THE WAR

Horowhenua Chronicle, 4 November 1915, Page 3

THE WAR

«- 1 Kf.WOl UIC TKLKUIUi'U— COrJtßUaH'f.] i l'JCll i'ilt'SS ASSOCIATION i THE RT. HON. H. H. ASQbTTH'S SPEECH. London, November 2. The House oi Commons was packed when the lit. Hon. H. 11. Asquith rose to make his statement 011 the present position of affairs. Reierring to tho operations at Dardanelles lie said that from the moment Turkey entered into the war it was 110 longer possible, either from the strategic or political viewpoint, to concentrate entire energies 111 the western theatre. The Turks threatened the Russians in Caucasus and indirectly threatened Egypt. The Turks Here able to close tho Black Soa and our supplies of Russian wheat .rom the Black Sea ports, and their entry also produced a great and lasting effect on the attitude of the Balkan States. Consequently the Government 'had to lace tho question in the Near East, not merely strategically, but had to consider and consult with its naval and military advisers as to tho best and most politic course to take, either aggressively or otherwise. Britain in January had not sufficient militjary forces available for service in the East o'- to do more than provide for the local defence of Egypt against the Turkish attack, .which was ultimately defeated in February.

The Government had then brought to their notice the possibility of a naval attack 011 the Dardanelles. Alter full ■investigation, consultation with the naval experts, including the Admiral commanding that part ot the Mediterranean, and notwithstanding some doubts and hesitation in tho mind ot Lord Fisher, the Goverment felt jusfficd 111 sanctioning a naval attack People who had been thinking and saying that the altack was initiated without full review of all the. latent possibilities Ave re entirely mistaken. It was most carefully conceived and developed by consultation between the Admiral on the spot and the War Staff of the Admiralty, and bet ore any final decision was taken it was communicated to the French Admiralty who entirely approved and agreed to participate therein, ft was enthusiastically received and acclaimed uy the illustrious Grand Duke then commanding tlu Russian Army who rightly thought it would assist him in the Caucasus. The matter was most carefully reviewed over and over again "by the War Council. The operation then conceived Avas purely naval as they could not afford at that time—and Lord Kitchener said so and all agreed—any substantial military support. It was therefore decided to make an attempt with thr> Navy alone. T take my hill share of responsibility of initiating that operation, my full share, and T deprecate more than I can say tlio attempt to allocate blame to one Minister or another. or the suggestion that some undefined personality 01 great authority and over-mastering Avill controlled and directed the strategy. That Ava.s not the case. No 0110 is more responsible than I am. T thought then, as everybody must have thouglit who knew tho Avhole circumstances, that we would run risks, especially as very great objects were in view—navnelv to influence the whole H-ill •ran .-■iviatinn 111 a sense favourable to tho Allies, to open communication with the Tilnck Sea, and to strike a blow at the very heart of the Turkish Empire. The operations culminated in the attack on the Narrows Avhich resulted in a set-back. Government had then to consider avlic-tli-er further operations should be_ continued. ft was the opinion of the advisers of the Government., and it seemed a very tenable opinion... that by the aid of an ad-equate military force an atir'ck might, still he driven home successfully. General Si>■ lan Hamilton Avas selected to conduct the expedition. He had witnessed the naval attack, and lie and tho Vice-Admiral 011 tho spot wore in agreement that the joint naval and military attack was necessary. The active plan of operation was left to the judgment of the commanders 011 the spot and there was never any disagreement between them and the opinion of the General Statf in Britain.

flic aetim-i operations wore familiar to cvorybody and he would only say that, in the whole course of the war he had never sustained keener disappointment than that by the failuruo of the operation. At the beginning oi August the chances of success seemed not only great but preponderating, and the consequences of succor would have been almost immeasurable and it would have solved the Avliole situation in the Balkans, prevented Bulgaria from entering tho war. left Constantinople open to capture, and been claimel throughout the Eastern world as a most brilliant demonstration of the Allies. But it did not .succeed, notwithstanding the magnificent exhibition, never surpassed, of the gallantry and resources of the British troops and none were more conspicuoiYs than the Australians and New Zonlanders. Nor .should the House forget the extraordinary services rendered by the Navy.