FOCH

Hokitika Guardian, 27 July 1918, Page 4

FOCH

(By Maurice Barres, Member of the

Academic Francaise.)

No one ever seemed more the man of the situation than the general who commands in chief tin* Allied Armies fighting the German.-. on the Freni A trout.

It is not a fortuitous concatenation of circumstances or a lucky hazard which has carried Genera! Focli to the position he occupies, but tae very logic ol wtr. He reaches supreme command at the moment when events have proved his doctrines to be right, and when the results of his teaching and methods'have shown that he lias the qualities necessary to lead us to victory. Have we not had it sufficiently dinned into our ears that this i> above all a war ol material—practically an industrial affair or engineering business? Well, we iCitglisli and French have got together the finest material in the world — cannon and munitions, of which the quantity and quality surpass everything the imagination on the eve. of hostilities was able to conceive. and yet we have come near to missing success. Missing it for want of a chief, for want of tnat single General Staff which, according to Moltke, is ’* the intellectual principle of an army,”

And were we not also told that in war conducted in the German fashion the place of the chief and of tiie General Staff had become smaller and smaller, that the theories of Napoleon’s time were out of date, and that tlie first business of our officers was to forget what they had been- taught in the military schools ? To-day all these hasty affirmations have disappeared before a vaster and more complete experience. What appears clearly in the blinding light of the battle

of the Somme is the truth of this principle expressed by Koch in the preface cf one of his works: “ Industrial improvements modify the forms of war and continue the evolution of the art. hut without bringing about revolution in it or in any way altering the fundamental principles of the conduct of operations, for wise decisions are based exactly ou the same considerations as in the past, and the same faults, when repeated, produce the same checks. The art of war draws its inspiration always from the same sources.” And these sources are the exhaustive study of campaigns and of the psychology of great captains.

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The life of Focli has been entirely devoted to drawing from these wells of knowledge what one of his masters called “ tlie war sense,” and wliat lie has defined as “ the precious faculty of taking decisions appropriate to one’s aims and means, 110 matter what may be Die military situation in which an officer finds himself.”

Fupil and professor at the Paris Higher Military School, Focli, .011 the day war broke out, was the most brilliant representative of that great institution, where liis teaching had continued that of the Maillards and Bonnals and Langlois. Critics have not been wanting to proclaim the bankruptcy of that teaching at the moment when the Germans, burying themselves in their trenches and bringing up their monster artillery, seemed to have revolutionised all theories. But those who. had some knowledge of the training which our General Staff officers had undergone at the military school knew what one could hope for from that process and what one might expect from chiefs like Focli. Petaiu.or Fayolle, who were formed by it.

What was it that was taught at tfie Paris Higher Military Bpj]aol ?

■What did -Foeh learn there and what did lie teach? Not readymade principles capable of being learned by heart, not .maxims applicable to general cases or bookish doctrines, nor even the reasoned adaptation of a principle to a concrete case.

Nothing so little resembles a j precis of “ the art of war ” as Focli’s ; lectures, published in two volumes j under the titles of “ The Principles , of War” and “The Conduct of j War.” Only sluggish and super- i ficial minds, wrote General Bounal, . who, with General Maillard. was in France the great founder of higher military studies, “could suppose, that war doctrine can be formtt- ; lated in a certain number of pages j or be constituted by a series of j theoretical rules. No; such doc- J trine is the expression of a psycho- j logical state.” What psychological j state? That which Napoleon ad- j mirablv defined when he said. “ I j am the quicker thinker.” What : the war school taught Focli and what he tried to teach his pupils was to think quickly and to find the right and most rapid solution to any given problem of war.

To fashion men of prompt and wise decision and develop in them steadfastness of soul, such was tlie ideal of these fine masters. By ap propriate training and work and exercises suitably directed they bent their minds to educating the reflexes of their pupils so as to accustom them “to feel rather, than judge’’ a given situation, believing that in warfare qualities of character are the most important of all. No teaching in France was more concrete and empirical, or if one may sav so, less didactic.

More, the signal value and flexibility of such a method were demonstrated 111 startling fashion during tlie Battle of the Marne by General Focli in the first days of hostilities. On September 9, T 914, before La Fere Champeuoise, the centre of his army was in retreat and his reserves were exhausted. In such a case a strategical hand-book would have recommended him to throw up the game. But in defiance of all principles this professor of tactics withdrew the 42nd Division from the line where it was in action in order, by an audacious movement, to bring it behind his front face to face with the enemy, who was debouching from La Fere Champenoi.se—and the battle was won. Tn-.i~ Foeh showed himself capable of. taking 1 decision appropriate to the circumstances, with a mind tree from a.abstract prepossessions, like a faithful pupil of that Napoleon of whom General Melassaid that “he ignored every rule of war at.d attacked you on the flank when, according to principles, he should have attacked you in iront.”

111. No doubt in taking a decision at La Fere Clianipenoi.se contrary to all the school theories which condemn the displacing ol units i:i action Focli recalled, as it were auto-, maticali' - , the result obtained at Niderbrpnn lay tlie unexpected deploying of tlie brigades of Fuutanges and Abb itueci, or the intelligent energy of Alvensieben and Prince Frederick Charles at Gravelotte. From his theoreetical studies, which so many small minds affect to despise, Focli had thus acquired a war sense equal to that of the most famous captains. In the sequel one saw him, by means of consummate art, win all the in which lie was engaged, nimble as he was to utilise the more than mediocre resources placed at his disposal, and to multiply them by manoeuvring in such a way as to stand up to an enemy who possessed numerical superiority. Thus it was that on the Yser there came a moment when he had net a single fresh regiment to oppose to the onrush of German reserves which were every day renewed. By changing the position of his troops, and giving the enemy the illusion of numbers, .while at the same time ever ready to counter-attack, lie deceived and wore out liis adversary, and so established the unbreakable barrier which has once more resisted the most brutal blows ol the Germanic hordes. More recently still, in Italy, Focli gave pioof of his master vision and of his rapid and clear grasp of military situations. It is generally agreed that to him aa important part was due in the choice of the lines which tlie Italians have gloriously defended in oroximity to the Pinve. To the German Genera! Staffs plan, which is as simple as it is brutal —and which scarcely differs from that which Clapsewitz expressed when he affirmed that one should “ march straight to the goal without worrying about: the adversary's strategical plat*, because everything depends upon the tactical results” that one obtains by multiplying the violence of the shock bv the mass employed—Focli, that faithful adept of the Napoleonic principle of economy' of forces, is predisposed to oppose a more subtle method where judgment and cal- ; dilation have a larger share. To the German onslaught he opposes manoeuvre, parryingf be direct blow with skilful fencing. In this duel in which the future of the world and of civilisation is at stake, the Com-mander.-.in-Chief of the Allies is peculiarly fitted t make use of the special qualities of the AngloSaxons and the French, to take advantage of their individual value and of the moral ascendancy each of our soldiers has gained over the enemy, and to set his own intelligence victoriously against the German mass. .

If.it be true, as General Foeh asserts, that “ victory goes always to those who merit it by superior force of intelligence ana will,” wliat hopes are we* not justified in placing in this man who has given ns so many' proofs of untameable energy and of the most subtle intelligence ?