The Triple Understanding.

Horowhenua Chronicle, 21 March 1911, Page 4

The Triple Understanding.

UNAFFECTED BY A RUSSOC4EIUIAX AGREEMENT. (Krom a Special Cor respondent of tlic London Daily Chronicle.) There is a great deal of trepidation just now as to the future of the Triple Entente, or ns my latest Russian correspondent prefers to call it in English, the Triple I'nderstandino-. This is a good thing, because at a crisis of our internal politics we may forget that our European interests also require to be atended to; and. indeed, in the other countries concerned. France and Russia, fears have been expressed that tnc deatli of Kin- Edward, coupled with our political crises, might tend to cancel our role for the time being in Europe. All the .same, there seems to be no reason for any GRAVE ANXIETY. The Triple Understanding is in the nature of things. If in the days of avowelly . absolutist government in Russia 'there could stin be not only an understanding but even an "alliance with republican l-'rance, how nnicih more favorable are the circumstances now, w.heu the beginnings of constitutionalism in Russia have only served to show up the approval by the Russian people of this article of the former policy of the Government. Alliance with France has not given, and will not give, to tli'e Russian Liberals, all that they might like to get from it, but it means in a certain sense "doors open," whereas the old concerted action with Germany usually meant "doors closed." This is only one aspect of the matter; but it must not be forgotten that the Russian Emperor hinis-.>ll last year received a party of Deputies of the

FRENCH CHAMBER. To turn to more everyday interests, French capital is too deeply engaged in Russia, and' the economic transformation of Russia is now far too definite a process for the friendship of France to falter at a moment so propitious to her commercial interests. Rut one becomes much surer of one's ground if one glances back at the action of Germany, with regard to Uussia during the pastfow yoar.s. I,n Russia, Germany is in a sense widely credited with the initiation of that disastrous policy which brought Russia to a premature struggle with Japan under the most unfavorable conditions possible; for Germany is supposed to have wished to create a vacuum on the western froiirtier of Russia, which would leave her free to prosecute 'her own plans. This fear, entertained by Russians, seemed to be confirmed when Austria, with the • SUPPORT OF GERMAKV, proceeded to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and apparently separated Bulgaria from the rising movement of Panslavism in the Balkans. The revolution in Turkey lias been only a temporary check to the political and economic advance of German influence; and we may fairly assume that the German' interests there are too solid to be disturbed. This i.s a great change from the times when England was supposed to be preventing Constantinople from falling into the hands of Russia. From am English point of view, there was also something extremely clumsy in the way Germany obtained her success after the Bosnian annexation when she demanded that Russia should retire from the role-of champion of Slavonic States of the Balkans. If this i.s not Russia's role in European politics, it is hard to see that she has any other. An immediate victory was won a-nd without war; but that has left a lasting soreness which was bound to be felt at least quite as much by the Sovereign audi his Government as by his people, because it was the former that had to accept the responsibility for a reverse which would be remembered by

EVERY PATRIOTIC RUSSIAN. Russia could not then go to war; amongst other things, the internal state of the country absolutely forbade it; hut the check, coming almost in the nature of an affront, r.i.ul from a Power which had always claimed to be friendly to Russia, could hot. soon be forgotten. Of that one could have no doubt, after witnessing the way in which men of the most incompatible political opinions met together in common protest. Now the success of Austria and Germany in the Balkans is precisely the first and most necessary step to the strengthening of German influence, political and economic, along the line that through the Turkish Empire to Persia. AVihy, then should there bo a Ru.sso-Gcrma.il agreement at all? There are several reasons, and they are easily understood. In internal R-itssiain polities, as in external—and this is i one of the things that Englishmen are constantly forgetting— German means, not the German people at all, hut the German Government, which" is regarded by all parties in Russia as the chief prop of absolutism in Europe. This view has over and over again bech expressed, especially by THE REACTIONARIES. The Reactionary leader, Mr Swanebach, addressed his protest against a Russian Constitution, nwt to his own Sovereign, but to the German Emperor. When the Duma men came to England, the Reactionary spokesman, Mr Puvishkovicib, addressed an open letter to the German people through the Kruez Zeitung explaining .that all good' absolutist Russians really hated England. The same gentleman announced last year io the Duma that if a party of representative Enlishmen visited Russia he would try to arrange for them an unfriendly reception. Ts tin's* then, the attitude- of the Russian Government? -Nothing of the sort. But it must he remembered that English friendship is new for the Russian Government, and. as internal .affairs sufficiently testify, the new spirit progresses not without difficulty in Russia and the old prejudices die hard. The Reactionaries have 'no longer any moral support in the country, hut they-still have a disproportionate influence in the vicinity of the Sovereign. However, this is only a partial explanation. Russia has suffered a. severe reverse, followed by great mternnld.isorders. Those who wish to see quiet restored' will not he anxious for new complications. Tt is eminently in the interests of Russia that there should he a period of recuperation, and anyone who is

FEARFUL OF CHANGE —and this mood is very strongly defined ft] many quarters—will certainly not be inclined to drift into anv quarrel with Germany. Beyond l all this, there is no doubt that the Russian Government is 1 right, and' has taken up the correct nosition.Whatever may be the, various opinions as to German aggressiveness, the view both of Russia and England as the same—that there is no hostilIi y T. o,lc Co,mtl 'V because one seeks the friendship of another. Sometimes an opposite view has been attributed £&• Germany; she is supposed to claim that friendship between Jtogland and Russia is in itself.,an offence of bofclv parties against herself. No one will for a moment admit such a claim, and one has no right to believe lightly that it is put forward.- But anyhow, what Russia, appears to have done is to hsve antf-

eipated possible complications by treating on points of detail with the Power 'concerned; and we at leastshould only he glad, for it is what we should no doubt be ready to-do with Germany or with any other Power. . . In face of conflicting reports, it is difficult to know exactly what " has been stipulated; 'but the arrangement appears at the most to reduce itself to an agreement that there shall lie no opposition from to a railwav ending at the Persian Gulf, .-mil connected by Russia with lines traversing THE RUSSIAN ZOXW of Persia. This at once reminds us of the recently published project for a line connecting the Russian railway system with the British Indian. Tins project emanates from a group of Russians long known for their advocacy of friendship to England on grounds of public interest, and carries the support of some of the most prominent financiers in Russia. The through line already reaches Baku on the one.side and Xush-ki on the other. There is required a line from Haku to the Russian frontier, with a continuation through Persia. A glance at the map will show that the whole route is very direct- and cam, if undertaken fairly soon, be completed before any other. It would not bo difficult to bring into touch with it the goods traffic of the Volga ind Caspian, a>id thus reassure the Moscow merchants as to the development of their very important trade with Northern Persia. The present suggestion is that the whole line should be adniinisered by a single international company, which would admit the accession ot other capital besides ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN.

If such a lino is constructed, itwould be no misfortune that a Gorman line terminated at the Persian Gulf were somewhere connected with it. On the contrary, this might prove a guarantee for solidarity ol interests not only of the two hut of the three countries in Persia. In a word, it would apjiear that there is no reason for alarm at the conclusion of the Russo-Gcrman agreement. It would seem to bo an arrangement which we, under similar circumstances, might have concluded out-selves; sttnd it is for many reasons exceedingly unlikely that it will make any serious disturbance of the present balance of forces in' Europe.