DISARMAMENT

Hawke's Bay Tribune, Volume XVII, 26 November 1927, Page 6

DISARMAMENT

CONTINUATION OF DEBATE LABOUR MOTION DEFEATED. LEAGUE OF NATIONS’ COVENANT. London, November 24. Sir Austen Chamberlain, continuing his speech in the House of Commons, in reply to Mr Ramsay MacDonald's disarmament motion (reported yesterday) gave a number of reasons why the present Government could not recommend the signature of the optional clause of the League of Nations’ Covenant, but said he would be the last man to state that the attitude which they had to take at this moment must necessarily be the attitude of the British Government for all time. It was a very few years since the Covenant was signed, since the League of Nations was created, and since the permanent Court of International Justice was established. The decision which the British Government did, in fact, come to was the decision reached by the Imperial Conference, when they agreed that it would be premature to adhere to the optional clause. Further, they were not to take any action in the matter without prior constitution among themselves. He need: not say how important it was that the whole Empire should act together. NAVAL BELLIGERENT RIGHTS. Embarrassment to all would be created if one member of the Empire were concerned in a dispute on which another member of the Empire had undertaken to arbitrate, continued Sir Austen Chamberlain. While he himself had not done so. it was. he believed, common ground to all parties in this country that even if the Government did sign the optional clause they could only do so with reservations. At present there was a great bodv of law on the subject of naval belligerent rights. We should have to reserve anything which concerned the relations of the Empire. We should have to reserve anything which concerned the dominions and make it perfectly clear that we would not arbitrate on internal matters which were in the sovereign jurisdiction of the State itself. What really could be contributed to the sense of general securiy or the cause of arbitration by giving a signature to the optional clause with reservations. if we were not prepared to make in advance any engagement, which, at the time, might require for fulfilment concurrent k«»t«J» ■ in certain Parliaments in the Empire That did not mean that we weer not ready to use to the fullest measure arbitration for the settlement of disputes. BELIEF IN ARITRATION. Sir Austen Chamberlain pointed out what the country had none in the matter of disarmament and arbitration. He supposed it was true to declare that we had arbitrated more and on more important issues than any other country in the world. Me have shown our belief in arbitration in the past, and as we had nrnctlged it in the past so we would nraetise it in the future. We could not, however, undertake to arbitrate >n all cases, when we felt we would not have power to secure obedience to an adverse award where we ourselves had been in a dispute, as for instance, over Mosul. "Has any Power done more than we in the cause either of security or disarmament? Some have talked more, some have wanted to pass more resolutions and been ready to sign more papers, but who has done more either in the cause of disarmament or the cause of security? Let him first throw a stone at us.” MR MACDONALD’S CHARGES. Mr MacDonald, in submitting his motion, expressed the opinion that the Geneva naval conference was bungled from beginning to end. Britain failed to scout the field before joining the battle. The only chance of an Anglo-American agreement and an American agreement with the rest of the world was for Britain apd America to come together and remove the <’.ance of war. The conference failed because war methods, instead of peace methods, were followed experts being allowed to usurp politicians’ functions. Britain was pledged under every peace treaty to promote peace and disarmament, but no real disarmament conference had yet been held, only discussions how to reduce armaments in order to save money. He was not interested in disarmament as an economic move, but as a means of removing the world's trust in arms. If the Government faced the problem of common security there wuld be no difficulty from the viewpoint of the dominions. As Russia was joining in the exnlo; security could proceed. Sir Austen Chamberlain’s duty was to bring the Empire as a uniteo and powerful force into the councils of Europe and contribute a system of peace. Sir Austen Chamberlain appeared to be setting up the Empire against the League. He was quite mistaken. It was true that under the British Government's prompting, the Governments of Australia and Canada rejected the protocol in 1924, but rhe protocol was only the first draft. Mr Mac Dnald believed the Empire could find a form which was not merely words. BEST THING THEY EVER DID. Tlie Hon. W. C. Bridgeman summed up the dehate on behalf of the Government. He pointed out that the Labour Government was the first to lay down 10.000-ton cruisers authorised bv the Washington Conference. In his opinion it was the best thing they ever did. It was useless to pretend that there was a warlike spirit in Britain. The whole country was in favour of peace. Even the I>eagiie of Nations sometimes looked to the British Naw to control the peace of the world. The Labour motion was defeated by 318 to 105. Mr Duff-Cooper's amendment. "That the House, recognising tint the Government’s efforts have been constantly directed to the maintenance of peace, the reduction of armaments and the advancement of the authority of the League, remains opposed to Britain assuming and extending tlie dangerous obligations embodied in ■ protocol of 1924. arid

approves the Government’s policy.” was carried by 288 to 66. LLOYD GEORGE’S REMARKS. Mr Lloyd George thought Sir Austen Chamberlain had dealt most inadequately with disarmament. So long as there are huge armaments in the world, arbitration and conciliation would be impossible. The first step, therefore, was to reduce armaments. At the present moment 15,000,000 men in Europe could be called up for slaughter with equipment such as the world had never seen for horror and destruction. The League’s disarmament commission had made no progress in the last two years because conscription was outside the scope of the inquiry. Other countries complained that Britain and America, who did most blathering about peace, were increasing naval expenditure. Risks must be. taken for peace as they were taken for war. Mr Lloyd George hoped Sir Austen Chamberlain at Geneva would use his influence for disarmament and arbitration. "without which. I think, in the not distant future, there will be such an upheaval as the world has never seen.” Mr A. Duff-Cooper, moving the amendment referred to above, said : "If the United States wants the biggest navy in the world, let them have it. We should protect our shores and commerce from every menace, but I do not include America as a passible attacker. That is the only way of beating the big navy party in America.’’ Mr Buxton said the pillars of Labour’s policy were disarmament, arbitration and security. Sir Austen Chamberlain professed great friendship for the League, but was always attempting to cheek its activities. He was like a hen continually warning ducklings not t o take to the water.