MINED

Hokitika Guardian, 10 March 1917, Page 1

MINED

The’‘Barbed Wire” of the Sea.

One cannot be at (sea V6ty long in any ktnd of a fighting ship without discovering that the Navy hns its own kind of “batbad wire” to contend against. ’ ■

This is not strung p.b?a‘ on poles, neither does it bristle up defiantly like the wire which sprawls aggressively all along the Western Front.

In fact there ia a wide difference between the two. The latter makes en ugly enough obstacle to face, with its “ gooseberries ” that tear at the feet and lorg, octopus-hks tendril that hold in deadly grip.s-.h<fever they once twist around. Bat with a l its horrors this invention of the Evil One is not nearly ss bad as the ” barbed wire ” which the s.Atur has to face.

When glaocirg over an up-‘o-date chart of the North Sea one finds it blotched all about with markings which look like eruptions. As a matter of faot these markings do indicate possible eruptions, for they show the wheri-abaa's of minefields. These ate tho “batbed w;ra” of th-j to*, &cd ft nxstier thin'g to ran against eua", w.th all hia ingenuity in devising methods of destruction, bai never contriv.-d. One need ex-rt no tffjrt of imagine. - tion to justify the cjcnparisiit, for tie minefield answer* jast the same purpose afloat as the barbed wire entangleraeut does ou shore.

Without it.sen war would be a very d fferent (’■attar from what it now ia, or, at iea’t, iu the narrow waters wtiers all the most important fighting mart take plao ! ), ' Ore has o;ly to look cursorily at the situation to urde:Btaod how important an influence tins uiiv il "bribed wire” exercises up m the ccod...ct of opera..ions tfl -ufe

For one thing it limite the movements of the belligerent forces. Even our Grand Fleet, master though it be of the seas, cannot go wht rover it peases because of tho miuefisldasc\=teted about the water- Whenever the sea Hun wants to “ dig himself in" at a base he drops a minefield in front of it, and behind this protection proceeds wi h his task, well knowing that no British admiral would be so foolish as to play tho enemy’s game by taking ins ships into such a dangerous area.

And they are not little minefields that the Hun puts down. Some of those he has laid in tho North Sea are quite the biggest entanglements ” of the kind ever constructed, containing, as they do, thousands upon thousands of floating death-traps They have cost him a great deal of money, but from his point, of view it has been money well spent, since no hostile ship can get through a minefield uuless it knows the secret chanuels, and where such exist they are continually being changed in order to prevent any of our vessels discovering, and using, them.

KEEPING- MINEFIELDS INTACT. Experience has taught the Hun that he cannot rely for safety even on his naval “ barbed wire ” unless he spends a good deal of time Keeping it intact. Our submarines are very inquisitive and have a habit of “ poking their way ” through his thorniest “entangle* men:s,” which give the Hun many uncomfortab'e moments. Although we on this side of the Channel hear nothing about these incidents, time ond again have our E-boats crept through his “ barbed wire ” and dared the lTuu in his lair ; so much so that he never feels wholly secure against them. Surface vessels, however, are quite another matter. For them to attempt “jumping” a minefield would mean almost certain destruction. Barbed wire erected against tro ps cm bo destroyed by artillery. The kind used at sin cannot be s-vapt away in this fasmoo. A squtidion might bombard a minefield until its guns were worn out and the “ 60iar gletn°ut ” wornd stiii bo irapas?üble. Toe only aafa way of treating guoh an obstraotieu lies in finding out

' its position uud than keeping awuy Iroui if. And 8; bat is it e course ge • err I v adopri-r*. Minefields ()ia\ tl e pat tof c >rce g l ?na-e« a* well is nro tctioLs O't* t enough have tha II n* tria l to a:U' 1 our ships i< to tbsm, though tor c orc> h-tva ihev tuc'aedai in don » thi-. Numb vs of such trn a 1 were laid for Sir John Jeilicoe, a <{ he fe'l info nno r£ tlmrr. ia fact, the oi.l/ ships lost in G.rm i inim.fields Lavs h,- n t.he Gertmv ’ o -n. J.?3t kiw maa,- they h ve h 1 destroyed and billy d-un-ged in t* a wey passably the Marin carat (Admiralty) siloes know-. Certainly it ii more than 003 or two. and in practically eveiy c»se they am d’easter t y dashing iuto thoir o u rainos wb a

running away from 'Britts* vess t which we«'e chising thorn. The G. - mane, you e>, had to get home corn - how in order to reach safety, «h a our ships were able to stop when tb y plo ised and therefore con d keep clear of unceceeeery dangers. By beat ing ntn id • at the presence of these dt .th-bestrawn d in the way of “’Oping iff ” cruising grounds, one becomes the better able to understand certain naval happenings which might otherwise seem a bit puzz’ng. Such for example, as the pero to *• comings oat” of the Gmam High Seas Pleat. Every now and again we are told from. Berlin that. “Ou’ Hgh Seas Fleet went out iuto thi North Sea yesterday and returned again with* out meeting with the enemy.”

WHAT ‘‘COMING OUT’MEANS. Now thia may be quite true in so far as the bare statetnpot of fact g 093 though a rank lie at tegarda the implication sought to be couveyed by it. The German Fleet “conus out ” in this way quite often—acd there is nothing to *t’p it from doing so. What really happens on these occasions is that the Et iaei’s timid “ Armada ” leaves hat hour, steams up and down inshore behind the shtlter of its minefield?, possibly ventures a little into some neutral three-mile limit, and then “ turns again borne.” Ao a militaty effort each a “cruise ” counts for nothing, being about equivalent to a battalion of the Ptussian Guatd going for a route march twenty milts behind the German front and then boasting that it was not molested en route by any of the Allied treops. For all practical purpoees two fleets might ju«t as well have a stretch of dry land between them as a tniuefield, since the one is no more passable to ships than the other, acd so long as the German High Seas Fleet keeps within the shelter of its miles-wide mint-fields it nriy continue to *• coma out ” with impunity. Upon such occasions the German nav&l commander takes very good care to keen the minefields between himself and the British Fleet, and not to put them between bim?eif and tha shore. This tiavtl " barbed wire ” also socoon's foe sundry things that haopu.ff Z.ebtugge,. From that b ee Han destroyers creep out and ae ze Diirch merchantmen by earning from behind min fields find “grabbing” the unlucky Hollanders, uceh after tha fashion of a fco.pad sptinging on an unsuspecting traveller frem behind a wati. And ‘the minefield likewise plays an important part in connection with the sporadic fo r ays of enemy torpedo craft. Without it i ueb guerrillalike adventures would be far less eaey. -tSut tha raiders can bolt out and bolt back again knowing that after reaching a certain point on tha way home thsy mill bo Pretty secure against attacks, the minefields will stop pursuers from risking their ksels in unsafe waters at night. “If wo know where, this ‘barbed wire ’ is down, why don’t we watch the pkeee ? ” ore may ask. Ate you sure we do no- ? Af er all what do we fo’ki s-.hote knov of what h .ppens at sea ? Practically nothing at all! Always the Navy has been silent, now it is quite dumb. But one should net as-urne that because the N-ivv is dumb it is likewise aslesp. More than once Father Neptune (who is the only person privileged to watch these things) has seen our destroyers pluyiug at 11 long bowls ” across a minefield with enemy destroyers which were taking shelter behind the barrier. And it does not follow that this “ barbed wire” sfiovt wil always stay our progress auy more than the barbed wire m land does.