NEW ZEALAND.

Hawke's Bay Times, Volume 7, Issue 375, 10 May 1866, Page 3

NEW ZEALAND.

(From the Times, 23rd February.) The papers promised by the Eoyal Speech “ on the present state of New Zealand” have already been laid before Parliament, and Parliament, we venture to say, has seldom been favored with information more complete or more decisive. We shall be excused, we hope, if we premise that the remarks we have offered from time to time on this subject will be found absolutely verified by the documents now published; but the whole narrative, as here detailed by the very actors themselves, is so edifying, that we place it before the country, once for all, on the authority of the two Governments actually concerned.

Some time ago the Government of New Zealand conceived “ a policy.” It was a new policy, adopted by a new Ministry, and communicated to the Home Government as the opening of a new era in the history of the Colony. It consisted briefly in a claim to self-government, on condition of selfdefence. Creditable as this resolution was to the colonial authorities, it had not been conceived simply in the serenity of unclouded and disinterested wisdom. The Government and people of the Colony had discovered that if they depended on an Imperial army for protection, they must expect this army to be employed according to Imperial instructions, in opposition, perhaps, to their own views ; and they had learnt also this further lecson—that they must contribute to the maintenance of the force itself. Quickened by the convictions thus communicated, they resolved upon a policy of independence, and no sooner was it entertained than the most irresistible reasons -

were found for its justification. “ Ministers,” as as tlieso authorities state in a memorandum of their own, “ are of opinion that the Province of Auckland, for instance, having a population of about 37,000 European inhabitants, besides a very large proportion of friendly natives, ought to be in a position to ward off any attack from the comparatively small and badly aimed force which might be brought against it. They are aware that disasters to settlers in exposed positions may at times occur, but such, disasters have not been prevented by Imperial armies, nor could they were those forces doubled. ’ la pursuance, therefore, of theea most sensible views,, the Colo* nial Ministry proposed to establish an armed constabulary force capable of occupying defensive outposts, and to support this force, when requisite, by volunteer corps and friendly natives. They submitted that “ a force of the nature proposed has teen proved to be more effective for the special purposes required in New Zealand than large armies organised with a view to European warfare. Such a force, at least, may, it is hoped, be within reach of the colony. The possession of it would entail no liability to interfere in the management of our internal affairs, while, on the other hand, New Zealand has neither the means nor the desire to retain an Imperial army ” Nothing could be plainer than the wisdom of these opinions, which, it is superfluous to add, found a ready echo in the opinions of Ministers at home. Accordingly our Colonial Secretary sent instructions to New Zealand for the withdrawal of five out of the ton regiments stationed in the colony, and for such arrangements as would facilitate at no distant period the recall of the rest. At this point, however, occurred one of the most notable hitches in the execution of the design. It was only an unavoidable incident of our colonial system that the requisite orders had to be sent out with a qualification. If wo undertake to govern s country 20,000 miles off by directions from home, we must make allowance for possible events between the despatch and receipt of instructions. It was conceivable that when these orders reached Now Zealand, the reduction of the army might, by the occurrences of the intervening sis months, have been rendered impracticable, and Sir Duncan Cameron, therefore, the Commander-ia-Chief of the Imperial forces, received, along with the instructions to send the five battalions home, a discretionary power to detain them. Now, it happened at this critical conjuncture, when 5000 British troops might either be embarked for England or employed on services of the Colony, the New Zealand Government had obtained considerable successes against the savages in insurrection; but these successes had been confined to a particular district. South of that district the natives were still in arms, and, indeed, threatening from a peculiar strong “ pah,” or fortress, an important portion of the settlement. Sir George Grey, therefore, the Governor of the Colony, proposed to General Cameron that he should delay the departure of the troops, and employ them in decisive and final operations against this pah and the rebels in its vicinity. General Cameron refused, basing his refusal on grounds which have been partly proved insufficient, but which were partly by no means unreasonable. Ho doubted whether the operations proposed would be so easy or so successful as the Governor imagined, and even, thought that more harm than good might ensue from a campaign in which the natives, if worsted, would make us pay dearly for victory. Though allowances must be made for changes of season and circumstances, it seems almost certain that in these views the General’s circumspection was excessive, inasmuch as the very pa in question was afterwards taken with no great difficulty. On the other hand, as it was taken by the Colonial Forces, it is clear that Sir George Grey need not have made requisition for the retention of the troops, but the motives fay which the Gen. rai was otherwise actuated were both strong and rational. It was his duty to carry out the policy of the Imperial Government, and this policy ha knew to consist in repressing needless expeditions; in discountenancing aggressive warfare, in opposing any rash extension of the settlement, especially in the direction indicated, and generally in abstaining from any operations which might commit the Colony to further hostilities, ana so retard the departure of the Imperial army. In these views he appears to have met with tue approbation of his superiors, but the results on the spot were singularly and almost ludicorously mischievous. Sir Ueorge Grey could put such a stress on the Commancier-iu-Uhief as would compel him to retain the troops; but the Commander-in-Clnet could keep the troops so inactive taut for ail the good they did, they miga

as well be on the high seas. The upshot was a quarrel betwen these two authorities, degenerating into bitter and even violent, corrrespondence, which both parties by this time must sufficiently regret.

. I* * 8 plain from the paper before us that more is to be said for the “ forced inaction ” ascribed by Sir George Grey to the British army, under General Cameron’s command than was at one time imagined; or, perhaps, we] should rather put the case this way —that General Cameron Lad, for what he did, or- left undone, more authority than was supposed. The great and very laudable object of the Home Government was to withdraw the army from New Zealand altogether, and to leave the colony to its own military resources. But this could obviously be done only at a period of peace; and, therefore, the Commander-m-Chief was instructed to discourage all operations which might have the effect of extending or protracting the war. Sir George Grey and his Ministers thought the time was come for a decisive advance and a final blow but it was excusable in the Commander-in-Chief to be incredulous about any finality in New Zealand wars. He saw that one insurgent tribe was conquered, at any rate for a time; and that another, which Sir George Grey wished to attack, was inactive at the moment, and might continue so unless assailed. As to the prospects of the assault, he regarded them as very uncertain, and was, therefore, loth to engage the troops in any new expedition which might retard or destroy the consummation desired by his superiors. That he was guided in these views by the experience of- previous failures, for which he or his system was responsible, is no doubt true. Had the organisation and traditions of a regular army been more favorable to success in bush fighting, the General need not have been so distrustful of another campaign in the bush ; but as things really stood, and as they had gone for some time, it is itnposiblo to deny that he had some reason iu shrinking from an expedition which might be the commencement of a new war. Meanwhile, however, the military and political deadlock had, at least, this happy effect—that it brought about insensibly the conclusions most desired. While Mr Cardwell was representing it as “ painfully evident that two campaigns have been more than enough of a contest in which 10,000 of the Queen’s troops aided by a colonial force sometimes nearly equal in number, have been engaged in war against a body of natives never exceeding 2000 in number at one time,” and while Sir George Grey was recording with “ all the feelings of respect for the British army” in the Colony, that “ its forced inaction rendered it a source of weakness,” and “rather retarded than promoted that peace’’ which it was wished to establish, — while all this was going on the Colony was organising its Volunteers, and the Volunteers were taking pa after pa, and making short work of the war. In brief, the “ present,state of New Zealand,” after all these troubles, is by no means satisfactory, and we hope that the plain moral of so interesting a story will be boldly and extensively applied.