A YEAR AGO.

Hokitika Guardian, 17 April 1918, Page 3

A YEAR AGO.

WHAT MTCHT HAVE BEEN

Why we did not win the war in 1917 —a strange story, amply documented—lacking no mark of authenticity, accuracy and full knowledge—is told in Collier’s the leading American weekly of January 5, by Wythe Williams,

Paris correspondent of tho New York Times. On the 15th of January 1917,

at ian AlLiod War Council Iheld in Loudon, a grand offensive under Nivelle and Haig was time-tabled for April. The British led off on April 6, taking Vi tin- Ridge, according to plan. Within a few days tho French followed with equal success; when, lo “by nightfall of the lGth April the French armies were no longer under military authority, but. were in a , domain purely political.” What hail happened? On the morning of that day were ga-

tliered in the village of. •Snvigny, at the headquarters-of fieueral JficheW, commanding 1-lie armies of the reserve, over a dozen members of the French Senate the Chamber of Deputies, who had come out from Paris to take in the spectacle of the attack. The date of tJieir arrival will remain tragic in history. Whether MielieJer allowed them -here or whether they came on their

own imitation and insisted Upon remaining on their own authority, I do not know.. But [ do not know that by nightfall, as a result of what they saw for the first time, in their lives—a real, battle of blood and seed—they were ah in a mad panic. Throughout the day they had frantically telephoned the. Government in Paris that the Freud armies were being slaughtered and demanded that tile offensive just under way, ho ordered stopped. And stopped it was.

i “But at this point entered England,” j says the..narrator, —“or rather the English Government, whose intelligence department in Paris is unusually efficient in that it works underground as well as in the dear.” j On April JS came a telegram from Lloyd George to Sir Douglas Haig demanding the reasons why the French Government desired to discontinue the ‘action, and asked Haig’s personal opinion in the matu-r. Haig veplit-t the following day in a letter that is a masterpiece of logical argument. } t urged against the offensive being di«,continued or interfered with. ''I v i« casualty figures had been greatly exaggerated. lie foresaw the immediate wearing continuous counter attacks by the Germans when this offensive ceased He foresaw what happened on the Chemin des Dailies—German attacks sifV summer long which cost: the French more lives in June and July than in tic whole offensive tlikt was being stopped. He went even farther and pointed out t-liat* with the (French only inakin limited attacks the Germans would In free to operate where they pleased. |b forecasted their offensive programme in Russia and Italy. He closed with a strong appeal that the offensive continue unchecked, ns victory- was in sight and .that the j German line would lo finally smashed.

Whereupon the British Government not only made energetic remonstrance) , hut sent, over to Paris a delegation- -

Lloyd George, Lord Robert Cecil, Ad mini l Jellicoe- and Sir William Robertson. .The French Government promised, and then went hack from its promise, finally stop ping the offensive on April 29. “It N now a matter of definite knowledge tlm T on that day the German general cmy order was to prepare immediately for a quick retreat to the line of tlic Meuse

Three German army commanders h-d been ordered to Berlin in disgrace. The end of the German invasion of France seemed at hand.” A few days earlier the German press showed signs of panic “But when the Paris papers of April 18 reached 'Berlin the Germans discovered to their amazement that the same panic existed in France,” and thereupon changed their tone. These are the bones of a story Which, fully told runs to pamphlet length. It makes painful reading. By the time this war ends, parliamentary-meddlers and muddlers will have thrown away a millior lives.