THE DARDANELLES COMMISSION

Hokitika Guardian, 10 March 1917, Page 4

THE DARDANELLES COMMISSION

The Finding of the Enquiry.

The Blame Apportioned

An 111-Considered Venture. U'EU CBKSS ASSOCIATION. COPYRIGHT], (Australian & N.Z. Cablß Association and Renter.) - LONDON, March 8. From the commencement until JNov. 25th, 1914, no chango was made in tno machinery for the superior conduct of naval and military operations. This machinery consisted of the Cabinet, assisted by a committee of imperial Defence with the War Office and the Admiralty acting as executive agents. It must have been obvious from tne first .that it was far too numerous to control effectively the conduct of the war, and it is regrettable that this rudimentary fart. was not recognised immediately after the outbreak of the war. This was the position for four months when events of the most importance were occurring. The machinery for the higher operations were both clumsy and inefficient, and eventually an improvement was effected. The Cabinet appears to have been generally informed of any important decisions taken by the War Council, but not until executive steps had been taken to give whole or partial effect to the Council’s decisions.

This is what happened over the naval and military operations at the Dardanelles.

Some members of /the Cabinet did nor wish to bo informed of what was going on.

Mr Churchill during his examination said: “I often heard the Cabinet say they did not wish ,to hear this secret matter, and the fewer who know about it the better.” The report adds that these members were very rightly content to delegate full powers of the Cabinet to their colleagues on the War Council.

Mr. McKenna in his evilence confirmed this delegation. A distinction lias to be made between the real 'responsibility devolving on several Ministers who were members of the War Council. Mr. Lloyd George and Earl Grey shared an undoubted and very legitimate influence, but the main responsibility rested on Mr Asquith and Lord Kitchener. Mr Churchill, later in his evidence, said: “In the early stages the war was carried on by Mr Asquith, Lord Kitchener and me, but I was on rather a different plane. I had not the same authority as Mr Asquith or Lord Kitchener, and if they said this or that was to be done that settled it.”

The Commission finds this description of the working of the machine substantially Correct, save ML at Mr 1 Churchill probably assigned to himself a more unobtrusive part than he actually played. There was a distinction between the War Office and the Admiralty. Mr Wolfe Murray stated thax. m/o Kitchener acted very much as his own Chief of S/taff, and he (Murray) was never asked to exprss any opinion. In the Admiralty it was different. Mr Churchill was not an expert, and Lord Fisher and Wilson acted as experts. Lord Fisher explained neither he nor Murray, nor Wilson, were members of the War Council • “ we were experts who only opened our mouths when told, and we were never asked anything about the Dardanelles.” The majority finds that Mr Churchill initiated the attack at the Dardanelles in the War Council on 24th November, 1914, as an ideal method of defending Egypt and Russia. Lord Kitchener declared that troops were not available and the War Ctetuicil’s acceptance was unfortunate because investigation would have revealed otherwise.

Thus naval action or none had to no decided by Admirals Fisher and Wilson, both of whom did not express any dissent to the proposed naval action alone.

They should have expressed their their view if they thought the project was navally' impracticable. They did not object, however, becauso they regarded the operation as experimental only.,

The Commission thinks there was an obligation first on Mr Churchill ana next on Mr Asquith, and next on another member of the War Council to insist upon a clear expression of expert opinion on a naval action alone, because the chances of a surprise amphibious attack offered such great military and political advantages that it was mistaken and ill-advised to sacrifice them by a hasty and purely naval at-

tcek,'which could not itself secure the desired objecjts. Admiral Wilson confirmed [Lord Fisher’s statements. Mr Churchill in his evidence declared that his aiaval colleagues had the right and the power to correct him, or dissent from his views, and were fully cognisant of their rights. Earl Grey stated that the War Council went entirely, in naval and military matters, by the opinions expressed by the two Minsters.

Mr Balfour gave the opinion that if the experts did not express their opinions he would infer that they assented, and ho did not think they should remain silent if they did not agree to the propositions.

Military experts stood on a different footing, because Lord Kitchener wu» an expert.

lie, however, thought that the members of the. Cabinet presiding should have facilitated the experts’ assent or dissent by asking them. Lord Haldane said ho would expect Lord Fisher, if he had any objections, to have stated them. He did not concur with Lord Fisher’s view of the War Council’s care, and ho thought that the political members of the Council did too much talking, and the experts too little. ILloyd Gieorgo also disagreed Lord Fisher’s view and none of the junior Sea Lords were consulted about the Dardanelles. Commodore Lambert" expressed .the opinion that the Dardanelles was a proper subject for the Admiralty Board. At a discussion on Nov. 22nd, 1915, the Junior iSea Lords submitted a minute to Mr Balfour that the principle that the supremacy of the First Lord is comploto and unassailable, bad been

pushed 'oo 'a- and tended to imperil our national safety. Tlio Commission considered that nan the naval members of the Board been regularly and collectively consulted on the large questions of war policy during the present naval campaign, some at least of the events which the Empire is bitterly deploring would not have happened; that until the authority and responsibility of the Sea Lords were enlarged and defined there coma be no adequate assurance that similar disasters would not recur.

Mr Churchill agreed that the four Sea Lords should be fully consulted, but Prince Louis of Battenburg and Lord Fisher did not favour this. The Commission found that Mr Asquith was ill-informed of the way tho Admiralty business was being conducted when he told the Commission that the War Council was entitled to assume that any view submitted by the First Lord was considered the opinion of the Admiraly Board.

•Regarding War Office administration the Commission, thinks it regrettable that the devolution of authority and responsibility on which the War Office is based was ignored by Lord Kitchener and all the evidence points to the fact that Lord Kitchener did not consult his subordinates and gave prders over the chiefs of departments. He centralised the whole administration in his own hands, and when an order in council at a later stage in the war restored the power of the Chief of the General 'Staff Mr Reginald Brade opined that this was due to Lord Kitchener’s not asking or disregarding the advice of the General Staff. Lord Kitchener pushed this centralisation to the extreme, and though it proved eminently successful inj the Soudan it was unsuitable for a largo scale of operations, and threw work on the hands of one man, with which no individual could successfully cope. Dealing with the narrative of the Dardanelles events the Commission concurs with Admiral Jackson that the Nov. 3rd bombardment was a mistaKe calculated to place tho Turks on tho alert, and this order emanated solely from Ithe Admiralty, and (the War Council was not consulted. On 25th November Mr Churchill suggested an attack on Gallipoli which would give control of the Dardanelles and enable us to dictate terms at Constantinouple. He admitted that tho operation was a difficult one, and would require a largo force. Lord Kitchener agreed that it might be necessary to make a diversion by attacking the Turkish communication, hut the moment had not arrived. On January 2nd,1915, tho Russians wero somewhat had pressed in the Caucasus, and Russia asked for a demonstration against the Turks in order to relieve the pressure. The Foreign Office sent a telegram drafted by the War Office stating that a demonstration would be made, though it was feared that any action would not seriously affect the withdrawal of it lie enemy troops in the Caucasus.

Mr Asquith and Mr Churchill aid not see this telegram ,though later they thought that Lord Kitchener’s reply was the outcome of a conversation with him, and Lord Kitchener writing to Mr Churchill said : “Had troops land anywhere, the only place for a demonstration is the Dardanelles, but we are not ready for anything ibig for some months.”

The Commission opines that although Lord Kitchener pressed for demonstrations, this did not neccessarily involve the attempt to force a passage.

The proper conclusion seems to he that when a demonstration appeared necessary Mr. Churchhill thought it possible a passage as the men and army were a passage as he men and army was ready and ho had to provide for Home •Defence and he was unwilling to withdraw a single man from France. Mr. Churchill’s. views as to the success of a purely naval operation were more omptimistic than warranted by the experts’ opinion, therefore Lord Kitchener grasped too eagerly at the proposal to use the lleot alone, but the responsibility rested rather with Mr. Churchill.

The latter alleged mavellous potentialities of tho Queen Elizabeth, whoso astounding effectiveness would revoluisa all warfare.

The decision on 16th February, 1010, to mass troops in the 'neighbourhood of the Dardanelles marked the critical stage of the whole operation. The Commission considers that inasmuch as time was important, no eompromiso was fLen possible between making an immediate vigorous efFort to ensure success by a joint naval and military occupation, or falling back on the original intention of desisting from a navaH attack if,the experiences gained during the bombardment were unsatisfactory.

Lord Kitchener decided on 20th Feb. that the Twenty-Ninth Division ana part of the troops which, by the decision of the 16th, were to have been sent Ealtsward, should not then he sent, and Colonel Fitzgerald, by Lord Kitchener’s orders, instructed the Director of Naval Transports that transports for that division and the restof the Expeditionary Force would not bo required. Tliis was done without informing Mr Churchill, and the consequent delay of three weeks in the despatch of the troops gravely compromised the probability of the success of tlie original attack by the land forces, and materially increased the difficulties of the final attack.

Tho Commissioners consider that in view of tho opinions of the navai nina military authorities on the spot the decision to abandon the naval attack after the bombardment of the 18th March was inevitable. They point out that there was no meeting of tho War Council between 19th March, and 141 i May, while important land operations were undertaken. They think that before such operations were commenced the War Council should certainly hare considered the whole position ,and they opine that tne Premier ought to hare summoned a meeting of the War Council for that purpose, and if he did not do so other members of the War Council should have pressed for such a meeting. The Commissioners think that this was a serious omission and opino that Lord Kitchener did not sufficiently avail himself of the services of his general stall', with tho result that he undertook more work than was possible for one man to do, thus causing confusion and a want of efficiency.

They are unable to concur in Lora Fisher’s view that it was liis duty, if he differed from Mr Churchill, to maintain silence at the Council or resign. They think that the adoption of any such principle generally would impair the efficiency of tho public services. Although the main object was not attained certain important political advantages were secured by the Expedition, but whether those advantages axe worth the loss of life and treasure involved must remain a matter of opinion.

The Commission states that the evidence confirms the accuracy of Mr Asquith’s statement that Lord Fisher reluctantly acquiesced in the Dardanelles operation so long as lie thought it would not seriously interfere with his plans elesewliere. It may bo he was convinced that the demands made upon the fleet fori Dardanelles preudiced his alternative schemes and ho resigned. Although Lord Fisher in his evidence said lie was dead against a naval operation alonb, lie did not, at the time, express any such lecided opinions The actual decision arrived at by the War Council on January 13tli after hearing Lord Kitchener and Mr Churchill, while Lords Fisher, Wilson and Murray remained silent, was couched as follows: “Naval expedition in February to take Gallipoli with Constantinople as the objective.” The report is signed by all themembers except the Hon. W. F. Roch, M.P. P.

THE MINORITY REPORT.

LONDON, March 8. In a lengthy minority report Mr Roach, M.P., states that forcing tho Dardanelles had been considered when Lord Fisher commanded the Mediterranean, and later when Lord Fisher was First Sea Lord in 1916, and by the General Staff. Lord. Fisher decided that it was mighty hazardous, and the general staff decided against a naval or military action. On 28th December, 1914, Hankey circulated a memorandum to the War Council suggesting that the Germans could he struck effectively througn Turkey. In January, 1915, Mr Lloyd George in a memorandum outlined a far-reach-ing policy against Austria in co-opera-tion with the Greeks, Roumanians and Serbians, also the withdrawal of substantial forces from France. Admiral Jackson presented to Mr Churchill a memorandum against the possibility of rushing the Dardanelles, and showing the losses involved in ever reaching the Straits. Lord Fisher. Wilson and Oliver expressed objections to a naval attack, but after the War Council meeting on 13 January they commenced working otu details for the systematic reduction of the forts by a naval bombardment. Later Lord Fisher told Mr Churchill that he would attend tho War Council but did not liko this Dardanelles affair; whereupon Mr. Asquith, wrote Lord Fish er stating that lie thought it imperaivc that Lord Fisher should attend half an hour before the meeting on the 28th January for discussion, and Mr Asquith, Mr Churchill and Lord Fisher fully discussed the proposal. Later at a War Council a dramatic incident occurred. After Mr Churchill had explained liis scheme on the map Lord Fisher left the tabic. Lord itchener followed, and asiteci Lord Fisher ivhaifc he intended to do and Fisher replied that he would not return to the table, but intended to resign as First Sea Lord. Lord Kitchener followed, and asked lie was the only dissentient, and as Mr. Asquith had decided upon tho venture Lord Fisher should remain at the Admiralty.

Lord Fisher after further conversation reluctantly gave in to Kitcheners entreaty and resumed liis seat on 14th May.

When tho War Council decided to persevere with tho scheme Lord Fisher thought that his great alternative scheme, which had been his main preoccupation during the period, and to which his mind and energies had been almost exclusively devoted, was doomed and he said : “I have been faced tby tlie progressive frustration of my main schemes of naval strategy,” and the following day he resigned his post. Meanwhile on 12th March, Sir lan Hamilton was nominated to command the Dardanelles forces, and was leaving for the Dardanelles the next day.

Ho assisted in no staff preparations, and no preliminary scheme of operations of any kind. It was still assumed that the .Navy would force a passage, and the War Council on 19th March authorised Mr Churchill, to jjnUorm Admiral dJo Ho heck to continue tho Dardanelles operations as he thought fit.

The War Council did not meet until May 14tb.

The minority report concludes:—The War Council eoncentratel its attention too much upon tho political ends gainable in an Elastern offensive, and it never had detailed a staff, or estimated of men, munitions or material, or any definite plans showing wluvt military operations were possible. The War Council underestimated,, without any real investigation, !the strength of the Turkish opposition, and rejected, without sufficient consideration, all previous expert opinions against a naval attack on the forts. Mr Churchill tailed to present fully to tlie War Council the opinions of his naval advisers, and lie failed to consult tlie Board of Admralty. Mr Roach decides that important political advantages were gained by the first success of the naval attack, but he strongly urges that similar operations in the future should bo thoroughly considered by a joint naval and military staff.