HOW TO SHORTEN THE WAR.

Hokitika Guardian, 7 February 1918, Page 4

HOW TO SHORTEN THE WAR.

THE ECONOMIC WEAPON

(By G. B. Dibblee, Author of “Germany’s Economic Position.”

The Chancellor of the Exchequer recently presaged, quite rightly, that it the war continued long enough the Central Empires would collapse from financial exhaustion before we should. Such a termination of the war, however, would be a flisaster only less overwhelming than an inconclusive peace, and we must eagerly cast about for any method or measures which can avert it. In other words, we must take every possible course which will convince the German nation of the inevitable end of the war, as we see it, with a corollary that the sooner they bring this end about the better it will be for themselves.

The first and most obvious method ot accomplishing this end is to inflict conspicuous military defeat in the field, a consummation to which we are bending ever}' effort. * The German nation, on the contrary, are still accepting the 'military estimate of therr.situation officially prepared for tliefu and see themselves firmly holding the western front, and the Far East, ; while their arms have recently ob--1 tamed important successes in the Baltic and Italy. The convi&jon of j ultimate military defeat is still far j from pressing heavily on the German imagination. ! Where the grim shadow of fear has already affected the German temperament is in the economic world. The German people do not yet fear defeat nor any consequences such as they themselves had already* planned to inflict on their enemies. , But they cannot but be aware of the preponderance in world resources of the Powers wheqn their Wickedness has arrayed against them. It is not only'- their markets which they fear to lose, but in a large number ot natural products required tor | their industries they have no sources ot supply at all, and can only obtain them by exchange, mostly from their present enemies. Setting aside gold and diamonds, there are many* articles ot prime utility in manufacture or necessary for life and comfort for which Germany' is still dependent on foreign, ‘mostly' enemy', countries. She lacks all tropical products—cocoa, tea, coffee, spices, the better sorts of tobacco ; valuable minerals such as spelter, nickel, tungsten ; and she' has very little copper. If Galicia went to a reconstructed Poland she would be wholly' destitute of oil and petrol. Perhaps the most conspicuous instance of her complete dependence on enemy' countries is in the case of rubber. * * * * .«

Now what economic policy is Germany at present pursuing in preparation for trade after the war? She is reorganising her. system of cartels on a large scale and equipping them with capital Tor an aggressive trade war. That is more than a matter of probability ; in two trades we know it to be a fact—in shipping and in chemical dyes. What steps would she most dread to be taken against her by way of retaliation ? Theclose organisation of soriie one or any of those monopoly products whose supplies are wholly in her enemy countries.

I should like it to be understood that although I am dealing with economic factors I am not in the least doing so from an economic point of view. lam thinking only ot a war measure lying ready to our hand which, according to Sir Edward Carson,,we ought to use now. I am well aware of and have studied closely the dangers of creating monopolies, but for the’moment I disregard them. What I suggest as an instance oi such a weapon is an agreement between our Government, our Colonies and Dependencies, and the Brazilian Government for .the control of the suppty of rubber so that none should enter Germany after the war except in a manufactured form. The experiment would be new in this country, but it would be familiar to Brazil, who lias already handled her coffee supply in bulk for the purposes ot the market. It might possibly, but not probably, involve some loss, and the capital required would be considerable, but what is that compared with our joint expenditure of about 20 millions a day ? The same policy could be extended to those supplies of all kinds which we can effectually control, gradually adding to them as the war continued, thus extending the threat of economic pressure until the Germans thoroughly realise the coming trade domination which we can quite legitimately bring to bear on them.