FINAL STRUGGLE.

Hokitika Guardian, 19 July 1919, Page 4

FINAL STRUGGLE.

BEFORE THE ARMISTICE,

GERMANY’S FORLORN HOPE

Interesting light on the growingly hopeless position of Germany in the closing stages of the war, hastened by the consummate generalship of Marshal Foch, which ended in the Armistice of last November, is given in a recently-published volume by the Union des Grandes Associations, 3, rue Recamier, Paris. On the authority of the secret documents of the French Grand Quartier General, the volume (says the “Morning Post”) shows to what utter straits the once victorious German Army had been reduced. There is a picture of Marshal Foch, who every day received from the Second Bureau, a statement of the German Army, containing a list of the divisions in line and in reserve, an estimate of their condition and value, and their distribution among the various armies. To this statement was appended a summary' of the enemy’s probable intentions. At regular intervals the same department issued diagrams showing the number of enemy divisions in line that required to be relieved, and the divisions available to relieve them. Reserve divisions were divided into three categories; first, fresh divisions which had had more than one mouth’s rest and were therefore completely reconstituted ; secondly, reconstituted divisions which had been brought up to strength and had rested a fortnight to a month ; and, thirdly',: tired divisions just out of the line; which had not had a fortnight’s; rest. i

THE FINAL OFFENSIVE. \ The writer traces the general movement of great opposing armies | leading up to the final offensive. Marshal Focli felt that the moment ; had come for the decisive general : assault. On August 23rd he wrote : “ The offensive battle engaged on : July 18th . . . will be continued ■ without respite so as to give the • enemy no time to re-establish liim- : self.” Accordingly, he prepared three great converging attacks—the one in Flanders ; the second in the centre, in which the British and , French were to force the Hitidenburg position from Cambrai to St Quentin, while the French on the right drove the enemy across the Aisne; and the third on either side : of the Argonne. 1 These offensives opened between September 26th and September 28th, ■ and on October 9th the German army abandoned the Hindenburg position, which it believed impreg- ; nabie. Between October 10th and October 20th the enemy’s retreat, became general on the whole front ; from the North Sea to the Meuse. Between September 26th and October 20th, 139 German divisions out of 191 were engaged in the battle. On October nth 44 divisions inline were incapable of hard fighting, and lo replace them the enemy had i only seven fresh divisions and ' about 15 inferior divisions that!

might be withdrawn from quiet sectors.

The Second Bureau summed up the situation in the following words : “It is impossible for the enemy with the forces that he has at present in line, to stop and face any considerable attack for an appreciable time.”

Hindenburg had already written his letter to the Chancellor. On September 28th the Supreme Command had informed the Chancellor that an armistice was necessary, and on October 4UI Prince Max of Baden had telegraphed to President Wilson asking for a suspension of hostilities. The Germans were ready to throw up the sponge.

AKMV DWINDLES AWAV. Between July 15th and November 11 th the enemy had broken up twenty-three divisions, and his reserves had dwindled away, and that although his front had been shortened by about a quarter. His infantry, despite reinforcements received from the twenty-three divisions broken up, was about half the strength of what it had been on July 15th, and 011 November lotli the majority ol his divisions numbered between r,OOO and 2,000 combatants. Practically 110 fresh reserves remained. , The moral of the army was very low, as is shown by a number of quotations from German documents,

while their material was. passing through a state of acute crisis. On July 15th the Germans had about 12,500 field guns and 7,860 heavy guns, or about 20,360 pieces in all. On November 10th they had about 9,000 field guns and 4,500 heavy guns, or 13,500 pieces in all. Their artillery strength had been diminished by oue-third. Their ammunition stocks were so low that they had had to suppress barrage fire. Finally, and most important of all, at the beginning of November the AllieS had a reserve ol eighty divisions, which was steadily increasing. The German High Command realised that even retreat was impossible without a disaster, and therefore, demanded an armistice.