NEW ZEALAND AND GREAT BRITAIN.

Hawke's Bay Times, Volume 13, Issue 694, 24 June 1869, Page 4

NEW ZEALAND AND GREAT BRITAIN.

fNew Zealand Herald.]' Putting aside the question of whether Imperial troops, accompanied by Im perial control in the direction of war, are worth the Colony's acceptance on any terms short of leaving the matter entirely in the hands and to the cost of the Home Government, it must be admitted by all that the manner in which the Imperial Government has shirked its responsibility, is not credit able to such a country as Great Britain. A large proportion of the despatches lately published re fer to this matter, to the reten tion of the 18th Regiment in NewZealand, and generally to the employment of British troops iu the Colony. First one excuse is urged, then ano ther, why the Imperial Government should decline to accede to the request of the Governor or the Legislature, and finally the Secretary of State makes his stand upon the giound that " the abandonment of all control over native policy by the Home Government was conditional on being totally relieved of any responsibility in respect of the military defence of the settlers." As far as mere argument and right go, Mi Stafford is far too much for the Secretary of State, and incontrovertibly proves the unsoundness of the Imperial argument; for, as it will be remem bered, in 1862 the abandonment of responsibility by the Home Government in native affairs was not sought by the Colony, but literally forced upon it. As Mr Stafford says,—"elaborately prepared addreses to Her Majesty from both Houses were then passed setting forth the objections to such a transfer. In the face, however, of these careful protests, the responsibility was thrust upon the Colony, which had no choice but to take it up. But, iu doing so, both Houses of the Legislature used the following emphatic words: —'The Houses reci gnise the thoroughly efficient aid which her Ma jesty's Imperial Government is now affording for the establishment of law and order, and relying on the cordial cooperation of the Imperial Government for the future, cheerfully accepts responsibility, &c.'" Here, then, was a clearly implied covenant contained in the words which we have italicised. a covenant which the Home Govern ment finds it convenient at the present moment to ignore. So, agaiu, with the action taken by Mr Weld's Minis try in 1864, Mr Stafford shows that even the self-reliant party carefulh guarded itself against totally relieving the Home Government of responsi bility, inasmuch as the request for the withdrawal of the troops —a course already indicated by the Imperial Government —contains the provison that such withdrawal be made "at the ear liest possible period consistent witi the maintenance of Imperial inter ests and the safety of the colony.'* Subsequent events have proved that the troops were withdrawn before such withdrawal was consistent with the safety of the colony; and when this fact forces itself upon Downing-streei in so palpable a form as the Poverty Bay and other massacies, we are met with the taunt that 220,000 Europeans aided by loyal natives, should be "able to defend themselves, if they make proper arrangements, against a few thousand disaffected natives, of whom a few hundred only appear to be at present in arras." Now, such a taui.t as this we never expected from a Minister of the Crown, supposed to be well up in the true knowledge of the case. The misinformed newspaper press of England has frequently made use of this argument for the purpose of throwing the stigma of cowardice on the colonists, or of charging them with remissness in their exertions for self defence, and has been as frequently answered by the local press of New Zealand or by colonists at home. Mi Stafford aptly puts a parallel case when he 3ays, " It is as if, supposing a force of half-a-million armed rebels to occupy the centre of Scotland or Ireland, making murderous raids in all direc tious, the industrious and peaceful inhabitants were,*upon asking for a few regiments in Edinburgh or Dublin, to to be taunted with the statement that the British Islands contain thirty millions of souls, who with good management ought to protect themselves." To those "commissioned" detractors of the Colony, who from first to last have industriously maligned the settlers whoge hospitalities, when here, they

very gladly accepted and who now largely constitute the "various quarters" from which the Secretary of State still receives unofficial statements, we would recommend the perusal of Mr Stafford's remarks to this' unjust taunt. " Those who sneer at the defensive arrangements of the Colony should recollect that when one of Eng land's best generals, at the head of 10,000 British soldiers and 5,000 colonial auxiliaries, besides friendly natives, encountered the same foe whom the Colony has now to face (but at a time when that foe was less experienced) the result was neither brilliant nor conclusive." Let our detrac tors ponder this and refrain from judging lest they should be judged also. But the argument of putting the number of the population of one race against that of the other is so utterly fallacious, and so frequently urged that we may be excused if we refer to it again. Not ouly do we deduct at once from the number of our population the whole of the inhabitants of the middle islaud —not only must we bear m mind that while of the European population of this island, women and children bear a very large proportion, the very reverse is the case with the Maories, and that their women and boys of ten years and upwards are all active combatants —but we must also remember that civilization and wealth, while they give us some advantages, oive us also some care and trouble We have property to protect as well as battles to fight, and we need men for both services. We cannot tnrn ont en masse as can a Maori tribe, taking our women as a commissariat corps, and putting muskets into the hands of all, boys and girls even, strong enough to carry them ; we cannot leave cultivated farms and stocked warehouses, and the household goods which it has taken years of toil to accumulate, as the Maori can leave a r'ew raupo whares and a potato patch, to the cnance of destruction iu our absence. The very nature of our settlements, occupying as they do a mere i'ringe of the country upon the c »ast fine, leaves us open to attack, while it leaves us utterly unable to avail •urselves of the full strength of our aggregate numbers to repel such attack. The Maori, whose force is numerically stronger than any we can bring against ■iim, occupies the interior, menacing us in every direction, and able to choose what portion of our settlements he shall attack in detail. The attack h made, the loss sustained, the attacking party safe back in his mountain f istnesses, long before the Colony or even the North Island as a whole knows that an attack upon the fated district has been made. So, again, with the remark —not for the first lime us j d against us —which now appears? iu the despatch of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, that we ought to be able to defend ourselves agaii.s i few thousand disaffected natives, " of whom a few hundred only appear to be in arms." But why are there only a few hundred at present in arms? Simply because it does not suit the Maori tactics to bring a larger force into the field at one time. It is computed that General Cameron had never as many as 1,500 natives in the field against him at any one time, but dues any one believe that either then or now the rebel army was only a few hundred strong. This is our difficulty and weakness, not our strength. It is the lbstaining from open complicity by the great bulk of the natives who really recruit and feed and munition the few hundreds in the field that paralyzes our action. Bid we see our enemy as such we could put forth our strength to crush him —we could cut at once at the roots of the tree, instead ol merely continuing to lop the branches which grow again as quickly as we cut them. It is clear, however —to re turn to the question at issue, the employment of the Imperial troops —that Gre.->t Britain would not afford us a single soldier were it even to save every woman and child in New Zealand from butchery. She knows and feels that if one half the inhabitants of the Colony were murdered iu the strug gle that may ensue, a few years would see their places taken up by fresh emi grants, who would buy her goods and manufactures, and so long as she can keep her trade she cares for little else. Well I let it be so, but let her states-j men fully understand that we colonists will have uo interference on her part

with the manner in which we manage our affairs. It is no business of either Governor or Secretary of State if we offer so mu-'h for a Maori rebel, dead or alive. The Colonial Government is supreme in such and cognate maN ters, and the most that Great Britain; can look for is that we acknowledge a! nominal dependence as part of the em- 1 pire. The completion of the Great Pacific Railroad, the direct and close communication which will follow between New Zealand and San Francisco the future New York of the Pacific w iH virtually reduce our dependence towards Great" Britain to this slender thread. Our trade will go with outsympathies, and they will avowedly be far from those who, in their feelings and dealings with us, miugle the love of a stepmother with the sharp practice of a petty huckster.