PASSIVE DEFENCE AT SEA.

Hokitika Guardian, 13 August 1917, Page 4

PASSIVE DEFENCE AT SEA.

A NOTABLE FRENCH CRITIC.

(By H. W. Wilson.)

Defensive Avar spoils ruin.Wiu.iam Pitt.

“ The Germans give 'to their operations at sea a character of violent aggressiveness, while the Allies content themselves with the employment of means which rather belong to the system of Avar called ‘ defensive.’ ”

Such is the general judgment passed on the naval policy of the Allies by a French officer of the greatest distinction, Admiral Degouy, in his remarkable A'olume .“ La Guerre Navale et l’Offensive” (published, by Chapelotf, Paris, 3/.) Admiral Degouy is an able and fair critic. I’lid ugh his book has been very heavily censored by the French authorities, so that it has many blank pages, it is nevertheless oE extreme importance. In an introduction dealing Avitlj the submarine peril ho. makes a new and A'aluable point. He asks whether it is quite certain that the ships sunk by the German submarines are not those the cargoes of which are most Urgently required by in. He Inis a touch of gentle sarcasm for the “benignity, not to say the partial and accidental character,” of the blockade ns practised in (lie past, and he urges the necessity of enforcing a close and ett’e tive investment of Germany, cutting off all traffic along the Danish coast and closing all the routes from Scandinavia. -

One of the anti-submarine plans which he discusses is that of a great barrage or mass of obstacles across the North Sea, composed, a s he suggests, of special mines and special nets :

What is quite certain is that if tills barrage pmved effective the Germans AA'billd try to destroy it,

Avhile the British Avould endeavour to repulse their attacks. There Avould be engagements, first of light ships, then of more and.more powerful ships, and at last perhaps an engagement between the battleships on either side. J If such a' barrage is constructed across the North Sea, lie says, the entrance to the Baltic must also be closed.-

Examining the Allied operations in detail, ho finds at every turn signs of Avliat- he calls “ the Collingwood method,’' 1 not “ the Nelson touch;” It should be said for those Avbo do not know naval history that Collingwood, though a very brave, noble,

and devoted officer avlio rose to the "loftiest heights under Nelson’s magnetic influence, Avas yet yvheu away from Nelson usually a mediocre and uioaterprisilig commander. The first example of this passivity he finds in the failure fo use the Allied sub--1 marines vigorously against the Gorman Fleet on the outbreak of Avar, before the enemy had had time to take precautions. Our French seamen, and, above all, those who man our. excellent submarines in the Channel and Straits of Dover, were not responsible for the decision not to undertake this operation, Avhich at the outset Avould have been as fruitful as it Avould have been easy. The reasons for so surprising a forbearance are Avell known to the Avell informed. 1 refrain from stating them, despite, the light which a discussion of them would throw on the question of “ temperaments.” The Allied Fleets were strong they were manned by brave men. What Avas wanting in this crisis ? What Avas it that imposed on our fine squadrons this passive attitude Avhich has been so much criticised that today one is weary of speaking of it ? The opportunities at the outset were

missed. This Avas became of the tendency of all administrations to become absorbed in the monotonous routine of

petty tasks : All clearly marked-out duties are performed (in such administrations), but the “something more” which means nothing to stagnation, hut which is indispensable to progress receives attention from very lew. No initiative is shown, because it may cause trouble; no ideas are to be found, least .of all hold ideas ; there is no imagination—for Avhat Avonld they do Avith it ? Entire confidence is placed in “ safe people ’’ who never think of anything but, also never cause any difficulty. There is no enthusiasm except affioug some few officers. ... . Higher up in the

hieiarchy people “ carry on.” No preoccupations as to military policy, no speculations regarding war and its nobler side, no reflections as to Avhat the enemy is likely to do against ns or Avhat avo can do against him. Such is a living admiral’s picture of the modern Admiralties outside Germany, find, he adds, they are dominated by a “ temperament essentially conservative, anxious for repose, Avitll lidtliing in it of an offensive spirit.”

The Allied Navies can do everything, he insists, but they must be told what they are Avanted to do, or they must at least be asked to act. A second example of the defensive spirit he finds in the Allies’ air policy so far as concerns the protection of their tmvnS. “It is the defensive puro and simple, a local defensive," and lie reminds ns of Napoleon’s maxim : “ He who holds himself on the defensive nin- risks Avitlibut making his enemy run them. Only the offensive can give decisive results.” Yet another example which he selects is the failure to deal with Zeebrugge. “ That the base of Zeebrugge still exists ie matter for astonishment,” he writes.

A very important chapter Avhich has been published in the United States gives a criticism and analysis of the Battle of Jutland. Admiral Degouy has the Avarmest praise for the conduct of Admiral Sir David Beatty, present Comtnander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet:—

From the point of vieAy of strategy, or rather of grand tactics, Admiral Beatty’s resolution to grapple his enemy or unflinchingly maintain his jjprip; whatever it dost him, until the

| arrival of the main British fighting forces—this resolution was.in perfect, conformity with the principles of war, and oiight to be praised -without any reserve. A point, which fills him with surprise is the inaction of tlie British submarines : Jellicoe’s fleet, it seems, did not include groups of submarines. Why hot ? I do not know. Perhaps in England they attribute to submarines too individual a role (i.e., they are not sufficiently employed in combination with other arms such as battleships and aircraft). And he also asks, “ What about aircraft?” though at the date of writing he could not know, what has since been officially stated, that the British Navy possessed seaplanes capable of torpedoing a warship in May *1010; then possessed them for many months When the British battleships arrived he notes the curious situation which followed : This pitched batrle —for at last, the two fl ets drew up against one another and deployed methodically in line one against ; the other—was not in the least like what abstract reasouera had expected. There was no decisive result. They fired at one another, th y suffered lucre or less I’jury, they inflicted more or less damage, and that was all. There was really offensive stioke. There Was no sensational manoeuvre. . . . “It is the fog that was to blame,” we may he told. But the fog did not become thick till night, and nightfall does not come early on May 3 . in high latitudes. The result was one unexpected by all the theorists. The less numerous of the two fleets hot only was not wiped out but actually stood the shock perfectly. . . . Neither of tlie adversaries was able to make up his mind to undertake''an offensive after tire battle in line, which would have proved beyond question his superiority in moral force. The engagement of May 31 did not definitely decide the predominance of the [British Fleet. The decisive battle at sea, he holds, in fact, has yet to be fought. For on one point Admiral Degouy is tolerably certain—that the Uerrnau Fleet will come out and give battle with all its three and with new weapons. It is interesting to note as a sign of reviving naval enthusiasm in France how many eminent writers she has in the ranks of her Navy! We are, unfortunately, not so well supplied. Against her Darrieus, Daveluy, Baudry, Caslex, and Degouy we can only show two or throe distinguished officers.