The Chronicle PUBLISHED DAILY. LEVIN. MONDAY, FEBRUARY 23. EMPLOYERS LIABILITIES FOR ACCIDENT COMPENSATION.

Horowhenua Chronicle, 23 February 1914, Page 2

The Chronicle PUBLISHED DAILY. LEVIN. MONDAY, FEBRUARY 23. EMPLOYERS LIABILITIES FOR ACCIDENT COMPENSATION.

t JL\ the so days of complex liabilities at Jaw practically everybody runs some risk of being cast in i compensatory damages for acei- I dent caused to some employee. Where the person responsible lias been wise enough to secure an insurance policy the trouble is minimised, but there are cases wheroin no liability to compensation is suspected. JJrotully speaking, it is advisable for every employer to carry an insurance policy, whether he employs casual labour only or regular hands. A sidelight on the unexpectedness of legal liabilities to compensate for accident is all'ordod by a recent judgment of Sir libber! Stout, Chief Justice, in the Napier case of Toohill v. Hind marsh and another. The point made is of such wide interest that, we aVe led to quote from the judgment. His Honour said : "I am asked to rule on certain question of law preliminary to the trial of this action. The action is for damages for breach of the sfatutory duty imposed by section 7 (2) of the Scaffolding Inspection Act, 1008. That subsection is as follows: '7. (2.) When any building is in the course of election, repair, or structural alteration, it shall be the duty of the person having the control or management of such operations to make provision, in the satisfaction of the Inspector, for the protection of workmen and others within such building or in the vicinity thereof by boardingover the joists of such building, and keeping them so boarded over so long as any risk of accident Avould be incurred by the removal of such protection. , "It appeal's thai for part of the building there was a contractor, but that for the woodwork there was no contractor, ihe proprietor employing an overseer and paying the employees their wages. The two question that arise are, - "(1.) Was the proprietor in such a ease 'the person having the control or management' of ihe erection of the building? "(2.) It so, can hi; plead that the non-fulfilment of the statutory requirements was caused by the neglect of a fellow-servant of the plaintiff so as to exempt the proprietor from liability r , "(1.) I am of opinion that the proprietor was 'the person having the control and management' of the operations. He appointed the overseer and he paid the wages, and he could have removed the overseer and dismissed the workmen, or ordered anything he desired. In my opinion he comes within the very words of tlio subsection. "(2-) Kegarding the second question there is, in my opinion, no difficulty. If a statutory requirement is not complied with by the proprietor, it being his duty to comply with it, ho eanuot be heard to say that a fellow-servant was negligent. The words oi Lord Shaw in 13uLier (or JJlackJ ana Another v. I'ife Coal Company (Limited) A.C. IVJ) are especially applicable. He says, at p. 17-I,— " 'In (J roves v. Lord \\ inborue (1898, 2 Q. 13. -11W, -ill)), a case iountled upon the neglect to keep machinery properly fenced in accordance with the provisions of the factory and \\ orkskop Act, the same view on the point of principle was taken, A. L. Smith, L.J., remarking, 'In the present ease, which is an action founded on the statute, there is no resort to negligence on the part of a fellow-servant or of any one el.se. There being an unqualified statutory obligation imposed upon the defendant, what answer can it be to an action for the breach of that duty to say that his servant was guilty of negligence, and therefore he was not liable:" Ihe defendant cannot shift his responsibility for the performance ui his statutory duty on to the shoulders of another person, lliu language of Kigby, L.J., is, if possible, sliJl more, unambiguous. It is in the. folowing .terms : 'Ihere |,as been a failure in the performance of an absolute statutory duly and there is no need for the plain- ;| tilV to allege or prove negligence j s on the part of any one in order to make out his cause of action. That being so the doctrine of. ( common employment is out of the • t question.' I ( •' 'When to the dicta oi: tlioso s learned Judges there mv adde.i ' those of Fletcher Aloultou, L.J., , ( . and Buckley, L.J., in tTie case of !

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David v. Urittanie Merthvr Coal Company (1909, 2 K. 13. 140, U7), it cannot be, denied that a powerful limlv of authority stands oil tin; books in favour of the proportion, in it> absolute sense, that the defence of' common employment is not pleadable to an action ba>ed upon the neglect of statutory duty. 1 ( l ( . s i ro for myself to say that 1 appreciate the force and cogency of the opinion of Fletcher Moulton, L.J., in the case of David (sup.). "I am therefore of opinion thaf both these questions must be answered in favour of the plaintiff. The first question will lie answered 'Yes,' and the second question