THE MESOPOTAMIA COMMISSION

Hokitika Guardian, 28 June 1917, Page 2

THE MESOPOTAMIA COMMISSION

A SCATHING REPORT.

GRAVE FINDINGS.

(Par Press Association —Copyright!

(Received this day at 1.20 a.m.,) LONDON, Juno 27.

The report of tho Mesopotamian Coriimission, constituting another Historic war document, has been issued in a Blue Book of 188 pages. It deals comprehensively with the operations through various stages of the advance to Baghdad and incidental-happenings, and examines lengthily questions which have given rise to public criticism. The main report, embodying the findings, conclusions and recommendations, is signed by all tho commissioners except the. Commoner, Commander AVedgewood, who presented a dissentient report. The Commissioners find the expedition was a justifiable military en;erprise, hut the division of responsibility between tlie India Office and the Indian Government was unworkable. The scope of the expedition’s objective was never sufficiently defined in advance. It criticises the Com-mander-in-Chief or his representatives for failure to periodically visit Mesopotamia. The advance on Baghdad in October. 1915, was an offensive movement based on political and military miscalculations. It was attempted with tired, insufficient forces and inadequate preparation and in thoKut disaster. The weightiest share of responsibility for the. untoward advance lies with Sir John Nixon, whose confident opinion was the main cause of the decision. The others responsible in tho order of sequence were: Viceroy IHardinge, (Commander -in - Chiei>, Beauchamp Duff (Military Secretary of tlie India Office, Barrow, Austin Chamberlain, and the AATir Committee of tho Cabinet.

Tho Commission point out that the last two were responsible as political leaders, who cannot secure complete immunity through adopting expert subordinates’ wrong advice.

Tho general armament and equipr mont were quito insufficient to meet the needs and the whole system of commissariat was badly organised during tho period of Indian Government responsibility, though there was no general breakdown. The Simla authori- ; ties bestowed meagre attention and' 1 illiberal treatment to the expedition’s wants during 1914-15. ' The supply of reinforcements was : insufficient in connection with the advance on Bagdad and Kut relief operations. The Indian military i authorities insufficiefly realised from the first, the paramount importance of ' river and railway transport in Mesopotamia and their responsibility is grave General Nixon was responsible tor recommending the 1915 advances with insufficent transport and equipment. The transport shortage beginning in 1916, rendered the Kut relief operations fatal. Dealing with the medical provision, tho Commissioners declared this was insufficient from the beginning and ultimately resulted in a lamentable breakdown, after |the battles of 1915 and 1916 and most lamentable ,severe sufferingapportioning the blame. Tho Commission in apportioning the blame on the Indian Government for inefficiency of management of the Mesopotamia campaign, recognised their anxieties in other quarters. The Commissioners declared that notwithstanding the period of reversWT.the success of the campaign as a whole has been remarkable and assert that in many parts of the world, wherein the Allies are engaged no more substantial resutls and solider victories wer* achieved than in Mesopotamia. Their final conclusion seriously censures the Indian Government for the lack of knowledge and foresight shown in the in- < adequacy of the preparations and lack i of readiness to recognise and supply the ] deficiencies. r i