ON THE PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE PROVINCIAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT.

Hawke's Bay Weekly Times, Volume 2, Issue 65, 30 March 1868, Page 77

ON THE PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE PROVINCIAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT.

The following Memorandum, oii ‘ certain, changes in the method of administering the government of the province} and* proposed modifications of the whole Brovinciali system of New Zealand, was laid before , the Canterbury Provincial Council on the 28th ult., by his Honor W. S. Mdorhouse, ‘Superintendent of that province According to an intimation'.contained in the opening address, the Superintendent transmits to the Council a memorandum on the subject of. certain changes in the administration of thp Provincial Government under the present Constitution, and also upon the subject of changea in the Constitution of. the colony, calculated to limit the functions of-the General Assembly and Provincial Councils.' It appears to the Superintendent, upon a close consideration of the present circumstances of thiß and other provinces of the colony, that material changes are, not only imminent but required.

These changes are of two kinds:—First, those internal forms which may, within the limit of existing powers, be effected by the Provincial Legislatures.: Secondly, those alterations of the Constitution which can only he made by the Governor and General Assembly. With regard' to internal reforms, they may be comprehensively dealt with under two heads, viz., retrenchment and administration.

As to retrenchment, the Superintendent has caused estimates of expenditure to ba prepared which recommend great reduc* tions in nearly every department, and he is ready to receive suggestions. respecting further reductions which the Council may agree upon as being practicable and consistent with the good of the province.

It would be well, for the Council to consider the present scheme of Executive Government, and determine whether any alteration shall be now made. It appears to the Superintendent that his present position is practically divested of what is commonly understood to be political responsibility—that is, to the people through the Provincial Counoil. He cannot.act in any material particular except under the advice of a legally-appointed. Executive, having the confidence of a majority of the Provincial Council. If the measures of his Government ore rejected, he does not retire with his advisers, from office, but he acts as a matter of course upon the advice of succeeding politicians holding opinions opposite ;to those held by his late Cabinet. A clear apprehension of the incidents of . his’ posr-' tion would prevent a Superintendent from identifying himself personally with ’ the policy of advisers here to-day and gone tomorrow. . He must be no party politician in a provincial sense; hut, under the existing order of things, is 'clearly hound to abstain from any indication of individual feeling or opinion, because it is impossible to say what may be the variety of counsels he may be called upon to accept and apt on during even one year of office. If he advocated particular policies in his Cabinet, there, would be no guarantee that always 'during his ordinary ' term of office he would not be in a minority of the Executive, of which he was nominally the head.

The administration of New Zealand is carried on. by a responsible Government under an .imperial Governor' who, saving his guardianship of imperial interests, is not (under the present advanced condition of the Constitution) personally responsible for the conduct of the administration. ’’He holds a position relative to New Zealand (save in so far as he is responsible for obedience to imperial .directions) ' almost analgous to that held by the Crown'in‘relation to the Empire. In fact the doctrine that “ the Ring can do no wrong” applies (so far as the New Zealand public are concerned) to the Governor as now advised by a responsible ministry. 1 As has been remarked by leading political writers, responsible Government in the case both of the colony and the provinces; has been an entirely spontaneous' grdwth out the will of the public ; not deriving its origin by any imperial statutory prescription. *

Probably political philosophers will not succeed in evolving a system in its broad features better adapted'to a free constitution, so far as the Government of the colony is concerned. The same may be said of Provincial Governments; if it be found expedient to oontinue the provincial Bystems in their present shape and power and importance.

Assuming that the pi ovinces (or at any rate this one and some others) continue to hold similar powers to those exercised at present, it would appear to be necessary to protect the puhlio in the enjoyment of its freedom by imposing the sanfo restraint upon the supreme governing power* in. the provinces asis brought to bear upon the Governor of ;the«colony. But; should a change of - constitution of tti© provinces take place, 'their legislative powers, confining them to ttie management of the material estate of ttie the country ;(£.«., the waste lands and public works), then it would at* once-appear to be consistent with eoonomy to adopt a much more direot, : simple, and inexpensive form of administration. . -

It is even now yeiy plausibly objected to 'the prevailing system of ■ responsible government in the provinces, ; that whatever - .safety may . attend. their' -working ig more than tountsxbalanced^^y i expense?,

and delays, and that the security of public liberty does not > demand‘ the same degree of restraint upon the ; action* of an elected Superintendent .as would. ,he necessary in nominated Governor of a colony; br in the case of a Superintendent nominated by the head of aoolonial political party or faction J That the Superintendent ianotnominated,'but is himself-the elected officer ofthe people. Further, that if,,responsible executives were done -away with; the electors would be more solicitous than* at present to secure' the services of a man eminently capable of personally directing all the departments of his Government, and that the direot and constant pressure of responsibility might be enforced by the voting of supplies for only six* mouths at a time, so necessitating half-yearly meetings of the Council, and consequent statements of accounts, &c. That the responsibility of the Superintendent being sole would operate directly, and would bear more onerously upon the administration of affairs than in its now decided pressure. That the administration would be more nervously prompt. That its policy would disclose a greater uniformity or design and relationship in all its parts. That its expenses, without all impairing its efficiency, might .be made much lower than those of the existing form of administration. That the Council might anticipate the chances of executive' blunders in most cases by making very full disclosures of its wishes. With regard to the means of communication between the Superintendent and Council, that this might well be effected by messages -and addresses, and, in case of difficulties arising out of misconceptions, these' might be very easily cleared away by conferences moved by either' the Superintendent or Council.

Another system of responsibility more nearly allied to the existing one,, has been a good deal discussed, by which the superintendent'would have no responsibility whatever exoept under the Constitution Act, the Provincial Audit Act, and the Limitation of Patronage Ordinance. That he should receive a mere nominal salary, and that his only care should be to ascertain that he did not suffer himself to introduce or concur in legislation or administration that was either beyond his powers or in breach of law. That he should leave the policy of the province to be settled, and the administration to be conducted, by a responsible Ministry supported by a majority of the Council. That fa effect he should solely act as guardian against any possible deviations from legal limits, himself being closely hemined in by statutory restrictions and penalties. If the Council determine to continue the syetefo of- responsible government ; and if the General Government continue the provinces in their present form, the Superintendent would strongly recommend the Council to seriously consider the value of the last mentioned plan.

It is.in-the, highest degree interesting to the public to know the exact spot wherein political responsibility resides. Responsibility, by the foregoing plan, would rest unmistakably ,on the Superintendent’s Ministers ; and the Superintendent’s care would be-to protect himself and the country by restraining breaches of the Constitutional Law..

The Superintendent conceives that a simple 'Vote of a small honorarium to the Superintendent,;. and. Airesoliition that he is not reaponsible;except as above-mentioned, would be all the Action required to be taken by the Council as regards the office and functions ot the 'Superintendent. But as regards the responsible Executive, they should be paid in proportion to the labor and responsibility oast upon them. One great advantage of this arrangement would be, : ; that political. misunderstandings between* the Superintendent and the Provincial'Council, and party leanings by the Superintendent, would be almost unknown.

The above remarks are addressed to the Comicil as bearing upon the present constitution of the provinces, and as treating of changes within their power. ‘ ... But there, are. external powers capable of dealing with the provinces to an almost unlimited extent; and it is the great hope of many very earnest,, able, and conscientious'Politicians to -completely extinguish Provincial Governments; by legislative action in the General Assembly. The Superintendent would here state to the council that his'judgement will hot permit of his being a party to the abolition of the provinces; neither is he inordinately anxious to make any great organic change; but he believes, that the present extraordinary alteration ;in the internal condition of the colony in many: of its provinces will, during the next session of the General Assembly, forcibly lead-to a determination to attempt., a very sweeping, and at the, same time uniform modification of the .provincial system involving material reductions of provincial powers. '‘ i; !i k On> thee other hand a’ stTong ' party will make determined stand in favor of ourtailiqg ( an<|l expressly limiting the action of the' General Goyernmeut, and extending' the- p&vrers of the provinces in a conceSp6hding;,dbgree. ' Political leaders have * gone -to the exfont :of declaring that the legislation of the Assembly should be limited .expressly to those Bubjeots, which, by the, 19th;'clause of.the Constitution, are excepfod ‘from provincial legislation, leaving the: province absolufo-in-allbther matters, the ncqeptanoe of such a theory would necessitate an t,, aipount;: of - retrogressive action jApi aepom-phshmpnt,-but tdaotoatmnal and übte. r '-' 1 -:--V'-

jlt haq always tendent that the provinces attempt legislation in, those few cases where it’ is obviously apparent that exceptional legislation is required to suit exceptional conditions. Writing with considerable knowledge of the colony the Superintendent believes that, save in the matter of the Waste Lands of the Crown and Public Worker, it is not necessary that the provinces should have anyf material ’ legislative powers; , nor that it is necessary that pro vincial' institutions should retain their present form. At the same time the Superintendent has no material objection to urge against either the retention of the present Superintendents and Councils, with greatly reduced legislative powers, or to the present mode of election. However, anticipating the above-mentioned curtailment of provincial functions in one direction, and their material extension in another— i.e., in the matter of land and works—it has occurred to the Superintendent that a different mode of electing Superintendents and Councils might be adopted wiqh a great advantage and fitness. Before proceeding to an explanation of that different mode of election, it would be’ well to state a great patent principle that may well govern the distribution of Colonial and Provincial Government labors. One first great principle, viz.:—

That the General Government shall govern and protect all the people of the colonv, and that the Provincial Governments shall care for and colonise all the lands. The observance of jthis rule would make the General Assembly the ,s,ole legislators on all subjects excepting the sale, letting, and disposal of the waste lands of the Crown, the ordering and execution of public works, the raising of rates and local taxes in aid of local administration, and public works and immigration, ttie division of road boards and districts, and some minor cognate matters. The General Government taking upon itself all the consolidated debts of the colony, and without making any provincial apportionment of. liability in respect of any part of-that debt, defraying both interest and principal out of the consolidated revenues of the colony, thus in effect making the debts of the entire colony a charge not upon the territory but upon the people, and so initiating a system that would in its operations disclose the most extensive guarantee possible against undue increase of public: indebtedness in favor of any quarter of the colony whatever. Under such a plan no further debt could be sanctioned except upon proof of a great public policy iu its favor, as every elector throughout would be interested directly in reducing, or af any rate limiting, the general 'public burthen. Concurrently witti a distinct division of labours, there would also naturally occur a distinct division of revenues.

The General Government would be compelled to confine its fiscal exactions to the supply of its own bare necessities, i.e. t to the payment of the civil staff, the general" legislative expenses, the maintenance of customs, postal, police, - judicial, telegraph, and other of its departments. The provinces, relieved entirely from the responsibility of debt, would have to maintain by their own system of finance all their own proper expenses ; and the provincial establishments, being compelled to go directly to the people Jor the needful means to carry on their operations, would have every proposal for the expunditre of money canvassed by a deeply interested body of critics, and so would follow a much more exact economy than would be likely to arise out of any except very similar causes.

The result of the operation of this system would be tliat in each succeeding year, unless the increase of population were stayed, the Customs and other taxes would admit of gradual reduction, the labouring power of this’ country would be thereby relieved, the necessaries of life cheapened, and then would be commenced a steady progression towards the great commercial desideratum —• virtually free seaports.

This is not the proper opportunity for discussing all the arguments that will be urged for and against the change that must come over the government of the colony. It may be noticed, however, that one line of argument is to be expected from the representations of certain provinces in the General Assembly, in opposition to any proposal to substitute a general oolonial instead of a particular provincial liability, for those parts of the consolidated debt which were incurred by particular provinces.

In addition to the great weight of policy in favour of making the consolidated debt a; final oharge upon the consolidated revenues, reasons of jua&ioe may be urged (entirely unanswerable) why each of the sereral provinces may have exclusive property in its waste lands without being held responsible for, the specific amount of debt it was permitted by the General Government to contract.

Having glanced at the probable direotion of expected changes in the Constitution, the Superintendent sntimits to the Council the expediency of their , now considering what plan, having regard to the imperative wants of other parts of ttie colony, would be most suitable to this province, and . at the same time be . reasonably adapted to the oireumstanees of the otheVs. With a yiew r to the greatest: possible reduotion ih all .ttie expenses of'the colony, I :it-would appear wise on, the part, of the Legislature to make (if possible) the services of ‘the ‘Supexiafoade&ts WAilable in the provincial

administration iof the department of the General Government.. Such administration should he assumed ex officio, not.by appointment of the Prime Minister... But, tmdfer such conditions, it'would be necessary to take the utmost security for his'fitness in point of capacity, as well as of respectability, and popularity. The qnestion then arises, how these desiderata can be arrived at without an abandonment of the elective principle in the appointment :/ of Superintendents. Among uthers; the following might be considered an acceptable expedient: Let the General Assembly, upon the suggestion of the existing Provincial Councils, divide the several provinces into road districts; a ratepayers’ roll for each having been prepared, let the ratepayers first elect their Road Board; secondly, the Board its chairman ; and thirdly, let a Council, composed of Road Board chairmen, mayors of boroughs, and chairmen of municipalities, elect the Superintendent of the province. By such a plan the Superintendent would not only be an elected, but a thriceelected officer; and, as a matter of course, would be most gladly accepted by any Government as ■ex officio administrator of General Government departments in the province. By administration ia this.latter sense is meant administration under instruction derived, not from a Minister, but from the law.

Tbe Superintendent has already adverted to the expediency of establishing complete independence of the General and Provincial Legislatures by maintaining the broadest possible' line of distinction between the subjects, upon which they.may respectively operate. It has been suggested that the simplest division may be effected by leaving the territory within the respective provinces to- be solely disposed of and improved by the Provineial Governments as their principal employment, with power to levy taxes and rates on private estates. All great public works, excepting military defences, might be made by the Provincial Governments, and the Road Boards should care for the minor works. .

The Superintendent elected as last described would be ex officio Chairman of' the Council, §nd the business of the Council being of an entirely material character, might be disposed of in a manner similar to the practice of legislative meetings of pnblic companies, the Chairman conducting the business of the session himself.. Tbe present Audit and Treasury systems would be perfectly applicable. . An alternative course .might be to leave the Constitution as -it now stands. The Superintendent believes this to be impossible. Changes must occur in some of the provinces, and it is hardly probable (notwithstanding all the charm that is said to lie iu variety) that any statesman would be contented to make a patchwork constitution—although, within constitutional limits every province ought to be utterly free to ordain such rules as are its own free choice; still, uniformity iu the constitution of the provinces, if they are to exist at all, is a matter of great economical importance. - The ordaining of a uniform Bystem for the provinces all over these, islands would involve material surrenders of sqme minor privileges, would call for a complete suppression of some much oherished prejudices, and would operate as a very severe test of patriotism. The Superintendent has .endeavoured to make his memorandum brief and suggestive, his principal deßire being to'provoke debates in the Council, for the instruction of its’Government.

W. S. MOORHOUSE. Superintendent of Canterbury.