THE ITALIAN MILITARY SITUATION.

Hokitika Guardian, 17 November 1917, Page 4

THE ITALIAN MILITARY SITUATION.

The Germans have found a crossing of the Middle Tagliamento, somewhere west of Codroipo, and in their official announcement claim to have captured GOOO men and a number of guns. It their claim is well-founded, either a severe battle has been fought or the Italian army is honeycombed with unreliability. A firm footing has been obtained on the west bank of the river, and by continuing their rushing tactics the Germans will a - cempt to drive a wedge between the Italians for the purpose of trapping the northern armies. General Cadorna has now lost any chnnee of striking at the flank of the German armies and, as far as can be seen, has so far been unable to restore the morale of his troops. As a general conducting a retreat, lie has not shown himself capable of striking any surprise blows which would interfere with the enemy’s advance. In slow, methodical warfare against very 7 powerful positions he was masterly enough in dealing with the Austrians, but the succession of rapid blows by the Germans seems to have paralysed both himself and his armies. It may now be very 7 doubtful whether he will be permitted to retain his command.

As the Germans seem to have crossed the Tagliamento in force and to have broken trie units opposing them on the west side of the river, they will not increase the depth and width of the incision they have made in the Italian line and begin to deploy 7 a large force along the river. They will not wait until the whole of the west bank is cleared of the Italians. As soon as they have a sufficiently wide front they will take advantage of the demoralised state of the Italians and rapidly 7 push forward, thus compelling the Italians to fall back from the whole river front, without: fighting along its banks. With' their own morale raised to a high pitch by 7 the success of their rushing tactics, the Austro Germans are able to cover and gain large slices of f evritory at a comparatively light cost, and, owing to their less o'f morale and material, the Italians are not able to take a great enough toll of the enemy forces to weaken materially the on-rushing waves of men. With this picture palpably 7 in view, it is impossible to see how the Italians can possibly 7 hold up the enemy 7 between the 'Tagliamento anti the Piavo, and, if they suffer any more serious losses the Italians may 7 have to fall hack on the shorter and safer line of the Brenta. To do so, how'ever, will involve the loss of Venice.

Should the Italians be driven hack to the Brenta the chances of General Cadorna retrieving his defeat on the plains of Veneiia during the present campaign will become remote. On the short line of the Brenta, he might, with his depleted forces on the higher ground, be able to hold np the enemy 7 until the Italian army 7 has been reorganised and augmented with men and gnus. What is disappointing about the Italians’retreat is that there ir. no way of estimating the enemy 7 ’s ratio of loss, and that the rapidity of tire retreat and the numerous envelopments of large bodies of Italians suggest weakness, in resistance and comparatively light losses by the enemy. If the Italians had fought stubbornly 7, giving ground step by 7 step, the depletion of the Austro-German ranks would of necessity 7 have compelled them in time to come to a halt and dig in as the Germans did in France after the Marne. The great, losses of guns and munitions at the bases in the Udine did not encourage any hope of General Cadorna making a brilliant recovery.

If the Germans push the advantage they have gained on the Tagliamento, the northeni army of the Italians will be either cut off or disintegrated into small bodies and driven into the mountainous regions of the Upper Piave, where it will be useless as a body with' which to manoeuvre against the Austro-Ger-mans. Moreover, in that region it may be caught between two fires by an advance of the enemy through the passes of the eastern Treutino. It is morally certain that the German strategists have not lost sight of the opportunity of out-manoeuvring the Italians from that quarter. Owing to" the ineptitude of the Russians on the eastern front, the Austro-Germans have command now of large enough preponderating forces both on the Izonzo side and in the Trentino, and as a consequeuce General Cadorna will not be able tore-' peat the brilliant recovery he made last year on the Asiago Plateau, when he stemmed the Austrian advance and hurled the enemy forces back into the Trentino. In any case the Italians have this time been too hard, hit and their losses in men and guns are too great to justify the expectation that General Cadorna can do aught else than retreat to a line favourable for making a stand.

There seems to be some truth in the statement of the New York Times that “ General Cadorna was ontgeneralled,” and it seems now likely that only by a large accretion of men and guns from France and the determination and patriotism of the Italian people can the enemy be stayed and finally driven from Italy. The opportunity is there;, the enemy is in a hurry, and the determination to achieve a decisive victory over the Italians is probably the outcome ot conditions that exist in Germany and Austria and of the apprehension of what another year’s war means to the Central Powers. The German strategists may, therefore, be making a gambler’s throw' in advancing into the plains of Venetia. The Austro-Ger-raan forces are on the wrong side of the mountains, and a bold stroke wonld involve them in ruin and disaster.