Hokitika Guardian & evening star FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 16th, 1917. ONE ARMY, ONE FRONT.

Hokitika Guardian, 16 November 1917, Page 2

Hokitika Guardian & evening star FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 16th, 1917. ONE ARMY, ONE FRONT.

F'r is a matter of surprise that it Ims taken the. Entente Allies forty months of stern and cruel warfare to realise the all-importance of complete organisation and internal co-ordination. Mr Lloyd George, we thought, had learneu something of the penalty 0 f “too late” from the Balkan developments of a year or more ago. He then gave utterance to some useful resolutions that never again would Britain be Loo late in essential matters peiy tabling to the conduct of the war. Now has come in submerging succession the difficulties of the Russian situation and the overwhelming fact of the Italian disaster. Again the British Premier reiterates his resolutions, and probably this time the whole seriousness of the position is upon him. Mr. Lloyd George now realises that, all the theatres must he a common front for the for the Allies. That there can he no sphere of operation to one nation alone, hut that each and all must play a common part where the services will he must useful. Thi s is the decision whieh one army one front implies. There is one- aspect of the Italian situation that strikes us n s peculiar. The Premier of New South Wales, Mr. Holman, returned lately to his State capital from Europe and America. Mr. Holman as a keen observing barrister saw and heard a great deal in his travels, and on his return to Sydney he gave his views of the general outlook, views which were in a strikinglv pessimistic strain. At a public luncheon he put the facts before his auditors as he saw t’'"U! at the fronts for himself, and feeling created was one«of rather marked pessimism. Tin's view was put to Mr. Holman the following day when he is reported to have replied a s follows: “T n.m not pessimistic. But facts are facts. The facts I stated, though known to the people of Europe and America, were still unknown in Australia. I. however, have always felt that

the first essential lor our people is thatwe may know exactly what we are up against. Before I left England the present crisis in Italy was anticipated. It has come as a thunderbolt to Australia. The situation in Russia was known, and its effects fore-sliadowcd months before we in Australia knew anything of it. This fore-knowledge stiffened the people of Great Britain and France, just as I believe the news will stiffen the people of Australia. . Tho British people are never at their best till they are up against the worst. In the full knowledge of my experience I still believe that there can be only one end to this war—the annihilation of Prussian power. The operations of German influence are gigantic—its efjfocts spring up in the most unexpected places. It is the cause of Russia’s retirement, and is responsible for the present disruption of Italy. Its influemv is now being felt in Americr.. Wo have had some experience of its power in our midst. So Ido not regard any other conclusion of the war as thinkable than that of complete victory. The dogged resolution and the national union of Great Britain! tin; wonderful organism gpower s and keen determination of the United States, may have to serve for some time as the principal stays of the Allies’ cause . But they are there. I have witnessed the enthusiasm with which America i s now arming for the Avar, or the determination with which Great Britain is prosecuting it after three years of suffering. The fresh vitality of the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race is hound to outlast the galvanic efforts into which the enemy is putting all his diminsbed powers. Those galvanic efforts are sufficient, no doubt, to kill us unless they are checked. They will he checked. Britain and France are doing this until the deciding might of .America can he exerted upon the scene. The fullest accord prevails between the three nations and the Government ' and although we see the enemy striking heavy blows and gaining temporary success, there can only he one conclusion to the struggle if we are true to ourselves. Mr. Holman redeems his pessimism to some extent, but he puts forward a remarkable statement surely when he speaks of the Italian crisis | being anticipted! If that is a fact. I and the Allies have permitted so groat i a disaster to overtake the cause, then it would appear that the greatest confusion must have prevailed in regard to the Allied command. If the position is as bad as Mr. TTolmnn the revelation is the most depressing of the whole war. and gives some idea why so often matters have gone amiss for the Allies. Tho time for complete j organisation is long overdue, and Mr. I T.loyd George must apply himself to | the international task with all speed ; and earnestness.