THE WEST COAST

Hawke's Bay Times, Volume 13, Issue 651, 28 January 1869, Page 3

THE WEST COAST

We take the following paragraphs from the Wanganui Chronicle, 21st January: —

The Wae.— -A period of six weeks, although it forms a small point in the back ward perspective of history, occupies a large space in the eager eyes of those whose future fortunes depend materially upon what may be done or left undone during its progress. The enemy has been close to our doors daring all the time we have mentioned, and the colonial troops have done nothing to weaken his strength or drive him from a position in which he is a constant menace to the settlers. No wonder the time seems long, and impatience excusable. The weather has been fine; the men have latterly been numerous enough; but Colonel Whitmore was waited for. The reason seems inadequate, but we are bound to accept it. Colonel Whitmore has now been here a week, and still Iho expectation of an attack upon the enemy, which prevails so generally, is dis appointed. We hear that nothing is likely to be attempted for some time to come. Although not known to the public, there may be reasons for remaining on the defensive, but after the delay which has taken place we are bound to say that these reasons would require to bo of a very good and sufficient character. Kai Iwi CATALEY.—CoIoneI Whitmore does not appear likely to get on with this troop. Its Lieutenant knows nothing of sycophancy in any shape or form : he persists in calling a spade by its proper name, and such plain and honest speech does not seem to suit the Officer commanding. More is the pity.

The Evening Herald, 21st Jan., contains the following :

Since last pay day (about a week ago) desertions from the camp at Westmere have reached to something enormous —150 men having left without permission. The intention in the great majority of cases, however, has not been to do more than spend their money in town and then go back to camp. The desertions are chiefly among the recruits, which does not say much for the course of discipline they gone through since their arrival here. Colonel Whitmore and the Kai Iwi troop have had a slight misunderstanding, without much reason for it. The Kai Iwi men have done the district a service that can never be forgotten, and they have shown a bravery not exceeded by any portion of the colonial forces. We think any attempt to underrate the efficiency of the corps will fail; and that Colonel Whitmore should not treat either officers or men disparagingly. We have no doubt that any differences at present existing may bo easily adjusted.

Colonel Whitmore may find it necessary to keep his designs secret, and prevent the possibility of direct communication with the enemy. vVe should, therefore, keep a tight rein on what is called the Maori cavalry. The majority of tipcrn may be friendly disposed, but wo have no more doubt that a few of them are rank traitors iand Hauhaus than of the fact of TitokoWaru himself being one. If they are allowed to scour about the country without an apparent object in view, the enemy will have full and accurate information of what is transpiring in camp They receive liberal wages, and should readily comply with commands.

We are also indebted to the Evening Herald for the subjoined paragraphs ;

Colonel Whitmoue and the Wanganui Times. —Colonel Whitmore has ar> rived, and the Times has commenced the gnawing process. “For very shame’s sake,” it says, “a more must be made within the next few days.” Before Colonel Whitmore has been six days here, and before he has had time to make preparations, he is badgered and vvorried about an at tack. The Kupapa organ has been re-

peatedly censuring the Government for urging M‘Donnell to attack Te JSTgutu-o-te-manu before ho was ready. Is the crime less in urging Whitmore to do the same thing? Colonel M‘Donnell has obtained a fortnight’s leave of absence to go to Auckland, and if a premature attack and defeat took place, of course it would not be necessary to get the leave extended. Leave of absence on the eve of an attack ! Where are the Kupapas, who consumed several hundred pounds worth of Government rations at M'Grath’s ? The West Coast Campaign.—A few

days at most will bring about once more the conflict between the colonial and rebel forces on this coast, and before this day fortnight many a man, now in the vigor of manhood, will have offered up his life as a sacrifice to his country ; and, let us hope, with results such as we desire. The position of Ngatapa is described as being tne strongest yet seen in New Zealand ; but it is very probable that it was an exaggerated estimate of its very strength, on the part of Te Kooti, that enabled Col. Whitmore to deal an effective blow. Titokowaru — whom we suppose to be the inspiring genius among rebels ; at any rate, his name embodies the wisdom of the council —has exactly followed Napoleon in one of the grand principles of war : he has never been without a line of retreat. We can suppose him reasoning thus:—‘Yictory will take care of itself, but we must minimise the effects of defeat by mating a good retreat.’ If defeated at Nukumaru, he will make in the direction of Perekamo. That position occupied while simultaneous attacks are made from different points, victory might “pit once oa the

helm.” It must be remembered that we . shall be fighting the enemy in a position chosen by himself, and strengthened by every art at his command. Every square yard of bush Is known to him, and can be ' used to his advantage. A Maori never fights well when he is being followed up closely, and most of our heavy losses have been sustained during the retreat ; it na'urally suggest itself, therefore, as the best strategy, to get in behind him, and sweep through the bush in the direction of the

open country. That is the only place where a concentration of our men can be safely made: in any other it is hut the prelude to panic and death. It occurs to us that a radical error has hitherto been made in fighting the West Coast rebels, in making the fortified pa the principal, or sole object of possession. We are thus drawn into a converging fire from the enemy, who has previously selected the positions which command the tracks our men are compelled to take. The pa, moreover, is intended more as a trap than a place of defence. Much experience, even by a non-military man, can be de rived from past engagements ; and it has been the invariable practice of the enemy to leave the pa directly we showed in front of it. The pa, then, cannot be an object of much account, either to the enemy or ourselves. Every plan must fail if it is laid upon the hypothesis that the enemy is to be met and fought at any given point. The war with To Eooti, and what appears to have been the final coup, may be instanced to the contrary; but a greater mistake it would be impossible to make, then to confound the tactics of Te Kooti with those of Titokowaru. The latter forces us to fight in his own style, from tree to tree ; and the worst of it is, very little science can be brought to bear upon him. If the bush is too dense and inaccessible for any but Maoris, we should try a tentative process, by “feeling” him —cutting tracks and roads, and worming upon him gradually. Ibis may appear, at first sight, dilatory, but it really is a very quick way of reaching him, wherever he is situated ; and, besides, would com pel him to attack on ground familiar to our men. Tine old qualities peculiar to John Bull, the most distinguished of which is tenacity, would never bo thrown away against the natives. To seldom know, and never admit, defeat, and to follow them up, without giving time for reflection, or to recruit their strength and courage, is, after all, before elaborate conceptions, where these are not inspired by an indomitable energy.