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MR LLOYD GEORGE.

REPLY TO CRITICS.

ON PARIS SPEECH.

ONLY DANGER, LACK OF UNITY.

7AUSTRALIAN & N.Z. CABLE ASSOCIATION]

LONDON November 19

Immense interest was manifested in the House of Commons in the debate initiated by Rt. Hon. Mr. Asquitn ! on the Rt. Hon. Mr. Lloyd George’s Paris speech . The House and galleries were crowded. | MR. ASQUITH’S CHARGES. - Mr. Asquith laid down two propositions which he hoped would not be controverted : firstly—in war, the ultimate responsibility for what had been done or undone rested with the Government. Secondly it is vitally important that frequent intimate consultations should he held between the Allied statesmen and the soldiers; , and co-ordination should be as comj plete as possible. Nevertheless ho l deprecated the establishment of any | organisation interfering with the re < sponsjbility of the_ General Staff to the Government, or derogating in any way from the authority and responsibility of each of the Allied peoples to their respective Governments.

| Mr. Asquith emphasised the fact ! that Mr. Lloyd George in his Paris, speech did not mention the Navy which in many respects dominated the ! strategic consideration . Mr. Asquith asked which would decide a disagreement between the Allies’ staff and General Staff.

Mr. Carson interjected: “The. War Cabinet.”

Mr. Asquith continued.—The object of the debate was to dispel certai n misapprehension arising in the Paris speech. Ho pointed out that Mr. Lloyd George’s views regarding Servia were not shared by any of the leading military authorities in England.

j The theory of a single front was perfectly sound and the corollary thereof was that an. Ally at one end of the. line was best helped by tho maximum effort at either end. Mr. Lloyd George had regaled the peo. pie of Paris with irrevelant rhetoric. His reference to the western front suggested to the British Dominions that j blood and bravery have been squandj ered when strategically, it could have | been better employed. Never were operations more carefully conceived than | those of Marshals Haig and French lea- ! ders, whom he doubted whether any I Allied Council wisely guided would have interfered! with in either of the two great offensives in the West in favour of more attractive adventures elsewhero

We had no reason to be ashamed of our war contribution. We kept the seas free; expanded the Army into seventy divisions; placed our arsenals and credit at the disposal oi the Allies and so we shall continue to the end.

LLOYD GEORGE’S REPLY,

Mr. Lloyd George, replying, said more important than anything he had said in Paris was to decide whether greater unity of control was needed, and whether we were taking the right way to secure it, He reaffirmed that we suffered by lack of combination. The criticism he had directed against the past was not directed against the Staff, or an allied commander. He merely used certain illustrations showing that lack of combination . among the Allies brought about disaster. The late Lord Kitchener once suggested a scheme for central authority. He, the speaker, wa.'s utterly opposed to the appointment of a generalissmo as such a scheme would produce friction.

OTHER NATIONS views.

Mr Lloyd George said he believed the United States would have preferred a Council with executive authority; hut he thought the circumstances at present did not favour this The Now Council would actually, not merely nominally, possess informatior which was at the disposal of every one of the Allied Staffs; therefore a permanent Council was essential . Regarding the Italian front there was a good deal that could be said about what General Oadoma said that what he thought or knew- General Robertson could not press things in respect to another front; but under the new Council he would be in a position to do so. The fact that the Anglo-French troops had to rush to Italy to retrieve the disaster must affect the operations on the western front. It had therefore been decided that present methods were utterly inadequate a«d inefficient . We must have a permanent body constantly watching things, and advising upon them and reporting to the Government He emphasised that the representation of the Navy was not an after thought. It wa s esessential that all information regarding Naval operations, should be known to these military advisers.. That was a different thing than the establishment of a Navy Council to co-ordinate in naval strategy. We were suffering at present from lack or such a Council and anyone who knew what wa s happening in the Mediterranean knew that there was a good deal to be said for such a Council. Ho declared that he had considered his Paris speech carefully and made it the deliberate purpose.

THE UNITY QUESTION. Mr. Lloyd George then reviewed the various resolutions adopted in favour of unity and co-operation and efforts in the direction thereof, whicn came to nought. “1 am afraid this may occur again,” he said, “we went to Signor Rapallo with documents most ' carefully prepared and previously submitted to the Cabinet, substantially the document which was adopted by gignor Rapallo. It was the document prepared here. I made up mv mind to take, risks and took 'them to rouse the public sentiment nor merely here, but in France, Italy and America, to see that the documents became an Act. 1 know nothing of military strategy, but I know something of political strategy and to get public opinion interested in th© proposal and to convince them of its desirability is an essential part of the political strategy. That is why I made that speech which would fotce

everybody to taik about this rx-bemo They have talked about it on two or three continents, and the result is that America, Italy France and Britain, is scheme is vital.’’ . He denied that he had blamed the British for what had happened. U was an unpleasant thing to remind Italy that it had cost twenty-five hundred - guns; but it was necessary otherwise Signor Rapallo’s agreement would never have been passed i‘l knew' very well,” he said, what, would have happened and did not wantt it to happen. I wanted this thing to be a reality. All this talk about easterners and westerners is utter balderdash. Our field is north south east, and west. Our business is to put pressure on the enemy at every, point of the compass and hurt him where we can. That is why we want a Central Council. HIS PARIS SPEECH.

He would withdraw not a single syllabic of his Paris speech. He asserted that no soldier in any war had strategically in his position less interested with by politicians. Only on two occasions hal he acted against the advice of soldiers in tins war—once in regard to the big gun (programme, vMien. they thought ihe was manufacturing too many and they would be unable to man them ; the other occasion was when he pressel upon the soldiers appointment of a civilian to re-organSse the railways. Behind the lines policy and strategy were inextricably interwoven and these trying to seperate them fostered disunion and were traitors.

NO FEAR OF SUBMARINES.

FIVE DESTROYERS ON SATUR-

HAY. Mr. (Lloyd George deprecated attempts to foster suspicion between (England and France. If we are to act together we need not fear wliat may happen. “I have seen anxieties on the horizon,” he said “and I neioi conceal these. It is better to tell people what is happening . and no anxieties will mndif*' my conviction that only two things could defeat us. If the submarine menace wrenched the freedom of the seas from us our hopes would he shattered; but I have no further fear of submarines. On Saturday, we destroyed five of these pests.” The only danger is the lack of unity.

MOTION WITHDRAWN. The motion for adjournment was withdrawn. NEWSPAPERS COMMENT.

ON LLOYD GEORGE’S REPLY

(Received this day at. 1.30 p.m.) LONDON November 20,

Newspapers unanimously insist on the brilliant success of Lloyd George’s roplyto Hon. Asquith’s criticisms even in explanation of certain debateable passages in his Paris speech were accepted a s necessary to arouse the publicopinion .among the Allies, on the crisis.

It has undoubtedly strengthened the position of Lloyd George in the War Cabinet.

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/HOG19171121.2.14.7

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Hokitika Guardian, 21 November 1917, Page 2

Word count
Tapeke kupu
1,362

MR LLOYD GEORGE. Hokitika Guardian, 21 November 1917, Page 2

MR LLOYD GEORGE. Hokitika Guardian, 21 November 1917, Page 2

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