THE GREAT ADVENTURE.

Hokitika Guardian, 20 November 1919, Page 2

THE GREAT ADVENTURE.

THE GALLIPOLI COMMISSION. A FURTHER REPORT. STRICTURES AND BLAME. (Lv Electric Telegraph—Cooyi ight.; AUSTRALIAN A N.Z. CAULK ASSOCIATION'] (Received This Day at 8 a.m.) LONDON, Nov. 17. The second report of the Gallipoli Commission declares from the outset the risks of the expedition’s failure outweighed the chances of success. The problem was never fully investigated by experts. No correct appreciation of thfe difficulties were arrived at. The naval operations in November, 1914, and February and March, 1915, led to the strengthening of the Turkish positions. There was undue delay in considering the situation, after the failure of the attacks following the first landing. The plan of attack at Suvla was open to criticism. The attack was not pressed as( it should have been. General Stopford did not secure sufficient information of the progress of operations. He and his staff wore partly responsible (for the failure of the water supply for the troops. The Commission thinks Stopford’s difficulties were increased by General Hamilton’s intervention. Hamilton’s personal gallantry was recognised, hut the Commission considers he should have examined more critically the situation disclosed by the first landing, and weighed the possibilities of success or failure more impirtially, in flip light of the resources at his disposal and have submitted a comprehensive statement to the Secretary of War for and against a continuance of operations..

The report lengthily .reviews the formulation of the project for the Dardenelles attack, which Lord Kitchener considered would counteract a possible stalemate on the Western Front, and require 150,000 men. The Dardanelles or Serbia, generally, was regarded as the likeliest theatre. Success there was expected to unite the Balkan countries against the Central Powers. The Commission is satisfied no general plan of operations at Gallipoli was formulated. Hamilton understood his force was secondary to the Navy, whose guns, however, were unable to dispose of the Turkish defences. 'After General Monroe’s advice to evacuate (based on his conclusion that excepting the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, the troops on the Peninsula were unequal to a sustained effort, owing to their inexperienced officers and lack of training), confirmed by Lord Kitchener,' the Cabinet should have taken prompter action.

The Commission finds the food supply on the whole was satisfactory, and medical supplies adequate, except in the case of Australian and New Zealanders, who were short of ordinary medical, and variety of food for the sick.

Sir Thomas Mackenzie, in a supplementary report, says he believes* the Dardanelles could have been forced, if the authorities approached the problem adequately and should only have launched a combined attack after proper preparation. Mackenzie believes the vital period for determining the issue was between August 6th and 10th, when Stopford and his officers threw away a golden opportunity, and gave the,Turks time to reinforce.