He advocated landing at Ayas Bay near Alexandria to cut the Turkish railway communications. This project necessitated the withdrawal of forces from Salonika and France as well as diverting Indian divisions on the way to Mesopotamia. The General Staff did not support it, and it was ultimately rejected. At a joint conference at Paris between the French and English Governments, Cabinet discussed the evacuation on November B3rd. Lord Curzon, on behalf of several colleagues, elaborated the case against the evacuation, whereto Mr Bonar Law ‘ replied that every military expert favoured the evacuation. TERRIBLE BLIZZARD. Mr Bonar Law’s memorandum shows that the Prime Minister and First Lord of the Admiralty opposed the evacuation, hut the military advisers’ advice was accepted. Meanwhile a blizzard in the last days of November aggravated the condition of the troops. Two hundred and eighty men were drowned in the trenches at Suvla and many frozen to death as they stood, while 16,000 ware frost-bitten.

General Monro then telegraphed to Lord Kitchener pressing for a decision. From November 25th to December Btli Admiral Wemyss, with remarkable pertinacity, advocated the renewal of the naval attack, but Admiral Robeck, who was then in England, placed liis views before the Council, and as a result of the War Cabinet at a meeting on December 2nd, Lord Kitchener telegraphed to General Monro: Owing to political consequnees there is a strong feeling against the evacuation if the Salonika troops are placed at your disposal would you make Suivla retainable ? The Navy would alsp, take the offensive. General Monro replied that lie did not think that there was any reasonable chance of success. The naval guns could not search the Turkish positions. On December 7th the Cabinet, mainly on Lord Kitchener’s advice, decided to evacuate.

Admiral Wemyss again telegraphed on learning the decision, urging a renewal of the offensive. He added: lam convinced that the time is ripe for a vigorous offensive. I am confident of suc-

COMMENTS ON THE REPORT. Lord Fisher appends a memorandum regretting that his official duties precluded his attendance at the sittings. Therefore he was unjustified in attaching his name to the report. Sir Thomas McKenzie supplies a supplementary report, and regrets that the evidence 'was not published, making the narrative inadequate, wlnle substantially agreeing with the findings, ho holds stronger views upon c.er- | tain of them. He believes that the forcing of the Dardanelles would have been practicable bad the authorities approached the problem adequately, and should only have launched a combined attack after proper preparation, j Whether Sir lan Hamilton was the right man to command can never be answered, because ho was hurriedly despatched, imperfectly instructed and inadequately equipped. Though Wolfe Murray attended the War Council, he expressed no opinion and tendered no advice, nor did he clearly understand that a decision had been arrived at to prepare a naval attack. When General Murray was asked why lie had not prepared a plan, he replied that lie was overshadowed by Lord Kitchener. He believes that the vital period to determine success or fail ure was between August 6tli and 10th

when General Stopford and his officers threw away a golden opportunity, and gave the Turks time to reinforce. The failure at Sulva was not due to the opposition of the Turks, hut to General Stopford’s failure to provide winter troops. Sir Thomas MacKenzie directs attention to the evidence of a Suvla witness as to the frittering away of life through General Hunter Weston’s repeated attacks.

Colonel Wilson’s evidence showed that lives had been sacrificed almost with futility, and there was Sir lan Hamilton’s admission to Lord Nicholson that lives were used instead of shells. Regarding the treatment of the wounded, Sir Thomas McKenzie quotes Mr Hughes’s matured opinion: “That he personally would recommend his Government, when the war was over, under no conceivable conditions to trust the Imperial authorities with the medical arrangement for the care o Australian sick and wounded.