H.B. TRIBUNE FRIDAY DECEMBER 9, 1927 RUSSIA’S ARMED FORCES

Hawke's Bay Tribune, Volume XVII, 9 December 1927, Page 4

H.B. TRIBUNE FRIDAY DECEMBER 9, 1927 RUSSIA’S ARMED FORCES

IT has been regarded as something rather inconsistent that .Soviet Russia, with numerically by tar the biggest torce in arms oi any European nation, should seek to pose, as it has done at Ueneva, as the leading aspostle oi disarmament. Very lew have given Al. Litvinoff credit tor being actuated by any real desire to establish international peace when he brought forward his theatrical am. impractical proposal for a universal reduction ot armies and armaments. At the same time, there seems quite a possibility that from motives kept well in the background, he was quite sincere in his advocacy of some such general scheme. This idea is suggested by what a recognised military authority, apparently with some inner knowledge of the subject, has recently had to say with regard to conditions that obtain in the armies of the Union of .Socialist Soviet Republics.

According to figures recently cabled to us as coming from headquarters of the League of Nations, the biggest army maintained by any ot its members is that of France, whose pre-war number of 835,000 has been reduced to 637,000. The authority now quoted puts down the peace strength of the Russian army at 1,124,000, while behind this active force there is a reserve of another 9 million of trained men. That the training of these is pretty thorough is shown by the fact that it begins with lads in their ’teens and is continued by five years’ service with the regulars, after which they are drafted into the reserve to be available for immediate calling up until the age of forty, it may thus be seen that, so far as mere numbers are concerned, Soviet Russia is a very formidable military Power. But when we come to the questions of efficiency, ■ equipment and reliability the story is not by any means so impressive.

in the first place, we are told, it would be quite impossible for liussia, under present industrial and financial conditions, to provide outfit for anything like the full number of men thus made available for immediate service. With regard to those in active service all are unusually heavily equipped with automatic guns and rilles “because the Russian is a poor rifle shot, and also because ot the difficulty of transporting heavy guns and ammunition in a country which is poorly, provided with communications.” In fact, the army’s most serious problem is transport. It still relies mainly on horses with a little mechanical transport, though latterly this has been increased by the use of agricultural tractors, which can be called up in the event of war. Then, the Air Force is as yet almost entirely dependent on foreign machines and, to a great extent, on foreign instructors. As for the Tank Corps, it possesses nothing but vehicles that, in vie" of rapid developments, can scarcely be regarded as anything but antiquated. In short, even the active army as a whole lacks material and equipment, while like provision for any strong body of the reserves would be a matter of the greatest d'ffi"idty.

So far as the morale of the troops is in question, we are told that it is good, with a fairly high standard of discipline. At the same time, it has to be recognised that it is, to an extent that gives the Communist dictators considerable anxiety, officered by men who served under the Tsar, while proletariat officers introduced to democratise the service are even more arrogant than the others, whose manners they copy and whom they support. As to the rank and file, the Russian soldier is still a stubborn fighter, but he is no better in his offensive qualities than formerly, and would probably lose all enthusiasm for his trade were he asked to fight abroad. Distinct from the general body of the Soviet’s armed forces are the troops of O.G.P.U. — the secret police—who consist of men specially selected and equipped for the defence of the revolution, the detection and punishment of espionage, and the protection of frontiers. They are a highlyfavoured force of proved Communist sentiments, and it is upon them alone that the Government can depend implicitly to carry out unhesitatingly, indeed with zest, the behests of those from whom they draw their pay. Assuming all or most of what is thus told us to be well founded, there is no difficulty in finding a reason, other than sincere pacifist convictions, for the Soviet rulers being desirous of bringing about reductions in the numerical strength of European armies. These might easily leave them, so far as reliable and efftcive forces are concerned, in a really stronger relative military position than that in which they now stand, while still greater attention and resources could be devoted to the world-wide campaigns of revolutionary propaganda in which their main hopes lie.