TIME-POWER.

Hokitika Guardian, 17 March 1917, Page 4

TIME-POWER.

Why This War Must Be Won in the West- . i By Lovat Fraser. - I Now that we are entering on an- i other year it is necessary to deolare J with great frankness than heretofore the familiar proposition that this war £ mast be won in the west. b If the Allies do not win the war in * the west, they will not win it any- * where. The Daily Mail has nnceas- * iDgly expounded the western view, 8 which has become more than ever the c essence of the situation. 1 la this country we do not think * enough about the one paramount objsct * of winning the war. We are con- * stantly distracted by other issues, C which seem to arise with unfailing 0 regularity once a week and cloud the 0 national mind and purpose. The re- ? cent change of Government was a dis- " traction, although a necessary one, " Theu came the distraction of the Ger- J! man peace trap. Last week we saw President Wilson effectually shatter- v ing his own dream of living in history as the Great Paoificator. Even Chriet.mas is almost an unwarrantable dw- 1 traction, for the one thing wo oug>* J . c be asking ourselves is : How jC 10 going to win the war next - p owe d The words “ next v<-/ • ’ •, o advisedly, for just >■ ’- Jar , are ,f sed J wasteful oi mor' / B J e have beeu h have hitherto' ‘ O 7 aad “ e . n > 80 we a dered time imuch o’" ontu ' Law has been i ±p criticised tor blurting out public- fj * .no remark that the war could nob go on indefinitely upon its present terrific scale. I agree with the com- ai mentator who observed that “it must T

go on long enough for us to win,” but f, Mr Bonar Law was right, The war _ cannot go on indefinitely, because if it Jj did the whole world would starve. In other words, we have not got all eternity in which to win the war, ahd decisions made just now are heavy with destiny. The great defect of the military policy of the Allies is that it I has been often vitiated by divided aims and weakened by secret differences, Ihe quarrel is said to be between tho the “ Westerners ” and the “ Eastern- I ers, just as it is in Germany, but the expressions need clearer definition in the case of the Allies, There are now four main fronts. They are: , (1) The western front, consisting of: i France and Flanders. 5 ’ C ' iia Southem {roat > c °nfined to- : (3) The extern front, which mustnow be held to include both Russia- : and Rumania.

(4) The Balkan front, by which is meant all the regions of the Lower Danube.

Our quarrels are not between “ Westerners ” and “ Easterner',” but b?t-vfeu Western men and Btlfea" men. Their po : rts of ditferes.cs nr ac limes almost paralysing, and tie utnu at effcr<B should dow be maja to compose them. *****

The existing problem in the Balkans can be reduced to the very simplest terms. Germany, it is argued, plunged half the wo: Id into war beoause she wanted to Cciive out a read to the East. She had to attack France acdßuesia first in order tc ovocome their inevitable opposition and to leave them permanently weakened ; hut her true objective was through *be Balkans into Asia, “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.” The inference ia obvious, and I have repeatedly expressed it. Cut permanently somewhere in the Balkans the German road to tbe East, and the war will he shortened because the Germans will have failed in their main purpose. As an abstract proposition, or a counsel of perfection, this contention is unanswerable; bni ia if a practical line of policy to-day? Have we time and opportunity left for the tremendous reili’ary operations involved in catting the German road through the Balkans ?

Discussions of this vital issue are almost invariably contused because they mix up purely political with purely military questions. When we read such an admirable bcok as M Andre Cheradame’s “ Pan-German Plot Unmasked ” we are all convmced about Germany’s political objects ; but the chief thing we ought to think about is how to effect the military overthrow of Germany with the means and in the time remaining at our disposal. I am sure l could write ft most attractive book demonstrating that the best way to overthrow Germany would be to march to Berlin : but Bonin is along way off, and so in effect is the Balkan railway. We must courageously examine this question in the light of present day facts, and never mind what any of ns said three six or twelve months ago. We are crowding whole decades into a year. The world is being transformed so rapidly that centuries sesm to rush past us while we stand at geze. * The great mistake of (he “'Balkan meD,” most of whom are politicians rather than soldiers, is that they have never faced, and in many cases have never understood, the military requirements of a Balkan campaign. They have dribbled out divisions whan they should have sent whole arrnu s. They tried to force the Dardanelles with old warships, and thought at first (o storm the heights of Gallipoli with 40,000 men. They sent a belated corporal’s guard to Salouica when Serbia was in her death-agony. They brought in Rumania at the wroDg time. They actually fancied that they could overawe Athens with a handful of marines. They have never perceived what it meins to wage war in the Balkans ■ against an enemy backed by an income parable railway system, shielded by mountain ranges, and operating on interior lines. # * * ■* * There ia only one way for us to operate on the Balkan front, and there has always been only one way. The Allies must provide a million men for the Balkans, and must make provision for keeping the force up to that strength, If they are able to maintain a million men in the Balkans for at least a year, they might then cut the German road to the East. If they are uot so prepared, then it is futile to talk about seeking a decision in the Near East. They must send all their supplies and munitions by sea, They would require an unthinkable number of transports. Their forces would have to advance through roadless and mountainous countries. Finally, when tney had severed the Balkan railway at Sofia or Adrianople or Belgrade, they would probably discover that as the result of such a vast and weakening undertaking they would have lost Antwerp for ever. Politically, I belong to the Eastern sohool. For 20 years I have played a modest partin calling attention to German designs on Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf. All my instincts favor a blow in the East if it ia possible ; but we must dismiss our political predilections and look solely at the military situation. The mistakes of the past cannot now be uudooe. The factor of time precludes the Allies from deve'oping distant campaigns on a grandiose scale. The factor of sea transport is an additional obstacle. The Ruesian main ought to be of immense impO£^ nCO "; n the coming year, but the '„, ' - of 0,9 — “ b 5 “‘-ted 2 western front »!>' uo „ here elw- To that end oil r- i(S musi bode . voted. . uot in the least mean that we * r „uld withdraw from Salouica or Macedonia, My poiut is that the war cannot now be won in the Balkans. Are we, then, it will be asked, to disregard Germany’s present possession of her oov&ted route to the East ? Not at all. A compete German defeat in the west ought to Battle that and many other problems; but there ii another governing formula which I expounded in “ Tho Daily Mail ” moro than a year ago. It is this: Guard Egypt and tho Suez Canal. So long as we fco d Egypt and tha Canal firmly we menace the pan-German plot. The key to the is still Cairo, and the Canal is the keyhole.