PERSIA AND THE WAR.

Hokitika Guardian, 28 July 1917, Page 4

PERSIA AND THE WAR.

“ the Persian Problem find German Intrigue,” the latest number of the, “ Times ” “ History of the .War,’’ throws an interesting light on a thing that has perplexed many. Persia is, of course, neutral, yet there has been much fighting on her soil; periodically the cables tell us that tlie Russians or the Turks have driven each other from Tabriz, Kermanshah, or Hamadaii. There have been sinister rumours of the treatment of Allied officials and civilians in Persian towns; in fact, for a “ neutial country Persia seems in many ways to have had, either by misfortune or design, an uncommonly close association with the war. The author rapidly surveys so much of her history as is necessary for us to understand her present position.

During the.years before, the war the internal condition of Persia had become chaotic. A revolution had giVen the country a Constitution, but the “ Voting Persians ” showed that they were not yet ready to profit by the institutions of democracy. A body of Swedish officers was brought to organise a gendarmerie and check the general disorder, but they were not very successful in their efforts. When war broke out Persia declared her official neutrality, The bulk of the population was hostile to Britain aud Russia and sympathised with the Turks, while Gernjany sedulously worked to bring Persia in 011 the side of the Central Powers. But more prudent counsels prevailed, reinforced, perhaps, by the remembrance that the British were in Mesopotamia and the Russians in the north-west.

Persia, no doubt, was feeble from a military point of view, but lier position her certain strategic advantages. She might have made tilings awkward on the Indian frontier, while, lying on the flank of the Mesopotamian expedition, her hostility would have been inconvenient. The Germans very reluctantly abandoned hope of winning her 'over. The energy, duplicity and audacity of their agents were extraordinary. The German and_ Austriaii legations became an asylum for broken men, mal-coutents, *and mercenaries of every description. Here these found both arms and money. The gendarmerie, whose services had never been conspicuously brilliant in the maintenance of law and order, gave up the task, and in many eases joined the recruits at the legations, where they had not to wait for their arrears of pay. Towards the end of 1915 the Central Powers commanded quite a substantial force, and decided that the hour had come to strike. Tlie representatives of Germany, Austria, and Turkey left Teheran, and in full uniform marched some miles away. They had with them the leader of the “ Democratic ” party in 'the National Assembly. They were joined by half of that Assembly aiid the disbanded gendarmerie and other troops in parade order under German, Turkish, aud Swedish officers. In Teheran were the British and Russian Ministers doing their best to dissuade the young Styah from leaving the capital. For an hour Persia’s fate hung in the balance. Then, lor once, moral suasion gained the day. To the intense disappointment of the motely assemblage waiting on the southern road, word was brought that they need not expect the Shah. The crisis Was over ; the coup had failed. The army melted away, but the author assures 11s that for a time-it was touch and go. If the advice ot the Allied Ministers had not prevailed Persia Would liotv have been among our eiieihies. He adds that what also weighed with the Shah was the downright loyalty of the Amir of Afghanistan. He had been approached again and again by German emissaries. He refused to have anything to do with them, beyond handing some of them over to the British. Habibiillaii of Afghanistan knew the British; lie knew that they would keep their word, so he kept his.