Hokitika Guardian & Evening Star FRIDAY, APRIL 12th, 1918. BRITAIN’S FOREIGN POLICY.

Hokitika Guardian, 12 April 1918, Page 2

Hokitika Guardian & Evening Star FRIDAY, APRIL 12th, 1918. BRITAIN’S FOREIGN POLICY.

An interesting resume of Britain and licr foreign policy is given by an exchange when noticing a recent publication. Professor 11. 'Ei. Egerton admits that, in writing “British Foreign Policy in'Europe” his chief object, is to refute the charge so often made by Gorman publicist* that “the history of British foreign policy ,has beep conspicuous for its display of perfidy and Unscrupulous, ness;” nevertheless, l u > has bravely resisted the natural impulse to present his country in the best possible light. Of patriotic bias professor Egerton shows little oi- none; he is so anxious to maintain strict impartiality that lie sometimes errs in the other extreme, and is betrayed into overharsh judgments or approval that is

severely qualified. British policy has been guilty of blunders and follies wliicn ,he d °e s not attempt to palliate; “ British statesmen may often have been J wrong-headed and mistaken,” nor docs lie seek to excuse them. But the errors have been due for the most part to ignorance rather that evil intent, and after a close and critical survey of the foreign policy of the country, Professor Egerton is convinced that it has been “on the whole, singularly honest and straightforward.” “ The British,” said Napoleon HI., “ are manly enemies and manly friends, and that is more than 1 . can say for others.” Professor Egerton thinks that the chief fault of British foreign policy has been it attachment In. the idea that some nation or other is the hereditary enemy of Britain, and that its every action must be viewed with the most grave suspicion. Such an attitude is not likely to promote peaceful relations, and moreover, has more than once enabled a subtle enemy, who was not ready to show his hand, to play upon Britain’s' fears to his own advantage. Germany is the obvious case in point. Bismarck probably foresaw that war between Britain and Germany was inevitable, but be did not. wish it to come before Germany bad matured her preparations, so he diverted attention from her plans by sedulously fostering antagonism between the sentinels of European liberty. The author -holds that for the interminable wars between France, and Britain during the 18th century and the legacy of suspicion which lasted till the 20th century, the tradition of the “hereditary foe” was to a great extent responsible. Walpole and the second Pitt both felt that there was room in the world for the two nations to pursue their own path of development in harmony and their conviction was justified by the courv'

foreign affairs in their administration, though 'in either ease the force of events finallv proved too strong. Posterity will be able .to decide how much of the o»nositlon between Britain and Russia during the second half of the Iffth century was based on a genuine conflict of interests, and how much on alarums and excursions horn of tradition and cultivated by a diplomatic corps which was too inclined to look upon foreign * affairs as a game, conducted on certain

convotitial rules. Professor Ifgerton’s surreys ends with the beginning of this century, in which arose a new era with a now sot of problems. FTe devotes a great deal of space to the nineteenth century, in which British foreign policy was peculiarly fortunate in its directors. Its history is, indeed, that of „ group of men who, whatever their shortcomings, represented much of what is best in the British character. Thov were different in everything but their intergnty; they may have hoen cynical

or high faintin’ or apt to bluster, but they were always honest and did not keep their political and their private consciences in water-tight- comj>:irlments. Professor Egerton analyses them in | an interesting fashion. Of Palmerston he says: “It- would be unfair to characterise this genial and jolly English gentleman, who in his old age was the idol of the nation, as a bully; hut in some proceedings he came perilously near to deserving the title." Palmerston’s “ remarkable courage and prescience” had the defects of theiqualities in a “restless and interfering diplomacy which sometimes involved ‘Britain in serious risk of war.” Speak-

ing of Gladstone, Professor Egerton aptly quotes Sir Robert Morier’s description:—‘‘His mind resembles tlie fasces of a Romas ]i c tor, a bundle of sticks (each ol them fit. to beat a dog " it'll!) made up promiscuously of every kind of timber—strong ash. oak snpI lings, ■ and also rotten reeds—and in the middle a great axe with which be can J/nmectinte-ly hew to pieces anv opponent who personally attacks him.” Lord Salisbury possessed “a combination of honesty and of cynicism peculiar to himno British statesman ever more sincerely desired peace with honour

iii'd none tided over difficult situations witli more success; his habit of lethargy and impassivity was probably assumed in order to give tin* other side a locus poenitentiue ; “ no one more fitly represented before Europe the kind of British Foreign Minister, which in our occasional moods of self-satisfaction we hope and believe to be typical.” Thanks to these men and their like Professor Efeerton is able to say that while as a nation no less thus as individuals Britain has often done those things which she '

ought not to have done, and has loft undone those which she ought to have done, “still, upon the whole, she has stood for two principles, both in themselves sacred, yet often apparently inconsistent with each other; fidelity to existing treaty undertakings, and sympathy with national aspirations. It is because we can with proud confidence maintain that during this war we have been fighting on behalf of these objects that we look forward hopefully.”