The Eyes of the Army in the Next War.

Horowhenua Chronicle, 24 May 1912, Page 4

The Eyes of the Army in the Next War.

BY CAPTAIN BERTHAM DIOKSON.

(London Daily Mail.) Captain Bertham Diclteon is the well-known airman who, after winning a notahle- triumph at the great French and ContinoHtol aviafcion meetings, had a teriblo collision in tho air and fell at tho Milan meeting in September, 1910. Captain Diekson, a cloeo student of tho science of flight, is tho only Englishman to liavo flown on English manoeuvres.

Napoleon's success as a general wat mainly duo to his 'having very much better information than his enemies, and tliougli tlio Fronci" nrmioe wore small they were quickly moving and better infonnod, were able to be in forao in the rigjht place at tlio right moment. Wβ must not make tho mistake of iinagiihic; that because wo have a small army we require less information. On tlio contrary, tlio sizo of our body for obtaining information ought to increase inversely as tlio size of our army diminishes. On the outbreak of war tho duty of obtaining all possible information concerning tho enemy falls to tho lot of the I.S.O.—tho Independent Strategical Cavalry. This body would have- un arduous task in having to make long ami rapid marches under trying conditions involving acontinual physical stmin for men and boasts in order to make safe a semicircle of Bomo 10 mites radius in front of the army. On mobilisation a largo proportion of cavalry horses mro invariably untrained and unsuitable for the purpose. In the early stages of a campaign the mortality is excessively high. THE TA'SK OF GETTING INFORMATION. 11" an efficiont substitute can bo found for this f#ree to obtain the required information, it must at once bo obvious what an economy in inon and horses would bo gained. I have no doubt that in the noxt European war this role »f obtaining information wiH fee entirely taken over by an aeroplane corps, and the iiugeforce of cavalry thus economised will eoomo a purely fighting unit. Aoroplanes will economic at leasfc a division of cavalry, and, in addition to the comieanders receiving moro reliable informatioH more rapidly, a larger area, of ground will bo kept under observation. Instead of twully drawn-up reports written by troopers or inexperienced officers being the only information of tho enomy th«t a general has to guide him, accurate report* will bo furnished by staff officers who, as noon us the enemy has been located, will bo taken up by the aeroplanes to eoe tho actual ground and the position and force of the enemy. Tin's aeropkno corps, of course, must be regularly organised and equipped with mechanics, spare parts, tools, petrol, etc., in fact all the necessaries required to keep aeroplanes in good trim. This outfit would probably be carried on specially equipped motor-lorrios with an armed escort, the mon of which would most likely be mechanics and would acfe in that capacity as occasion required. This corps could in reasonable weather easily make safe for strategical purposes the widliis of 100-20 ft miles of ordinary country in fnont of the main body.

A JTAVAL AIR CORPS. Tho pace of a monoplane k about sixty miles on hour, and a machine oan easily cover a, distance oi 1300 miles in any weather except storms or gales. Guarding naval ports or fleets against stirpriso is now the work of destroyer flotillas and cruisers. As this duty could be nioro efficiently done in a quarter of the time and with probably onc-hundroth of the cost by aeroplanes, it is clear that it will bo taken over by a naval ain corps. They will furthermore bo an absolute necessity to a fleet of battleships for obtaining information of the enemy's whereabouts. Biplanes on floaters might bo useful near tho shoro for sea work or for practico reconnaissance at times of peace, but personally I before that on actual service in time of war specially designed small fast monoplanes, which can bo easily put to- i gcthor and taken to pieces, and are therefore easily stowed away on board ship, will be tho only machines used. These monoplanes can be no constructed that they will float on "lighting on tho water. They will bo sent off from tho ship % some simple contrivance, and, aftor making reconnaissances of some 100 miles "•ill return to the fleet, landing •■•gam on the ship. if, f or reaßons connected with the exigencies oi tho service or others, tho machine « ''nabe to alight on tho veasel, '• v/.1l descend oti the water close tcv Hip ship, n-hero it n-ill float, tho num. and the machinj then being taken °" *«rd. M an y of these monoP nnee will be carried on uoard ships: ol an- size. The large biplancy

with floaters will he useless for ships in time of war on account of its cumborsomoneas and the difficulty of stowing it on board. Tho future war will probably ehow that three types of aeroplane are necessary. (a) A' fast single-eeator lnoneplano for strategical reconnaissance, replacing the independent cavalry, and for despatch carrying. (b) A fast two-neater monoplane for tactical reconnaissance and for carrying staff officers of commanding 1 officers. Some of these would* carry special arms for attacking the onemy's aeroplanes and dirigibles for harassing the enemy's camps, etc. (c) Large anil slower biplanes capable- of carrying sevoral men or explosives, wireless apparatus, heavy arms. These would bo found extromely nseful on occasions for making quick trips to destroy or hold bridges, keeping off the enemy's flir fleet, hovering about during batilo, and sending wiroloEe information regarding tho enemy's movomonte to the generals, directing artillery firo, efc6.

EUROPEAN , PIIOGHESS. I hope I have been able to ehow what mi absoiuto necessity tho rapid and reliable information obtainable, by aeroplanos will bo in future wars. France will have some' 400 army machines this year; lltfssia. iias followed France's example; Germany has voted large sums to organise and equip an aeroplane- fleet; Italy has found by practical experience in Tripoli the truth of my contentions, and is getting together a hugo aeroplane fleet. In tho caso of a Muropeau war the efforts of tho bolligeroate' respective- aeroplane corps to hinder ono another from getting information and tho inefficaey of firo from the ground to -prevent aeroplane reconnaissances will lead to a struggle for tho command of tho air between armed aeroplanes. This fight for tho supremacy of the air in futuro wars will bo of the first β-ud greatest importance, and when it has been won the land ami sea forces of the loser will be at sncli a disadvantage that the war will certainly have to terminate, like a -gamo of ehess, «t a much smaller Ws in men andmoney, to both sides.