THE DARDANELLES REPORT.

Hokitika Guardian, 10 March 1917, Page 2

THE DARDANELLES REPORT.

Cause? and Effect Why and Wherefore (Continued from our Fonrth Page.) London, March 8 Admiral Oliver thought that by the time the fleet overcame the initial difficulties the military force would have been ready. Generally speaking the Admiralty staff preferred a joint operation. The Commission thank that the War Council iu its action was prebably governed excessively by the profound effect oa the course of the war and therefore they neglected whether it was advisable to undertake a purely naval enterprise. It is highly probable that if Lord Kitchener and Lord Fisher had objected upon technical grounds, the project would have been abandoned. Mr Asquith stated that Lord Fish6t’s main objection was not based on the naval merits or demerits of the Dardanelles operations, but upoa the fact that he preferred another obj -efive. The Commission adds that it is impossible to read all the evidence and papers without being struck with the atmosphere of vagueness and want of precision which characterised the War Councils’ proceedings. It is almost

inconceivable that anyone, whether military, naval or civilian, could have imagined reaching Constantinople without military help on a somewhat large scale. In the case of the Dardanelles, the reduction of Forts and other difficulties were more hazardous than Port Arthur or Weihaiwei, while the narrow waters of the out were defended by mines and torpedoes. Referring to Mr Churchill's pre» sentment of the enterprise to the War Council, the Commission, without impugning his good faith, says it BGems clear that ha was carried away by a sanguine tempomment, and a firm belief iD the undertaking. The evidarca shows he obtained experts support to a less extent than he imagined and it is also clear that Ad* mira) Carden greatly underestimated the Turks opposition. Lord Kitchener held the opinion that once our ships were through, ; the position at Gallipoli wouid to be important. Moreover the others, including Earl Grey, confidently anticipated the evacuation of Constantinople when, our flset entered the Sea of Marmora. Then the idea of a purely naval operation gradually dropped in prestige and we drifted into a big military attack. Lord Kitchener on May 14th said that he realised that if the fleet failed the Army would need to help the Navy through. On February 16th he informed a meeting of Ministers that he had decided to despatch the twenih-ninth division. Acute discussions then took place in the War Council between the l*6th and 26th and Lord Kitchener's views underwent a change, as now there was no chance of breaking off the Dardanelles attack. There was a sharp difference ou the

20th between Lord Kitchener and Mr Churchill owing to a decision not to send the Twenty-ninth Division. Lord Kitchener held that a naval division with Australians and New Zealanders from Egypt would be adequate and he still thought that the fleet would got through. General Bird wood on March sth telegraphed Lord Kitchener that it was very doubtful if the Navy could force a passage unassisted, but in any base it would take a considerable time, as^the Admiral’s forecast was too sanguine. Then Lord Kitchener decided to despatch the Twenty-ninth Division, bat three weeks of valuable time were then lost. Lord Kitohonor was mainly responsible for tbeS9 decisions, although, if alive, he might throw new light upon them. It ia strange that the actualities of the situation should not have been more fully realised by Lord Kitchener and his colleagues. There were only two alternatives, either to face the loss of prestige by abandoning the Dardanelles or boldly to face the risk which would have been involved elsewhere by a deter*

mined effort to fotce the Dardanelles by a rapid combined attack in great strength. Unfortunately the Government adopted neither alternative for three weeks end the Government vacilated until the moment fur action bad lapsed, and the Turks were enabled to formidably strengthen their position. Mr Churchill wbb justified in attaching importance to the delay in despatching the Twenty-ninth Division. Even when Sir lan Hamilton on the eve of bis departure from London conversed with Lord Kitchener it was abundantly, clear that fhe scope of operations was not fully decided upon and Sic lau iu his evidence, dwelt strongly on the absence of information by the War Office staff. No scheme was drawn up and no water supply arrangements were made and there was a great want of staff preparations. Lord I'l..cliiD©r still clung to gettiug through without military aid and Sir lan Hamilton went out with that impreasioa.

He took Lord Kitchener's telegram that a passage through the Dardanelles must be forced as pre-Bmptory # Admiral Ds Roebeck in his evidence realised that it wat o tl/ possible for the fLet to stay in tbe Sea of Mf.r----m ra if a revolution broke out in Constantinople, otherwise it would have aims out again. I f > would have been difficult anyway for the transports to follow up in the straits. The Commission thought that it was clear that Admirable Deßobeck’a opinion was greatly influenced by pci tical considerations, and the loss of prestige if the attack weie abandoned. Sir lan Hamilton on March 19th telegraphed Lord Kitchener that he was reluctantly convinced that our battleships were unlikely to force a passage and that if the army were to participate the operations would not assume the subsidiary form anticipated. Owing to Hamilton’s and de Robeck’a presentations on March 23rd, the operations were postponed until adequate military forces assembled. The Comm'ss-on fmd that although tbe attempt to force the Dardanelles was a failure it vas fairly successful in relieving the pressure on Russia, while it delayed the earlier entry of Bulgaria into the .. war and kept a

large force of Turks a long whilo unmobilised. Dissenting Minutes. London, March 9 Mr Andrew Fi.-ber attached a minutes, dissenting from the view the report takes, and disagrees with the view that the naval advisers should have expressed their views to .the Council whether asked or not, if they considered the Council's project un* practicable navally. He algo differs from the Commission’s inability to concur with Lord Fisher’s views that he should maintain silence or resign. Mr Andrew Fisher expresses the opinion that it would seal the fate of responsible government, if State servants shared the responsibility of Ministers. Sir T. Mackenzie in a minute declares that it is premature to report an express opinion on the general results, Sufficient evidence had not been taken to enable a decision cn tha objects attained and it was necessary to complete the inquiry into the subsidiary operations to secure the true perspective and' he agrees with Mr Andrew Fisher respecting the experts giving their views unasked, Report to be Discussed. (Received Maroh 10, at 9 a.m.) London, March 9 Mr Asquith will ask the Government whether they will grant a day for. discussion of the Dardanelles report, and puhlish the evidence. It is understood that the debate wilt be permitted, but it is unlikely that the evidence will bo published, without carefully editing. Germans Abandon Efforts. Pakis, March 8

.Semi-official: The Germans in view of their defeat at Caurieres Wood have apparently discontinued their effort on the right bank of the Meuse, but our batteries dispersed troops massing north of Malincourt, apparently with a -view to a surprise below. Merely secondary actions have taken place on the rest of the front, but the cannonade is so furious th3t it caa be heard in Paris as in the battle of the Marae. The British on the Ancre are consolidating the conquered positions. French Arrivals and Losses. Paris, Marob 8 Official—There ware 859 merchantmen arrivals at French ports for the week ending. 4:b. The sinkings were one over 1,600 tens, and odb under 1,600 tons. Sixteen French fishers were sunk, French Destroyer Sunk. Paris, March 8 Official : Oar destroyer Oasin was torpedoed in the Mediterranean on the 28th February. The magazine exploded and the vessel Bank in two minutes. Seven officers and one hun-

dred men perished.. Two officers and thirty-two men were saved. Iceland Isolated. Copenhagen, Maroh 8 Owing to submarining, Iceland has been isohted for a month. The equation is alarming because there are no stores of foodstuff*. A hundred Iceland merohanta are stranded in Copenhagen. They are urging that Danish warships be sent to Iceland with sup. plies. Produce Exchange. London, March 9 At Lord Davonpoit’s instance the Produce Exchange convened a meeting of the principal provision firms throughout the country, when it was decided to fix the maximum prices for better, cheese, bacon and lard and to prohibit inter-trading. Importers must only sell to wholesalers and retailers, not to importers, except without profit or commission. Similarly wholesalers must only sell to retailers who oan only sell to oon~ earners.