NEW ZEALAND AFFAIRS.

Hawke's Bay Times, Volume 6, Issue 333, 18 December 1865, Page 1

NEW ZEALAND AFFAIRS.

(From tlie Times, 19tii Sept.) ANewZealander must certainly be themost remarkable creature in existence. He combines every characteristic of the savage with the faculties of civilised man. We call him a savage, and, as far as nudity, fierceness, and scarcely abandoned cannibalism can make him so, he is one. But no being of human race is more intelligent. He can live on the mountains, or in the bush like a wolf, but he meets his pursuers with all the resources of military art. He manufactures excellent rifles out of old ship muskets, and makes percussion caps out of soldiers’ buttons. He has never studied at a professional academy, hut he is a greater master of the science of fortification than the average British engineer. If there was one thing that might have been expected of modern artillery, it was that it would render a Maori pa untenable, but the Maori sappers and miners counterplotted in a moment, and added a work or two to their redoubts which completely defeated our Armstrong guns. Our soldiers actually respect them for their extraordinary talents and eminent valour. With all this, too, they are singularly given to rhetoric and debate. They would as soon talk as fight—sometimes even rather—and they display incredible proficiency in negotiations and conferences. We must add to this sketch of the New Zealander that, though his real conceptions of religion would probably be satisfied by the African Fetish, he has contrived to make a conquest of Christian bishops and missionaries, insomuch that these good people support him with devout fidelity, even against their own fellow-countrymen and friends. That we should find some difficulty in dealing with this creature is natural, but the«trouble is even greater than it ought to le.

This is the sixth year of the present New Zealand war —whether the war itself is the sixth or sixteenth of its series we shall not stop to calculate. We must only beg the reader to bear in mind that in our colony of New Zealand the European settlers actually outnumber the natives, and should therefore be presumedly competent to protect their own interests without any aid from abroad. As it is, however, we maintain a strong army of Imperial troops in the colony, supported by a naval force on the coast. Nor is it every Maori who at a given moment is our enemy. Some of the natives are usually friendly for the occasion, and are exceedingly willing to tomahawk other natives. Yet, with all these conditions in our favor, we cannot bring the war to an end. nor keep the Maoris in order. The roceut information that peace had been promised by the surrender of a native chief to a British commander as now diluted into intelligence far Jess decisive. William Thompson, the chief in question, did, indeed, give himself up; hut only, as we ure told, on the conviction that he could make a good thing out of the capitulation. He regards it, not as an act of submission, but “ rather as a step whereby his original right to much of the confiscated land, and perfect freedom and immunity for the past, may be secured.” Moreover, he relies in confidence upon his gifts of speech, and is persuaded that when it comes to debate the result will he ail in his favor. Besides this, he gains by time, while we lose ; his crops are coming on, and perhaps some of the troops may he soon withdrawn, so that his prospects are tolerably satisfactory, while ours, as he knows perfectly well, are not at all gratifying. The “ peace,” therefore, becomes, in the description of our correspondent, “ a tacit cessation of a struggle in which the natives find themselves hopelessly engaged, and which the Imperial troops are too weary, the Colonial Government too poor, and the colonists too disgusted any longer to continue.”

We will now by way of more impresive illustration relate a certain anecdote or episode of ibis war, showing bow it is conducted by the several parties concerned. At the beginning of the campaign, the commander of the forces. General Cameron, found his pith crossed hy one of those fortifications which we should spend live years and a million of money upon, but which the Maoris tirow up in week. It was “ a tolerably strong pa,” and was held by what, for a

Maori garrison, was an unusally large force From 4UO to 600 savages were supposed to' be in it. General Cameron, though disposing, we imagine, of at least five times that number of men, declined to attack it, and marched by it three miles in its rear. For this he had probably good reasons, but the garrison attributed the movement to certain incantations of their own. By the aid of a dead officers’ skull, and other magical apparatus, they bad cast a spell over the British army, and believed themselves to be witnessing the effect in the apparent retreat of their enemies. So pleased were they with the success of these rites that they made a song about it, ami sang their “ Malbrook” whenever there was an opportunity, to the great annoyance of our allies. However, the pa was really safe for the time, and the garrison had been gradually reduced to about 100 men, when the Colonial Yoluntecrs determind that if the Queen’s troops would not take the place, they would take it themselves. On this expedition they started about the middle of last June, being supported by a contingent of “ friendly ” natives, who could be relied upon for the work. The orders which they received from the Government agent on the spot directed them to advance within a certain distance of the pa, and then halt; bnt the volunteers, having set their minds on the thing, and being confident of success, marched straight on. The advance was justified, for when they arrived within a mile or two of the pa, an envoy came out with an offer of capitulation. The garrison said they would surrender to settlors and natives, hut not to soldires. So the whole affair was agreed upon, and the volunteers bivouacked on the spot, preparatory to the evacuation of the place in the morning. When day broke, up rode the Government agent with his staff of regular troops. At the sight of the red-coats, the Maoris retracted their words, and said they would not surrender at all. Upon this the “ friendlies ” stripped off their clothes, gave a frightful whoop, and fell to the war-dance “ with a spirit and fury ” which an eye-witness declared he had rarely seen equalled. Of course this quadrille was preliminary to the assault, and the sets would have filed off presently into forlorn-hope and storming party, when the Government agent, instead of profiting by the military ecstacy of our worthy allies, forbade the attack, and gave orders for the whole force to retire. We cannot pretend to fathom the motives of this policy, but if events ever carry a lesson this story of the Wereroa Pa ought surely to teach us that the colonists can do more for themselves than we can do for them. They would certainly have taken that fort, and we cannot but think that if they had their own way they would succeed in other matters too. It is hard that we should continue to be taxed both in men and money for a system which seems to do no good to anybody.

(Prom the Saturday Review.)

The New Zealand war is perhaps appi’oaching a close ; and as the ultimate result may be certainly foreseen, the historical importance of the contest will principally consist in the modified relations of the colony to the Imperial Government. The submission of the native insurgents has been frequently reported, although successive announcements have merely been founded on the surrender of some local tribe, or of one or two wellknown chiefs. It is now asserted that the so-called Maori King, under the influence of William Thompson, who appears to be a New Zealand King-maker, has renounced bis resistance to English authority. If the act of submission has been correctly recorded, Sir George Grey and his Ministers will scarcely have been weak enough to sanction such an unsatisfactory compromise. Wrn. Thompson offered, with much diplomatic ingenuity that the King should accept the laws of the Queen, or, in other words, that he should retain the royal title under the authority of the Crown, on condition of paying feudal homage to his superior. If, in the autumn of last year, the Southern Commissioners in Hampton Hoads had proposed that the Confederate President should accept the laws of the United States, Mr Lincoln would not have failed to object that a Confederate Presidency was essentially

incompatible with the existence of the Union. There is no room for two kings or queens in New Zealand, and the native pretender has not even the color of hereditary right for his inadmissible pretensions. The election of a Maori King was essentially an act of rebellion, and an English recognition of the claim would be an acknowledgment of defeat. It is possible that some theorist may wish to try the experiment of a subordinate native government, as the Emperor of the French is supposed to have thought of employing Abd-el-Kader as a dependent ruler of the Ah gerian Mahomedans; but even if the colonists were inclined to tolerate a distinct Maori administration, it would be incumbent on the local or Imperial Government to select an agent of their own, who would assuredly not bear the royal title. In modern India, as in modern India, as in the Eoman Empire, Kings and Maharajahs are accustomed either to exercise a qualified sovreiguty, or to enjoy a merely nominal rank ; but the natives of New Zealand are little acquainted with the history of heterogeneous empires formed by conquest, and they mean, when they give the kingly title to one of their leaders to disclaim as far as circumstances allow, the supremacy of England. Above all, they desire to define the boundaries of a kingdom, so that within its limits no white intruder may be allowed to occupy laud. When insurgent chiefs propose conditional overtures, it may fairly be assumed that they are beginning to be tried of the struggle. The Maoris are sufficiently intelligent to compare their own declining numbers with the increasing strength of the English settlers, who incessantly draw fresh supplies from the unknown and inexhaustible reservoir of population on the other side of the world. No uncivilised nation has sustained so equal a struggle against European weapons and discipline, but it must be evident to the more sagacious leaders that their final triumph is impossible. This year or next must -witness the termination of the barren and wearisome contest. In the meantime the Colonial Government has quarrelled with the General, and for once Sir George Grey appears to concur wdth his Ministers in complaining of the conduct of the war by the Commander-in-Chief. It would be rash to condemn General Cameron, who has proved himself a brave and capable officer, on the authority of colonial malconcontents or even of rival authorities. It is more probable that the General’s alleged slackness is caused by a divergence of policy than that it proceeds from excessive military caution. In pursuance of the generally expressed desire of the House of Commons, Mr Cardwell some time since instructed the Governor to direct the operations of the war without reference to the opinions of his colonial advisers. Similar orders were probably sent to the Commander-in-Chief, who is exclusively responsible to the War Office and the Horse Guards, and although the supreme military command belongs in theory to the Governor, even when he is a civilian, the general in command is practically responsible for the safety and efficiency of his troops. General Cameron probably considers that the colonial objects of the war are unjust or impolitic, and perhaps he understands better than his critics and opponents the difficulty of a territorial conquest It is the duty of the Home Government to settle and suppress the disputes of conflicting functionaries, and to define the the purpose and limit of the war, so far as it is conducted by the Imperial army. The offensive and defensive alliance of a metropolis with its colony involves unavoidable anomalies, which acquire practical importance as a distant province becomes gradually less and less dependent. The Crown is bound to protect its subjects, and it finds that its liability extends not only to the defence of colonists against aggression, but to the prosecution of their more or less legitimate claims. It is difficult to prevent those who are primarily interested, and who are also on the spot, from controlling the employment of the auxiliary force which they find within their reach. When the Imperial Government occasionally attempts to exoercise an independent discretion, the colony can always attribute to the ignorance or perversity of the home authorities, the miscarriages which are nearly certain to follow from a divided com-

mand. A man who borrows a knife and cuts his finger not unnaturally complains when the owner has attempted to guide the blade or to retain a hold on the handle.

The New Zealand Ministers, either on deliberate conviction or under the influence of irritated feeling, have formally proposed that the Imperial troops shall be withdrawn, and that the entire conduct and burden of the war shall be undertaken by the colonists. The offer will he accepted, if, having been seriously made, it is sanctioned and repeated by the Colonial Parliament. The English Grovernment will not press its aid upon an unwilling community, although the rejection of Imperial support is both ungracious in itself, and pregnant with further political consequences. The Maoris .are almost exclusively interested in the maintenance of a relation which to a certain extent implies a protectorate. The English settlers may, perhaps, often be justly and generously disposed to the native population, but the inevitable conduct of interests, and especially the competition for land, will redound to the constant disadvantage of the weaker party. Mr Roebuck’s antipathy to black people and to brown people is only the conscious and articulate expression of a tendency which prevails whenever the English language comes into juxtaposition with barbarous dialects. As long as the Imperial Government maintains an army in New Zealand, it is to a certain degree responsible for the policy which is pursued towards the natives; but the colony, by dispensing -with protection, may effectively exclude interference. There is ho danger, in New Zealand, of the highly unsatisfactory complications ■which threaten at this moment to involve the South African colonies in an alien quarrel. The Dutch settlers who have been allowed to form an independent republic have engaged in a war with Kaffirs and some of their neighbors; and some neighboring colonists urge the Government to assist the Boers, who originally seceded for the express purpose of conducting their frontier disputes without external control. Once left without an English garrison, New Zealand will be separated by a thousand miles of sea from the nearest military station; and, except under extraordinary circumstances, it would be useless to expect reinforcements from Australia.

The form of the proposal for the withdrawal of the troops is even more than significant than its substance. Following the example of some other colonial Governments, the New Zealand Cabinet has assumed a character which is at present wholly unconstitutional. The Governor is the only official link between the Crown and the colony, and no formal communication can be transmitted in either direction through any other channel. The Acts of the local Legislature are subject to the approval or disallowance of the Crown, but the Ministers, who are theoretically the nominees and agents of the Governor, are unknown to the Colonial Office. The measures of the local Government, though they may be reallly framed by Mr Weld and his collegues, can only be noticed at home when they have been adopted and proposed by Sir George G re} - . The application of responsible Government to dependencies, of which Mr Mill lately boastful as his own discovery, is still an experiment as far as its results are concerned, though there were preponderating reasons for making the trial. The continuance of the old method of administration was inexpedient or impracticable ; but it is uncertain whether the centrifugal force which would have snapped an unyielding chain will ultimately be checked by a more elastic bond of connection. It is better that the colonies should fly off into independent States than that they should be forcibly retained within the circumference of the Empire ; but the authors of responsible Government undertook to provide a planetary system of harmoniously revolving satellites, and it is still uncertain whether they will be able to keep their promise. Cabinets, as substantive bodies, are unknown to the English Constitution, and much more to our colonial copies. When they affect an independent existence, they contravene the theory that a Governme t represents the dignity iiml prerogative of the Crown ; and it is not surprising that their uasurpaliuu of authority

gljou'k! be generally connected with a tendency to discontent, if not to disloyalty. The Ministers of one of the Australian colonies lately attempted to organise a treasonable league with the neighboring provinces on the pretest of the comparatively trifling grievance of transportation to Western Australia. Mr Weld's proposal is less disrespectful, and in itself it appears not unreasonable; but the Cabinet of New Zealand has no more legal right than a club of Odd Fellows to negotiate with the Crown of England.

If, however, the Ministers who represent colonial majorities continue to encroach on on the rights of the Governors, their claims will probably be conceded for the same reasons which recommended the adoption of the responsible system. The forms which corespoud to a preconceived theory must give way to the actual working of institutions. When colonial Governors were required to select their advisers from the members of the local assemblies, the Crown virtually abdicated the power of regulating the internal affairs of outlying dependencies. It is better that the colonies should use their freedom as they think fit, although it may be a question how long it will be worth while to retain an honorary primacy. Secession, and the steps which, seeming to approach secession, may indefinitely postpone it, will not be denounced by any prudent English statesman as political crimes,